PIR DEEDAR AHMAD SARHANDI Versus MESSRS HABIB BANK LIMITED

DECISION

This is an appeal filed by the appellant, Pir Deedar Ahmed Sarhandi, against an impugned order, dated 28‑8‑1986, passed by the Sind Labour Court No. VI Hyderabad, who had dismissed the petition being time‑barred, under section 25‑A, I.R.0.1969.

2. Brief facts of the case are that the appellant was employed in the respondent Bank, as a Cashier‑cum‑Clerk since 1969 and was posted at the Market Road, Branch, Hyderabad. That according to the appellant he was taking most active part in the Trade Union activities, so he elected as president of the Habib Bank Employees Union, Hyderabad, and he was also one of the founders of the All Pakistan Habib Bank Employees Federation and in consequence thereof he was elected as president, and by virtue of this position, the appellant had not only resolved a number of different problems and grievances and of the Bank employees and had succeeded in getting provided certain lawful and legitimate financial benefits to the general employees of the respondents Bank, but due to his tireless selfless and honest services rendered for the employees of the respondent bank, the appellant had gained an unchallenged and undisputed favour of almost all the employees of the respondent bank, throughout in Pakistan, but, as highly appreciable and well regarded general publicity in the public was there in respect of his for human being. As per claim of the appellant, all this on the one hand was not liked by the respondent Management, while on the other hand Peoples Party Government of the relevant time was very inclined that see the Appellant should join their political party for its motives. Further, the case of the appellant was that as he did not like the political activities being an employee of a Bank, so he refused to either or join Pakistan Peoples Party or to bow down the administration of the time for this purpose, so, he faced double victimization and torture, one by the respondent bank that he should be removed from the employment as he was posing himself as champion of the cause of the workers while, secondly, by the different police agencies and other concerned investigation departments etc. Only to force him either to join Pakistan Peoples Party or to face the consequences of the refusal and sometimes at the cost of his life. Further, the appellant claimed that when neither the bank nor the different agencies could be succeeded to purchase him, so on 7‑11‑1973, the appellant was summoned and forcibly produced before the Government of Pakistan Peoples Party in the presence of various police officers as well as the executives of the bank and then at the gun point, the appellant was compelled to sign a resignation from his employment of the bank and he was warned that in case of his refusal to do so then he will be sent to jail. As per further claim of the appellant he could not resist the threat torture and the threat for killing of his life, so he had signed the resignation letter, but with retrospective date of 26‑10‑1973 and then was let from the premises. That immediately thereafter the resignation letter was handed over to the Officers of the respondent bank who were present at the scene and they were directed by the Ministry of the relevant time that the appellant should not be allowed the bank premises with effect from 8‑11‑1975. The appellant claimed that from this date neither he received the acceptance letter of the resignation nor any payment in lieu of his resignation, was paid to the appellant. According to the appellant, he was very specifically and clearly warned at the time of getting signed the resignation, that if any time, he would dare to send any complaint/ representation and/nor to take any other legal course, then, his life will not be spared at any cost. The appellant claimed that due to this unbearable and unavoidable circumstances as well as for the fear of his life, he remained silent from his activities of the trade union, but used to make all attempts to join his duties in the respondent bank as he was never communicated that he had tendered resignation which was accepted by the bank. The appellant claimed that after the fall of the Government of Pakistan Peoples Party in 1977, at the directions and general instructions of the Martial Law Authorities that all persons who had been un-necessarily and illegally victimized, harassed, tortured and put to losses, they should approach the concerned area Martial Law Administrator for its redress. Therefore, the appellant submitted the detailed petition along with all available and relevant documents before the Martial Law Authorities and the matter was taken up by them. After hearing the appellant the said Martial Law Authorities directed the .respondent bank to redress the grievance of the appellant, but, as it did not care even to hear the orders from Martial Law Authorities, therefore, the appellant had submitted a departmental appeal on 30‑6‑1985. The appellant submitted a departmental appeal on 30‑6‑1985. The appellant submitted that his appeal was rejected vide letter, dated 21‑8‑1985 and thereafter being aggrieved with all above state of affairs, the appellant had served upon the respondent bank his grievance notice on 11‑i1‑1985 which was also rejected by respondent bank, thus the appellant submitted the present grievance petition before learned Labour Court.

3. The respondent bank resisted the grievance petition of appellant only on a single legal objection that as the grievance petition was time‑barred, therefore, it could not be maintained. The respondent bank, however, did not resist the case of the Appellant on merits.

4. The learned Labour Court, thereafter, having heard the arguments of the parties only on the said legal objection, had dismissed the grievance petition of the appellant, hence the present appeal.

5. I have heard Mr. S.P. Lodhi, the learned representative for the appellant and Mr. Obaidur Rehman, the learned Advocate on behalf of the respondent bank and have also perused the record and proceeding of the case. There is an admitted position on record that the respondent bank while submitting its reply statement to the grievance petition before the learned Labour Court, had filed only an affidavit of one Shaft Muhammad, the Law Officer of the bank and along with affidavit, the respondent bank had annexed some documents, alleged to have been written and signed by the appellant. But, it is very strange to note here that if at all the alleged resignation accepted by the respondent bank or the dues have either been paid to him or had adjusted against the liabilities, then, why these two important documents were not produced by the respondent bank. Further, it is not known why the learned Labour Court had not given an opportunity to the appellant to thoroughly cross‑examine witness of the respondent bank on his affidavit and the alleged documents and so much so, why the appellant was not afforded an opportunity to submit his affidavit in rebuttal of this affidavit of the respondent bank. Therefore, in absence of this mandatory legal requirement and in view of simple unauthenticated or uncertified Photostat copies of the documents alleged to have been signed by the appellant, this evidence of the respondent bank cannot be relied upon. Admittedly, there is no rebuttal on behalf of the respondent bank that under coercion and threats his resignation was obtained by the officers of the bank with the collaboration of a political party in the Government at the relevant time. There is again no denial on behalf of the respondent bank that from the very date of the alleged resignation, the appellant was not approaching to different Civil and Military Authorities for the redressal of his grievance and the appellant had not approached the Martial Law Authority in 1977 along with his detailed petition and the concerned documents submitting the facts of his being victimized and deprived of the employment only due to the reason that he did not join Pakistan Peoples Party and that the Martial Law Authority had called the comments from the bank. It is again an admitted position that instead of submitting the required documents before the Martial Law Authorities by the respondent bank, it had informed the appellant that his request for re‑instatement in service had been rejected simply and its being time‑barred. In view of all the above facts. circumstances and the legal aspects, I would hold that since the very date on which the alleged resignation was force-ably obtained from the appellant, he was continuously approaching different authorities for the redressal of his grievance and from the year 1977, he had very correctly persued the matter through Martial Law Authorities. I would, therefore, hold that the time limitation for approaching the A Labour Court under section 25‑A,I.R.O. 1969, should be computed with effect from 25‑11‑1985 therefore, the present grievance petition under section 25‑A, I.R.0.1969 of the appellant is held be well within time and the impugned order of the learned Labour Court is misconceived‑ of the facts and circumstances of the case, hence, it is set aside.

6. As regards the merits of the case, there is nothing on record) in rebuttal of the claim of the appellant, 1, therefore, hold that the) alleged resignation from the appellant was under duress, threats and torture. It is, therefore, rejected and the appellant is entitled to be reinstated in service. As regards the back benefits and the proceedings against the appellant were in violation of the Law and the prescribed procedure, therefore, he is also entitled to get full back benefits. Thus, the impugned order is liable to be set aside on this point also.

7. For the reasons stated by me above, I would set aside the impugned order and would allow the appeal. The appellant is directed to be re‑instated in service with full back benefits, forthwith.

S.Q./1024/Lb.S

Appeal allowed.