CHANDIO MUNIR AHMAD Versus MESSRS INVESTMENT CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN

DECISION

This is an appeal filed by the appellant against an impugned order, dated 23‑11‑1986, passed by the Sind Labour Court No.1, Karachi, who had dismissed the petition of the appellant under section 25‑A, I.R.O., 1969.

2. Brief facts of the case are that the appellant was appointed as Steno‑typist and since 8‑6‑1966, he had continuously worked with the respondent Corporation. According to him, his post be converted as an Assistant and thereafter he was only for name sake designated as Law Officer, but, he continued to perform duties of clerical nature. Further, the claim of the appellant was that the General Secretary of the I.C.P. Employees Union (Front), therefore, the relations with the appellant and the management Corporation were not cordial and cooperative. So, the appellant claims that there was an anomally in the calculation of gratuity calculated by the respondent Corporation, thus, he served a notice upon the Corporation and requested it to pay Rs.40,500 as gratuity on the basis of his last pay drawn i.e. Rs.2,250, but, the respondent Corporation had only paid Rs.11,894. Hence, being aggrieved, the appellant approached the Labour Court under section 25‑A, I. R. O., 1969.

3. The respondent Corporation resisted the petition mainly on the ground that the appellant has no right guaranteed and secure any Law, award or settlement to sock the remedy as he was not a workman, therefore, his petition was not tenable in Law. The respondent Corporation submitted that at the time of termination of the services of the appellant due to his resignation was not a workman as defined in Law, but due to his promotion was an Officer's grade he had also accepted all the terms and conditions of service applicable to the management clarified employees. The further claim of the respondent Corporation was that at the time of termination of employment due to his resignation, the appellant had received all claim and dues in full and final settlement to his claim therefore, he cannot maintain the petition which was liable to be dismissed.

4. Both the parties filed their respective affidavits‑in‑evidence and they were duly cross‑examined. Thereafter the learned Labour Court had passed the impugned order, hence, the present appeal.

5. I have heard Mr. M. L. Shahani, the learned Advocate for the appellant and Mr. Samiullah Khan, the learned Counsel on behalf of the respondent and have perused the record and proceedings of the case. It is an admitted position on record that the appellant was initially appointed as Stenographer but subsequently, only his designation were being changed and not the exact nature of duties. The appellant in his evidence had specifically detailed his nature of duties even being for name sake as Law Officer, Grade III and he was never assigned any managerial position or was enjoying the hire and fire powers or there was any subordinate to him or he was either, to appoint any one. Merely designating the appellant as Law Officer, Grade III Officer does not mean that the appellant had been ousted from the designation of a workman. There is a consistent view of this Tribunal as well as number of authorities of the superior Courts that merely a designation does not bar a person from claiming him a workman. In Banks and Financial Institutions' cases, it was held that Grade III Officer was a 'workman' in view of the nature of his duties. The appellant had also denied to have received any benefit which was being given to an Officer in the respondent Corporation, there is an un‑rebutted evidence on record about the nature of duties being performed by the appellant. Mr. Samiullah Khan, the learned Advocate for the Respondent Corporation has no case in rebuttal the pleadings of Mr. M. L. Shahani, the learned Counsel for the appellant. Therefore, in view of the facts, evidence and circumstances of the case and the legal aspect, I would hold that the appellant was a workman within the meaning of the Labour Laws though designated merely as Law Officer, Grade 111, therefore, he was not only entitled to maintain his grievance petition under section 25‑A, I.R.O. 1969 before the Labour Court, but he was also entitled to get all dues and benefits which were applicable to a workman. The impugned order of the learned Labour Court is misconceived, hence set aside.

6.For the reasons stated by me above, I set aside the impugned order and would allow the appeal. The appellant is held to be a 'workman' and thus entitled to get his gratuity to the tune of Rs. 40,500 and not Rs.11,894. Therefore, the respondent Corporation is directed to make payment of the difference of gratuity i.e. Rs. 28,705.69 to the appellant forthwith.

S.Q.11030/Lb.S

Appeal allowed.