PAKISTAN STEEL CORPORATION LTD Versus KAFAYAT ALI KHAN

DECISION

This is an appeal filed by Messrs Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation, Karachi, against an impugned order, dated 9‑9‑1986, passed by Sind Labour Court No.IV, Karachi, who had allowed the grievance petition of the respondent under section 25‑A, I.R.O. 1969.

2. Brief facts of the case are that with effect from 12‑3‑1976, the respondent was a permanent workman of the appellant‑Corporation in the public sector and that on 7‑7‑1982, the appellant‑Corporation and the then Collective Bargaining Agent i.e. Pakistan Steel Labour Union (respondent No.3 herein) had arrived at a settlement, which enter. alia provided in clause 76 that monetary benefits granted by the Government from time to time will be allowed to the employees of Pakistan Steel in accordance with the directions and explanations issued by the Government'. That earlier settlement between the appellant‑Corporation and Pakistan Steel Progressive Workers Union, i.e. respondent No.2 herein was effective from 5‑1‑1980 for a period of two years but the new pay scales and fringe benefits allowed thereunder were applicable with effect from 5‑7‑1979. Further, the case of the respondent workmen was that on 17‑6‑1982, the Government of Pakistan in the Finance, issued 4n Office Memorandum notifying .the Presidential Order of sanction of an Additional Dearness Allowance of not less than Rs.50 and not more then Rs.200 to the employees of public sector Corporation and by virtue of Clause (3) of the said Office Memorandum, it was provided, as under.

"In the case of those of the above employees who are governed by the provisions of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, the Dearness Allowance sanctioned under Settlement and that a period of one year has elapsed from the date of effectiveness of the agreement or settlement under the said Ordinance that had been reached with the collective bargaining agent or Wage Award has been announced and implemented as case may be."

That the respondent workmen claimed that the employees of the appellant‑Corporation were entitled to the above‑said Dearness Allowance under the Presidential Order and their entitlement was also, guaranteed, secured and protected under Clause 76 of the Settlement dated 7‑7‑1982 and that this settlement was not hit by the exception clause (3) of the Office Memorandum, dated 17‑6‑1982 which refers to settlement, already concluded and implemented, but, does not speak of prospective settlements. It was also the case of the respondent workmen that the dearness allowance sanctioned under the Presidential Order was admissible with effect from 1‑7‑1982 or after the expiry of a period of one year from the date of effectiveness of the settlements which had been reached and implemented before 1‑7‑1982 and not after the lapse of a period of one year from the effective date of any subsequent settlement to be reached after 1‑7‑1982, and that the settlement, dated 7‑7‑1982 was not in existence when the aforesaid dearness allowance was sanctioned by the President of Pakistan. Further, it was the case of the respondent workman that in any case, even if the settlement, dated 7‑7‑1982 was to be deemed to come within the mischief of the exception clause No.3 of the Office Memorandum, the workmen of the appellant‑Corporation were entitled to the said dearness allowance with effect from 1‑1‑1983, when the period of one year had elapsed from the date of effectiveness of the said settlement. The respondent workman, however, claimed that neither he, nor any other workman of the appellant‑Corporation was given this dearness allowance and he was always kept on false hope that the matter was under the active consideration of the appellant‑Corporation ‑and the Federal Government who were in constant consultation with representatives of the workers and was assured that a favourable decision would be announced and as such, he should wait. That however, being aggrieved the respondent workmen had submitted a representation to the appellant‑Corporation for payment of the dearness allowance, but, as he did not receive any favourable reply, so, he submitted his grievance petition before the learned Labour Court under section 25‑A, I.R.O. 1969, as his right, guaranteed and secured under the Law as well as under Clause 76 of the settlement, dated 7‑7‑1982 was infringed.

3. The appellant‑Corporation resisted the petition on the ground that the petition of the respondent workmen under section 25‑A, I.R.0.1969 was not only barred by time, but, it did not lie, under section 25‑A, I.R.O. 1969, as the respondent workman had also not complied with the provision of section 25‑A, 'I.R.0.1969, and that as the workers of the appellant‑Corporation were getting their legal entitlement, therefore, the respondent workman was not entitled to the dearness allowance, as had been claimed by him. Therefore, the respondent workman was not entitled to maintain grievance petition under section 25‑A, I.R.0.1969, which was liable to be dismissed.

4.Both the parties have filed their respective affidavits in evidence and they were duly cross‑examined. Thereafter, the learned Labour Court has passed the impugned order, hence the present appeal.

5.I have heard Mr. Khalid M. Ishaque, the learned Advocate for the appellant‑Corporation and Mr. Mirza Muhammad Kazim, the learned Counsel on behalf of the respondent workmen and have also carefully perused the record and proceedings of the case. Mr. Khalid M.Ishaque, the learned Advocate for the appellant‑Corporation has submitted that the respondent workmen was not entitled to maintain grievance petition under section 25‑A, I. R.O. 1969 as no‑ right guaranteed or secured under the Law was infringed and the claim of the dearness allowances, if any, did not fall within the ambit of section E5‑A, I.R.O. 1969. He further submitted that the learned Labour Court, however, after recording the evidence of both the parties had referred the matter to this Tribunal for interpretation of the Notification, i.e. office memorandum dated 17‑6‑1982 under section 50 of the I.R.O. He, therefore, relied upon the following observations of this Tribunal in the said matters.

"Actually the interpretation is sought of paragraph 3 of the Notification, dated 16‑7‑1982. I am referred to a Judgment reported in 1983 P L C 1023. Following paragraph is quoted from the said Judgment in this case.

I am conscious of the fact that the view that I have taken does not resolve the real difference between the parties which is whether under the office Memorandum referred to above the employees of the respondent‑Corporation are entitled to the benefits conferred by the said O.M. but since this difference of opinion is in respect of the interpretation of any term of the settlement in question, I am of the view it would be beyond the scope of section 50; I.R.O. to interpret the O.M. in question or its real intention. All that can be said is that a material part of the benefits under the settlement have been given retrospective effect from 1‑7‑1981 ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????

In this case,' the interpretation of clause (3) of the Notification issued by the Government on 17‑6‑1982, is sought which is not competent under any section of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. There is no ambiguity or difficulty in reading the document itself. I am also of the opinion that it is beyond the scope of section 50 of I.R.0.1969 to interpret the Notification, in question. Therefore, the present application is dismissed. "

Mr. Khalid M. Ishaque, the learned Advocate for the appellant? Corporation has further vehemently argued that the learned Labour Court has seriously erred in assuming jurisdiction, not vested in it, in that the said application of the respondent workman and the claim made therein, fell outside the scope of section 25‑A, I. R.O. 1969 and that the claim of the respondent workmen did not relate to any right guaranteed or secured to him by or under any Law or any award or settlement for time being enforced and further that when the Settlement, dated 7‑7‑1982 had been signed, the office Memorandum, dated 17‑6‑1982 had already been issued. He further submitted that at the time when the respondent workman had submitted his application under section 25‑A, I.R.O. 1969 (bearing No.147 of 1984), the Settlement dated 7‑7‑1982 on which a reliance was placed by the respondent workman, had already been expired. Mr. Khalid M. Ishaque, the learned Advocate for the appellant‑Corporation has further submitted that the learned Labour Court had ignored the fact that when the respondent workman had filed his petition, the settlement, dated 23‑4‑1984 was already in existence and by virtue of its clause 20, his petition was not maintainable. He further argued that the said Office Memorandum, dated 17‑6‑1982 could neither be considered as law nor it had the force of Law and any benefit thereunder could not be enforced by invoking the provisions of section 25‑A, I.R.O. 1969, and that the learned Labour Court has not appreciated the fact that the petition of the respondent workmen had already stood dismissed and finally disposed of by this Tribunal, vide decision, dated 27‑3‑1986 and that the impugned order of the learned Labour Court is at' variance and conflicts with the order of this Tribunal. Lastly, the arguments of Mr. Khalid M. Ishaque, the learned Advocate for the appellant‑Corporation were that the learned Labour Court, while passing‑ the impugned order, had overlooked the fact that the respondent workmen had not complied with the requirements of section 25‑A, I.R.O. 1969, and that it had wrongly interpreted the office Memorandum, dated 17‑6‑1982. In support of his arguments, Mr. Khalid M. Ishaque, the learned Advocate for the appellant‑Corporation has also placed reliance on the cases reported in P L D 1966 Dacca at pages 107 and 156 respectively.

6. On the other hand, Mr. Mirza Muhammad Kazim, the learned Counsel on behalf of the respondent workman has nothing to add in his arguments, what he has submitted before the learned Labour Court. I, therefore, see no force in any of his contentions. In view of the above legal and factual position, I would hold that the respondent workman was neither entitled to receive dearness allowance as had been claimed by him in his petition nor he was entitled to maintain his, petition under section 25‑A, I.R.O., 1969, and to pass the impugned order which isl liable to be set aside.

7. For the reasons stated by me above, I would set aside the impugned order and allow present appeal. Orders accordingly.

A.E. /1069/Lb.S ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????? Appeal allowed.