INDUS JUTE MILLS LTD Versus MANSOOR HUSSAIN
DECISION
These are three appeals filed by Messrs Indus. Jute Mills Ltd., Dhabeji , District Thatta , against a common impugned order dated 10‑9‑1986, passed by the Sind Labour Court NoV.I , Hyderabad who had allowed the grievance petitions of the respondent workmen under section 25‑A, I.R.O., 1969..
2. The brief facts of the cases were that the respondents claimed to be the permanent employees of the appellant mills and were also the office‑bearers of the Collective Bargaining Agent. It was claimed by the respondents that on 11‑8‑1984, they were issued charge‑sheets containing the false charge of misconduct and that after holding the so‑called domestic enquiry they were dismissed from services on 7‑2‑1985. Thereafter, the respondent workmen had served the grievance notices and then preferred grievance petitions before the Labour Court. Further, the maid grievance of the respondent workmen was that as all the proceedings against them were initiated by an incompetent persons, i.e. the Director of the appellant mills, therefore, their impugned dismissals from services were nullity in Law and were liable to be set aside and so, they be re‑instated in service with full back benefits.
3. The appellant mills had resisted the petitions on the grounds that the proceedings initiated against the respondent workmen by the Director of the appellant mills were quite, competent and lawful as he was also an employer and/or owner of the mills in accordance with the provisions of Law and further that, as, the respondent workmen were found guilty of the misconduct in an enquiry which was fair, impartial and lawful, because the respondent workmen had fully participated in it and had not only cross‑examined the appellant mills' witnesses but they had also produced their defence witnesses as well as they had also availed full opportunity, therefore, their dismissal from service was also quite lawful, hence they could not maintain grievance petitions which were liable to be dismissed.
4. Both the parties filed their respective affidavits evidence and had also produced their witnesses and all of them were duly cross‑examined. By consent of both the parties, the evidence recorded in one case had also been treated as evidence in other two case. Thereafter, the learned Labour Court has passed the common impugned order, hence these appeals are common and similar, therefore, I would also decide the appeals by this single decision.
5. I have heard Mr. Mahmood A. Ghani, the learned counsel for the appellant mills and Mr. Muhammad Rasheed, the learned representative on behalf of the respondent workmen and have also carefully perused the record and proceedings of the case. Mr. Mahmood, A. Ghani, the learned counsel for the appellant mills has submitted that these three respondent workmen, namely, (1) Ghulam Hussain,(2) Muhammad Khan and (3) Muhammad Manzoor Hussain were issued separate charge‑sheets for trying to assault the Mill's Manager and for using abusive language and for threatening him of dire consequences, vide dated 6‑8‑1984 and that the Mill's Manager was himself a victim of insubordination riotous and disorderly behaviour as well as acts subversive of discipline, therefore, the charge‑sheets were signed by one Mr. M.A. Jamal , Director of the appellants mills. He further pleaded that all proceedings initiated by the said Director against the respondent workman, were quite competent and lawful as according to the term' employer as defined in' section 2(c) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. This subsection reads as under.
"Employer means the owner of an industrial or commercial establishment to which this Ordinance for the time being applies, and include‑‑
(i) in a factory, any person named under clause (c) of subsection (1) of section 9 of the Factories Act, 1934 (XXV of 1934), as manager of the factory.
(ii) in any industrial establishment under the control of any department of the (Federal) or any Provincial Government the authority appointed by each Government in this behalf, or where no such authority is so ‑ appointed, the head of the department. '
(iii) in any other industrial or commercial establishment any person ? responsible to the owner for the supervision and control of such establishment.
6. A perusal of this definition reveals that employers means owner of an industrial or commercial establishment and also include a person notified as a Manager under the Factories Act. The word 'owner' has been defined. Therefore, it has to be given its ordinary, natural and grammatical meanings. The owner in co‑Proprietorship company is the 'sole proprietor' In a partnership firm, the owners are partners' and in a public limited company the owners are shareholders and these shareholders are represented on the Board of Directors. Therefore, in a public limited company, the owner is 'Directors' or for that matter, any 'director' of the firm /establishment. Thus, Mr. M.A. Jamal , the Director, in question, falls within the purview of the term, 'owner'. The word 'owner' is also defined in Ballentines Law Dictionary at page 906, which means a person in whom legal or equitable title rests'. Therefore, the mere fact that definition of the word 'employer' also includes Manager under the Factories Act, does not mean that Manager of the company is the only owner and that Director is not the owner. In fact, the Factory Manager, who is notified under the Factories Act, is himself notified by a person who is above than that Manager and admittedly in the instant case, apart is director who is above than Notified Manager, therefore, apart from Directors, even a Manager will be employer. In this behalf Mr. Mahmood A. Ghani, the learned Advocate for the appellant mills has relied upon two decisions of this Tribunal reported in 1980 P L C at page 1224 and 1981 P L C at page 769. In the case reported in 1980 P I. C at page 1224, it was held by my learned predecessor that 'Manager' Administration was competent to sign the order of termination. Similarly in the case reported in 1981 P L C at page 769, this Tribunal has held that order of dismissal signed by Mr. Tariq Amin , Executive Director of the company was legal. This decision of the Tribunal was subsequently upheld by the Division Bench of the High Court, vide an unreported Judgment in Constitutional Petition No.D‑279 of 1981. Following this Judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court, this Triburftl in another case in Appeal No. KAR‑85 of 1984 Gul Ahmed Textile Mills Ltd. v. Tous Khan, has also come to the conclusion that Personnel Manager can issue order of dismissal. In the instant case, it is an admitted position that Mills Manager himself was a victim of assault and insubordination, therefore, in the F interest of Justice and equity. He should not have issued charge‑sheet or the order of dismissal, as there is settled principle of Law that 'no one can' be judge in his own cause'.
7. On the other hand, Mr. Muhammad Rasheed, the learned representative for the respondent workmen, has argued that only Mills Manager or Occupier can sign the order of dismissal. There is no reference of 'Occupier' in the definition of the term 'employer' as given in section 2(c) of the Ordinance, 1968. The word 'owner' is much more wider than the word 'occupier' Mr. M. Rasheed has tried to distinguish the above two decisions of this. Tribunal. But he could not succeed to do so. However, in support of this arguments, Mr : M. Rasheed has relied upon a decision reported in P L D 1979 Kar?at page 35, wherein it was held that only the owner or the person notified under Factories Act Would be deemed to be 'employer' for the purpose of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. In view of my above observations and the referred authorities. I find no substance in the arguments of Mr. Muhammad Rasheed. The authority relied upon by Mr. Rasheed in quite distinguishable and not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present cases. I, therefore, held that the Director, Mr. A. Jamal was quite competent to initiate proceedings against the respondent workman in the present cases' and the learned Labour Court was wrong to reject the contentions of the appellant mills.
8. As regards the merits of the cases. It is an admitted position that all these three respondent workmen had fully participated in the domestic enquiry and proper, lawful and reasonable opportunity was accorded to them to defend themselves, and perhaps for this reason, they have not seriously challenged the domestic enquiry and the findings thereon. After careful perusal of the complete enquiry proceedings brought on record and hearing the parties on this point, I would hold that there was nothing wrong with the enquiry proceedings and the Enquiry Officer has rightly held the respondent workman guilty of the misconduct, liable to be dismissed from their services. Therefore, on this point also, the respondent workman were not entitled to maintain their grievance petitions under section 25‑A, I. R. 0. 1969, so, I would also dismiss the same.
9. For the reasons stated by me above, I would set aside the impugned order of the learned Labour Court and would allow all these three appeals. The amount of back benefits, as had been deposited by the appellant mills in this Tribunal, be refunded back to the appellant mills, forthwith.
A. E. /1070/Lb.S ??? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Appeals allowed.