MUHAMMAD AMIN Versus PUNJAB EMPLOYEES' SOCIAL SECURITY INSTITUTION

This is an appeal against the decision dated 16-7-1976 of Punjab Labour Court No.1, Lahore.

2. Muhammad Amin, appellant was employed as a driver in the office of West Pakistan Employees Social security institution on 12-12-1966 vide order of the Commissioner of the Institution, the copy of which is Exh. P. W. 3/1. He was subsequently confirmed with effect from 24-6-1970 vide an order, the copy of which is Exh. P. W. 3/4 and his services were terminated by the Com missioner, Social Security Institution on 29-3-1974, after allowing him 15 days salary in lieu of 15 days notice for termination of his services in accordance with the terms of service as contained in para. 3 of the letter of appointment. The order of termination is Exh. P.W.3/2. The appellant challenged the order of termination of his services by way of a petition under section 25-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 on the ground that his services were terminated on account of his Trade Union activities, without service of any charge-sheet, without holding of any domestic enquiry and without issuance of show-cause notice. The learned Labour Court holding that the Social Security Institution was neither an industry under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, nor an industrial or commercial establishment within the meaning of the W. P. Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, dismissed the petition vide decision under appeal.

3. Aggrieved by the above decision, Muhammad Amin, appellant has preferred this appeal.

4. The first point for determination is as to whether the West Pakistan Social Security Institution is an industry under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969.

5. The Lahore High Court in the latest judgment in the case of K. G. Old, Principal, Christian Technical Training Center, Gujranwala v. Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court, Northern Zone and 6 others (P L D 1976 Lah. 1097), observed :-

"The upshot of the entire discussion is that the use of the expressions "Business, Trade, Manufacture, Calling, Service, Employment or Occupation" in the definition of Industrial Relations Ordinance is not in its ordinary dictionary meaning but in its popular and conventional meaning. In the context of industrial and labour laws, these expres sions apply to any enterprise which is organized and is systematic depending substantially, if not entirely, on the co-operation between labour and capital, and having as its object production, distribution and consumption of wealth, or the production or provision of material services. The enterprise as a whole has to be looked at to find out its raison d'etre, and any part of it which is incidental, anciliary or an adjunct cannot determine, the character of the whole."

6. The Social Security Institution was established under the provision of West Pakistan Employees Social Security Ordinance, X of 1965. According to the preamble of this Ordinance, it was promulgated in order to A introduce a scheme of Social Security for providing benefits to certain employees or their dependents in the event of sickness, maternity, employ ment injury or death, and for matters ancillary thereto.

7. Applying the test as laid-down by the High Court it cannot be said that the object of the Institution is production, distribution and consumption of wealth, or the production or provision of material services. Its sole object is to give effect to scheme of Social Security for providing benefits to certain employees or their dependents in the event of sickness, maternity, employ ment injury or death. Therefore, Social Security Institution is not an industry under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969.

8. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, relied on the Division Bench judgment of the Lahore High Court in the case The Management of Municipal Committee, Mianwali v. The General Secretary. Municipal Muhar r1rs' Union and another (P L D 1968 Lah. 395), wherein it was observed :-

"In so far as the Municipal Committee performs the functions of levying and collecting the taxes it is only performing a governmental function. The workmen who are engaged by the Municipal Committee to per form the functions which are in the nature of the regal or the sovereign functions of the Government and have been delegated to the Com mittee will not fall within the category of workmen and any dispute between them and the Municipal Committee will, therefore, be not an industrial dispute. In this view of the matter, the staff of the Munici pal Committee which are employed in connection with the collection of the taxes exclusively will not be workmen because the activities of the Municipal Committee such as assessing and collecting taxes which pertain to the sovereign functions of the State and have been delegated to the Committee, bear no relationship with the term "industry."

It is not the case of the respondent-Union that the Octroi Muharrirs have to perform any other functions except to collect the octroi duty. These Muharrirs being not the workmen within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, any dispute between them and the Municipal Committee will not be an industrial dispute.

There ace other activities of the Municipal Committee such as making and preparing roads, sanitation and conservancy, running the hospitals and the schools. They do not exclusively pertain to the regal or sover eign functions of the Government and can be undertaken by the private concerns of individuals as well. They are, therefore, an undertaking and can be classed as industry within the meaning of clause lg) of section 2 of the Act. The persons employed in such activities will be the workmen within the meaning of the Ordinance and any dispute which may arise between them and the Committee will be an industrial dispute."

9. This ruling has no relevancy because the Social Security Institution does not perform the functions which can be classed as Industry.

10. Now the next point for determination is as to whether the Social Security Institution is an industrial or commercial establishment within the meaning of the W. P. Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. Commercial Establishment is defined under sec tion 2 (b) of the Ordinance as under :-

"Commercial establishment' means an establishment in which the business of advertising, commission or forwarding is conducted, or which is a commercial agency, and includes a clerical department of a factory or of any industrial or commercial undertaking, the office establishment of a person who for the purpose of fulfilling a contract with the owner of any commercial establishment or industrial establish ment, employs workmen, a unit of a joint stock company, an insu rance company, a banking company or a bank, a broker's office or stock-exchange, a club, a hotel, a restaurant or an eating house, a cinema or theatre, and such other establishments or class thereof, as Government may by notification in the official Gazette, declare to be a commercial establishment for the purposes of this Ordinance.

11. Industrial establishment is defined under section 2 (I) of the Ordi nance as under :-

Industrial establishment means.--------

(i) an industrial establishment as defined in clause (ii) of section 2 of the payment of wages Act, 1936 (VI of 1936); or

(ii) a factory as defined in clause (i) of section 2 of the Factories Act, 1934 (XXV of 1934); of

(iii) a railway as defined in clause (4) of section 3 of the Railways Act 1890 (XI of 1980); or

(iv) the establishment of a contractor who directly or indirectly employs workmen in connection with the execution of a contract to which he is a arty and includes the premised in which or the site at which any process connected with such execution is carried on; or

(v) the establishment of a person who directly or indirectly employs workmen in connection with any construction industry.

12. From the perusal of the above it is clear that the Social Security Institution does not fall within the definition of industrial and commercial c establishments. Therefore, the appellant is not a workman as envisaged in the aforementioned Ordinance and as such bad no locus standi to be a petition under section 25-A or industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969.

13. In the result I find no merit in this appeal, which is hereby dismissed.