NATIONAL TYRE AND RUBBER CO. ETC Versus KHALIFA ABDUL RASHID
This is an appeal directed against the decision dated 26‑6‑1986 recorded by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No. 7, Gujranwala, whereby the grievance petition of the respondent was accepted and direction was issued to pay dues to the respondent according to scale No.7.
2. An objection has been raised by the learned counsel for the respondent that the appeal is time‑barred. The appellant has itself said that the appeal is time‑barred and has made application for condonation of delay. As a matter of fact no ground for condonation can be found in the application given under section 5 of the Limitation Act. In paragraph 2 of the petition it is said that on 17‑7‑1986 an appeal (which should have been an application) was put in before the learned lower Court for the supply of the copy of the judgment and the copy was delivered on 13‑9‑1986. The concluding paragraph reads. "It is, therefore, respectfully prayed that the delay if any in filing the appeal, may kindly be condoned."
3. The appellant appears to be under the impression that excluding the period spent for obtaining the copy the appeal is within time, but actually this is not the case. The date of judgment of the learned lower Court is 26‑6‑1986 and the application for copy was made on 17‑7‑1986, meaning thereby that 21 days were lost. Copy was delivered on 13‑9‑1986. There were only nine days at the disposal of the appellant to bring the appeal. The appeal, therefore, could be brought upto 22‑9‑1986 but it was lodged on 30‑9‑1986 and there is absolutely no ground given in the application for condonation of delay where this period was spent. Needless to say that where an appeal is time‑barred, the delay of each day is to be explained. Merely asking for condonation of delay by making an application is not sufficient. There should be cogent and reasonable ground for the condonation of delay. Since absolutely no ground is given, it is difficult to A condone the delay. A valuable right has accrued to the respondent by lapse of time which cannot be denied to him without any reasonable ground. The learned counsel for the appellant was confronted with this situation of the case during arguments but he could not say anything effective.
4. As a result, the appeal is dismissed as time‑barred.
A. E./254/Lb.P
Appeal dismissed.