SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT PUNJAB, AGRICULTURE DEPARTMENT AND 3 OTHERS Versus FIELD WORKERS' UNION, E.A.D.A., LYALLPUR

This is an appeal against the award dated 1‑7‑1975 of Punjab Labour Court No. 3, Lyallpur.

2. Mr. M. A. Khan, General Secretary of Field Workers Union of Agriculture Department, Lyallpur, respondent, raised an industrial dispute by giving demand notice and subsequently a strike notice. The concili ation proceedings failed on 31‑3‑1975. The respondent thereafter filed a petition under section 32 (1‑A) of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 before the learned Labour Court for adjudication of demands mentioned therein. In that petition 4 demands were raised, one of which was accepted and the rest were rejected.

3. Aggrieved by the above award the appellants namely, Province of the Punjab, through Secretary, Agriculture Department, Extra Assistant Director of Agriculture, Lyalipur, Deputy Director of Agriculture Sargodba and Director General, Agriculture (Field) Punjab, Lahore, have preferred this appeal.

4. The award was announced by the Labour Court on 1‑7‑1975. Alongwith the memorandum of the appeal application under section 5 of the Limitation Act was filed for the condonation of delay in filing the appeal. In that application it is mentioned that the appellants had applied for the certified copy of the award on 8.7‑1975 and that the said copy was supplied on 14‑7‑1975. After computing 6 days for obtaining the copy of the award, the appeal should have been filed on or before 6‑8‑1975, whereas it was filed on 15‑8‑1975. In other words the appeal is barred by time by 9 days. No explanation is forthcoming in the application for condonation of delay. Only one day's delay i.e. 14‑8‑1975 has been explained by stating that since that day was public holiday, the appeal was filed on the next day i.e. 15‑8‑1975. It is thus clear that the appeal is, time‑barred and since the delay has not been explained, the application for, condonation of delay is rejected.

5. The learned counsel for the appellants, however, contended that the award of the learned Labour Court was without jurisdiction and as such was nullity in law, therefore, the bar of limitation would not stand in the way of the hearing of the appeal. In support of his contention he relied on the judgment of the High Court in the case, Syed Mehmood Alam v. Syed Mehdi Hussain and 2 others (P L D 1920 Lah. 6).

6. Now the point for determination is as to whether the award of the learned Labour Court was without jurisdiction. In this connection the learned counsel for the appellants contended that since the workers of the respondent union have been made regular Government servants and were being given pension and gratuity like other Government servants, they petition was not maintainable under the law, because section l (3) of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 excluded the persons employed in the administration of the State. Section 1 (3) of Industrial Relations Ordi nance, 1969 reads as follows: ‑

It shall not apply to any employee in the Police, or any of the Defence Services of Pakistan and any service or installation con nected with or incidental to the Armed Forces of Pakistan exclu ding (Ordnance) Factory maintained by the Federal Government or to any person employed in the administration of the State other than those employed as workmen by the Railways, Posts, Telegraph and Telephone Department.

In the present case the workers who are affected by the award are malis, sweepers, chaukidars, watchmen beldars, coolies, jeep drivers, tubewell operators, field men, store attendants and cleaners of the office of the Director. The point for determination is as to whether the above categories of workers would be covered by the phrase employee in the administration of the State . The Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal in the case. The General Secretary, Provincial Buildings Employees' Union, Hyderabad v. The Executive Engineer, Provincial buildings Division and another (1972 P L C 285) observe4: ‑

Keeping in view the intention of the Legislature to confer the benefit of Labour Laws on as many persons as would be covered by the definition of "workman", the phrase "employed in the administra tion of the State" must be strictly construed. In this connection it is noteworthy that the Legislature did not say "any person employed in Government service". The intention of those who framed subsection (3) of section 1 of the Ordinance was not to deprive the benefit of the Ordinance to all persons who are serving the Government. Had it been so they would have said so. The phrase employed in the administration of the State therefore must be given a meaning other than "persons employed in Govern ment service.

According to the Concise Oxford Dictionary, Fifth Edition the word administration means‑Management (of business); management of public affairs, Government; the ministry, of Government. The word administer means‑manage (affairs); dispense (justice, sacraments, to); tender (oath to); furnish, give, (thing to); apply (remedies to); act as admi nistrator. The categories of the workers involved in this case by no stretch of imagination can come within the meaning of the words "administration and administer" and, therefore, section 1 (3) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 will not apply to them.

7. In view of the above the contention of the learned counsel for the, appellant that the award of the learned Labour Court was without jurisdiction has no force.

8. Lastly the learned counsel for the appellant wanted to challenge the award of the Labour Court on demand No. 1 which was accepted. I am afraid he cannot do so because the appeal is admittedly time barred and as such he cannot go into the merits of the case.

9. In the result I find no merit in this appeal, which is hereby dismissed.