MUHAMMAD ISHAQ Versus CRESCENT JUTE PRODUCTS LTD.

ORDER

This is an appeal against the decision dated 8-7-1972 of the Chairman, Punjab Labour Court, Central Zone, Lahore, passed under section 25-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 whereby the petition of the appellant Muhammad Ishaq was dismissed.

2. The facts of the case are that the appellant on 17-t-1968 joined the respondent's Mill as a clerk at Rs. 100 per mensem. Subsequently, vide order Eah. P-4, he was made acting chief tally clerk and on 18-5-1970 he was re-designated Assistant Supervisor Finishing. On 1-10-1970 he was confirmed as Assistant Supervisor Finishing vide order Exh. P-7. Subsequently, he was charge-sheeted and on receiving reply from him an enquiry was held arid he was dismissed from service vide order Exh. P-12. After that he filed an appeal before the Director of the respondent's Mill, which was dismissed, and that order of dismissal was conveyed to him vide Exh. P-13. AR grieved by that order the appellant filed an application under section 25-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 which was dismissed by the learned Labour Court as already mentioned above. Since the appellant had admitted his guilt before the Enquiry Officer, the learned Chairman of the Labour Court held that the objections raised by the appellant that he was not given an opportunity in defence and that no second show-cause notice was issued to him did not carry any weight.

3. Mr. Nazir Ahmad Naz, the learned representative of the appellant contended that the Director of the respondent s Mill dismissed the appellant s appeal without giving him hearing which was contrary to law. In support of his contention he relied on the judgments of the Supreme Court In cases, The Federation of Pakistan and another v. Sardar Ali and others (P L D 1959 S C (Pak.) 25) and Chief Commissioner, Karachi and another v. Mrs. Dina Sohrab Katrak (P L D 1959 S C (Pak.) 45). In the former case it was held

The right of appeal given by section 188 of the Act to a person aggrieved by a decision or order passed by an Officer of Customs, would become illusory if the appeal can be disposed of merely after perusing depart mental reports. The word appeal in itself implies a right of audience and the Central Board of Revenue failed to discharge its statutory duty in deciding the appeal, in the manner that it did. These were quasi-judicial proceedings of which the substance of fair hearing and opportunity for defence at the appropriate stage are essential incidents."

In the later case it was held :

"When a statute gives a right of appeal it should be understood as silently implying when it does not expressly provide that the appellant shall have the right of being heard.

It is a principle of natural justice that no one should be dealt with to his material disadvantage or deprived of his liberty or property without laving an opportunity of being heard and making his defence.

Mere consideration of the appeal memorandum alongwith the report of the Rent Controller was not sufficient for deciding the appeal".

In the present case I find that no personal hearing was given to the appellant and his appeal was dismissed in his absence after considering his memorandum of appeal alongwith the Enquiry Officer's report. In view of the law laid, down by the Supreme Court, the Director who had dismissed the appeal of the appellant had acted against the principles of natural justice and as such the final order of dismissal cannot be allowed to stand.

4. I also find that no second show-cause notice alongwith a copy of the Enquiry Officer's report was sent to the appellant. It was, however, contended by the learned repre3entatives of the respondent that since the appellant had admitted his guilt before the Enquiry Officer it was not necessary to issue second show-cause notice. It is no doubt true that when the appellant had admitted his guilt there was no necessity to enquire further but all the same the appellant was entitled to an opportunity to show cause against the quantum of punishment and, therefore, is my view, second show-cause notice was absolutely necessary.

In the result I accept the appeal, set aside the order of the learned Labour Court and direct that the appellant be re-instated. Since the appellant has been re-instated on technical grounds he is not entitled to receive back wages.