ANWAR MUHAMMAD Versus PAKISTAN RAILWAYS
DECISION
This revision application has arisen from the facts which may briefly be stated as follows. To start with, the applicant filed grievance petition under section 25‑A I.R.O., 1969 which was allowed and he was given not only seniority and promotion but also granted back‑benefits. The respondent went in appeal against the decision of the lower Court. During the pendency of the appeal the applicant gave a statement before the respondent's foregoing the back‑benefits provided he was given promotion. In view of the statement he was promoted as desired by him and the respondents withdrew their appeal pending before this Tribunal. After withdrawal of the appeal by the respondents the applicant once again approached the Labour Court for determination of his back‑benefits as his earlier waiver exercised by him could not stand in his way for claiming back benefits.
2. The revision application was vehemently opposed by the respondents who in their written reply took a stand that since the applicant had himself foregone .the back‑benefits, he could not turn round and make claim for the same.
3. The learned Labour Court after considering the material on record and hearing the arguments of the learned counsel of the parties dismissed the application and hence this Revision Application against the order of dismissal passed by the learned Labour Court.
4. The sole point to be decided in this case is whether the applicant who had on his own foregone the back‑benefits granted to him by the lower Court, could now riggle out from his previous stand and re‑claim the back benefits. Both the learned counsel for the parties had submitted their arguments and cited the authorities in support of their respective cases: It is not denied by the learned counsel for the applicant that the applicant had waived his right of back‑benefits. This finds support from the letter written by the applicant Anwar Muhammad to the Divisional Personnel Officer Pakistan Railways, Karachi wherein he has clearly surrendered his arrears of back‑benefits from 31‑5‑1992 to 3‑4‑1995 requesting at the same time that his promotion order be issued without back‑benefits with effect from 31‑5‑1992. The applicant's learned counsel, however, interpreted the waiver of back‑benefits by the applicant as having been made obviously under compulsion because his Promotion order was not being released. Furthermore, in view of the applicant's aforesaid waiver statement not only he got the Promotion but the appeal filed by the respondent against the main case was also withdrawn. I have, given my due consideration to the contention of the applicant's learned counsel that the applicant had waived back‑benefits on account of compulsion, but I am unable to persuade myself to agree with the learned counsel in this regard. There is no evidence on record to indicate that the respondents had in any way brought undue pressure on the applicant for waiving his right to back‑benefits. It is only his word that he was compelled to do so because until then he was not being given promotion by the respondents. May be issuance of his Promotion Order was delayed but that would not mean that respondents had no intention of giving him the promotion which was admittedly allowed to him by judgment of the Labour Court. If he had shown patience for some time he would have got the promotion order. It does not appeal to reason that after he was allowed the promotion by judicial decision, the respondents could run the risk of violating such decision with all legal consequences flowing against them. Even if the respondents delayed the issuance of his promotion order indefinitely, he had remedy available to him and he could have forced them by resorting to legal course. I am, therefore, convinced that the applicant was not compelled much less by the respondents to forego the right 19 of back‑benefits. It was all due to his impatience to see himself saddled in promotional post at an early date that he went to the extent of foregoing the back‑benefits. The learned Labour Court, therefore, rightly rejected the arguments of the applicant's learned counsel and also did not accept the authority cited by him in support of his claim. I have also gone through the same authority reported as 1994 PLC (C.S.) 1158. The learned Labour Court has rightly held that it was on different issue i.e. estoppel. It was held in the reported case that there could be no estoppel against the statute. That is not the case here. In the present' case back‑benefits were actually allowed to the applicant by the learned Labour Court but he himself waived his right to such benefits in his zeal to get his promotion as early as possible. He was not only entitled by law to back‑benefits but he was allowed the same by the learned lower Court, but nobody could prevent applicant from waiving his right to such benefits. As pointed out earlier no element of compulsion was involved in forcing him to waive his claim to the back‑benefits but once he had foregone the said back‑benefits he could not at his own free‑will again turn round and reclaim the same.
For the foregoing reasons I am of the view that the learned Labour Court had rightly dismissed the application made by the applicant for determination of his dues under section 51, I.R.O. Accordingly the Revision against the said decision has no force and as such it is dismissed.
H.B.T./16/ (L. Trib) Revision dismissed.