IRSHAD AHMAD Versus MESSRS GENERAL TYRE & RUBBER C0. OF PAKISTAN LTD., KARACHI
DECISION
These are in all 17 appeals (seventeen) out of these nine have been filed by the management of Karachi Transport Corporation against an impugned order 29‑10‑1986, passed by the Sind Labour Court No. 1, while the other eight appeals have been filed against an impugned order, dated 24‑1‑1987, passed by the Sind Labour Court No. V, Karachi. As, in all these appeals, only one legal issue is involved therefore, both sets of impugned orders are similar and common. So, I would also decide all these seventeen appeals by this single decision.
2. Brief facts of the case are that the services of these 17 workers were dismissed by the Management of the Corporation on different charges of misconducts. Being aggrieved the workers submitted grievance petitions under section 25‑A, Industrial Relations, Ordinance, 1969, before the learned Labour Courts.
3. The Karachi Transport Corporation resisted all these petitions by raising a legal objection that the employment of the Karachi Transport Corporation has been declared Essential Service under the Sind Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1958 since 9th July, 1986, therefore, the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the applications under section 25‑A, Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The learned Labour Court No. I, vide its impugned order dated 29‑10‑1986 has overruled this legal objection, while the learned Labour Court has dismissed the grievance petitions of the workmen holding that as a point of Law of considerable importance is sub judice in an appeal before this Tribunal, therefore, the Labour Court had no jurisdiction. Hence, these appeals.
4. I have heard Mr. Talmiz S.Burney, the learned Advocate for the Corporation and Mr. Muhammad Ashraf Khan, the learned Advocate on hehalf of the workmen and have also carefully examined the legal position of the case. It was contended by Mr.Talmiz Burney, the learned Advocate for the Corporation that the Karachi Transport Corporation was declared as Essential Services, vide Notification No. SO (T‑1) 5‑37/85, dated 9th of July, 1986, therefore, the jurisdiction of the learned Labour Court to entertain grievance petitions of the workmen or their reinstatement against their dismissal from service on charge of misconduct was ousted. In support of his arguments, he has relied upon mainly sections 3,7 and 8 of the Sind Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1958. In my opinion the contention of Mr. Talmiz Burney, is misconceived. He has also referred to me to authorities, reported in P L D 1982 S C at page 113 and 1984 P L C (C.S.) 1114. I would respectfully hold that these authorities are distinguishable.
5. On the other hand Mr. Muhammad Ashraf Khan, the learned Advocate on behalf of the workmen has submitted that there is a difference between the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952, and the Sind Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1958 and that the Laws, like Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969, Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 and Road Transport Workers Ordinance, 1961 were not barred under the Sind Essential Services (Maintenance) Act 1958, which is a provincial Statute. The question is not of conferring jurisdiction upon the Labour Courts, but the real question to be seen is if by the Act of 1958, jurisdiction of Labour Court stands ousted, therefore, any finding, that Labour Courts have no jurisdiction violates the well‑knows maxim ibi remedium (there is no right if there is no remedy). The difficulty is that the Act of 1958, unlike the Act of 1952 does not provide any forum from which an aggrieved person can get remedy. The Act of 1958 does not bar the jurisdiction as no substituted forum has been provided. A jurisdiction of an existing Court is barred only when a special Act has provided some other forum. In absence of any such forum, the Labour Courts have as usual jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate upon petitions brought under section 25‑A, I. R.O. 1969, by the workers of the Karachi Transport Corporation in cases where the prayer is also for P re‑instatement. I, therefore, hold that the learned Labour Court No.1, vide its impugned order, dated 29‑10‑1986 has very correctly held that the Labour Court has the jurisdiction. I would maintain this impugned order, dated 29‑10‑1986. As regards impugned order, dated 24‑1‑1987, passed by the learned Labour Court No.IV Karachi, I would set aside the same.
6. For the reasons stated by me above, I would decide all the above seventeen (17) appeals in terms of my above findings and would remand all these 17 cases to the concerned Labour Courts to decide them on merit of each case, within two months of this Decision. Orders accordingly.
A. E. /1065/Lb.S Orders accordingly.