MUHAMMAD AKRAM Versus SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB IRRIGATION AND POWER DEPARTMENT

The order dated 13‑1‑1986 recorded by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No.l, Lahore has been challenged, whereby the grievance petition was returned to the appellant on account of lack of territorial jurisdiction.

2. The impugned order not being a decision and not having been passed under section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 is not appealable. This Court no doubt has suo motu revisional powers but as the impugned order does not suffer from any legal infirmity, there is no occasion to exercise the said revisional powers treating the appeal as a revision.

3. The appellant was convicted and sentenced under some provision of Martial Law by a Martial Law Court. The Secretary to the Government, respondent No.l, asked respondent No.3 to take action and report back to him. Respondent No.3 proceeded against the appellant and terminated his services. The appellant instead of moving Punjab Labour Court No.4, Faisalabad, which has according to the notification of the Governor, jurisdiction, lodged grievance petition in Punjab Labour Court No.l, Lahore. It has been argued that as the disciplinary proceedings were started by respondent No.3 under the direction of respondent No.l whose office is at Lahore within the territorial jurisdiction of Court No.l, the impugned order is not legal. In the very outset it may be said that C.P.C. is not applicable and only guidance can be taken from its principles. This is a provision of C.P.C. that where the defendant resides or carries on business suit can be brought in the Court within the jurisdiction of which that place is situated. If there had been absolutely no provision in the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 about the forum where an aggrieved person can lodge petition, of course, all the provisions of C.P.C. on the point could have been considered. Notification issued by the Governor is to be read in the light of the main provision under which it has been issued. Section 35(1) authorises the Provincial Government to specify the industries and the classes of cases that are to be entertained and decided by the Labour Courts where they are more than one. Accrual of cause of action gives a right to litigate; therefore, this factor plays an important role in the field of litigation. Since a right has been given to the defendant that he will be sued where he resides or carries on business, on account of the demand of equity and good conscience facility has been given in civil law to the plaintiff to sue the defendant where cause of action accrued to him. There appears to be no reason why the demand of equity and good conscience should be ignored in labour cases. Therefore while on one hand employer has been given facility of being sued where the establishment is situated, case law has developed on the basis of equity and good conscience to apply in Labour cases, the rules contained in C.P.C. for bringing action against the employer where cause of action in part or in whole arises. So at place where a part of cause of grievance has accrued to a worker, he can, if so tikes, bring action against the employer there. But an employer cannot claim that he be sued where he resides or carries on business as there is no such provision. No doubt the Secretary to the Government has been impleaded as a party but this does not mean that where he holds office, a grievance petition can be lodged there. Of course, if a part of cause of grievance had arisen to the appellant within the territorial jurisdiction of Labour Court No.l, grievance petition could have been brought there. But no cause of grievance accrued here. Even this is doubtful if respondent No.l is a necessary or even a proper party. He did not pass any order prejudicial to the appellant. He merely asked respondent No.3 to take action. He did not mean that the appellant should be definitely dismissed. It meant that if legally any action could be taken against the appellant, it may be taken. Such a direction can never be prejudicial. Respondent No.3 awarded punishment and not respondent No.l. So cause of grievance arose to the appellant by the order of respondent No.3 and not by the order of respondent No.l. Learned counsel has cited 1984 P L C 446 and has argued that this Court held that grievance notice can be given to any authority if it falls within the definition of `employer'. This is so, but I also said that such an employer must have control over the worker. The authority to whom appeal against an order of dismissal from service lies, can be said to have control over the condemned person, so grievance notice given to such an authority is legal. Again I did not hold in any ruling that the grievance notice can be given only to the appellate authority. If in some case grievance notice has been served upon the appellate authority, it would not be improper. Even if it be said that respondent No.l is an employer, yet grievance petition can be brought where the main employer against, whom grievance arises, holds office and not where an authority who comes within the definition of employer but he had not passed the order of punishment. In the present case punishment was awarded by respondent No.3 who holds office at Sargodha and the establishment wherein the appellant was employed too is situated there, so the learned Labour Court No.l has no territorial jurisdiction. In none of the rulings cited by the learned counsel it has been held that the grievance petition can be brought where the employer holds office. Out of the rulings cited by the learned counsel only 1983 P L C 1220 needs discussion but this too is not helpful. The employee was transferred. Before he could join new place of posting, the Head Office terminated his services. It was held that the Court within whose jurisdiction the Head Office was situated had concurrent jurisdiction with the Court where the establishment was situated. This ruling rather supports my view that where the cause of grievance has accrued, there the grievance petition can be brought. The learned lower Court thus rightly held that it has no territorial jurisdiction.

4. As a result, I decline to exercise suo motu powers of revision.

A.E. /94/Lb.P Orders accordingly.