A.E.G. EMPLOYEES UNION Versus MESSRS A.E.G. BELFUNKEN (PAKISTAN) LTD.
DECISION
These are two appeals filed by A. E. G. Employees Union Karachi, one bearing No.KAR‑41/86 requesting therein to the respondent management to grant substitute holidays in respect of the holidays falling on Saturday and alternatively to grant over time wages if substitute holiday; while the other is bearing No. KAR‑75/86, seeking an interpretation of section 35 of the Factories Act 1934 and to see that the factory workers were entitled to weekly off with wages of without wages. As in both these appeals one and similar legal point is involved that whether the C.B.A. union is empowered to espouse the cause of individual workers under section 25‑A I.R.O. 1969, or not and whether before doing so service of grievance notice upon the employer by every individual aggrieved worker is essential or not, I would, therefore, dispose of both these appeals by this single decision.
2. Both the parties did not contest the cases on merits but they had restricted themselves only on the legal point. Therefore, the learned Labour Court has passed two separate impugned orders, dated 7‑1‑1986 and 30‑1‑1986 respectively, hence, these two appeals.
3. I have heard Mr. M. M. Jeelani, the learned Advocate for the appellant unions and Mrs. Ismat Mehdi, the learned counsel on behalf of the respondent management, and have carefully examined the record and proceedings of the case. It is an admitted fact that the appellant union to the collective bargaining agent of the respondent establishment and that the establishment is covered by the provisions of Standing Order Ordinance, 1968. It is on record that the workers were aggrieved on account of infringement of their legal rights, therefore, they approached the appellant union to take up their grievance, either with the management or with the concerned Court of Law, as it being a Collective Bargaining Agent. Therefore, a notice was served on the management by the appellant union but it did not redress the said grievance therefore, the union filed two separate applications under section 25‑A, I.R.O. 1969, as explained above.
4. Mrs. Ismat Mehdi, the learned Advocate for the respondent management had contended that the appellant union cannot file an application under section 25‑A, I.R.O. 1969 in its own name and, therefore, the present applications under section 25‑A, I.R.O. 1969 were not competent and liable to be dismissed. It was further argued by the learned counsel for the respondent management that as no mandatory grievance notice by aggrieved worker as required by law, was not given, therefore, the application by the C. B. A. union was not maintainable and liable to be dismissed. I see no force in these contentions of Mrs. Ismat Mehdi, the learned Advocate for the appellant union. It is a settled law that a grievance notice can be given by the workmen, himself, or through his shop Steward or through the. C.B.A. and then espoused their cause before the learned Labour Court through an application under section 25‑A, I.R.O. 1969. It has been consistently held by the Tribunal and the superior Courts that C. B. A. can espouse the cause of the workers or workmen through an application under section 25‑A, I.R.O. 1969, and not under an application under section 34, I.R.O. 1969. Therefore, the impugned A orders are misconceived, hence set aside. In view of these legal positions, I would set both the impugned orders passed by the learned Labour Court.
5. For the reasons stated by me above, I would set aside both the impugned orders and would allow both appeals of the appellant union. The cases are hereby remanded back to the concerned Labour Court for deciding each on its merits within two months from the date of this decision.
S.Q./1034/Lb.S ??????????
Appeals allowed.