MUHAMMAD SALIM Versus HABIB BANK LTD.

This is an appeal directed against the decision dated 20‑7‑1986 recorded by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No.1, Lahore, whereby the grievance petition of the appellant was dismissed on the ground that he had no cause of grievance.

2. The facts are that on account of involvement in a criminal case of corruption the appellant was suspended on 28‑1‑1975. He was acquitted on 9‑4‑1977 and was re‑instated in service on 7‑5‑1977. Vide order-dated 20‑8‑1977 the period of suspension from 28‑1‑1975 to 8‑5‑1977 was treated as leave due. The annual increments for the period during which the appellant remained under suspension were not allowed. The order dated 20‑8‑1977 was passed by Member (Power). The order by which increments were not allowed is not on the record and, therefore, it cannot be said by whom it was passed. The order dated 20‑8‑1977 has been challenged on the ground that it was passed by the Member (Power) but according to Rules, only the Chief Engineer concerned was competent in the matter. It has been argued that the order by which increments were not allowed was also passed by an incompetent authority and not by the Chief Engineer and this argument has not been controverted by the learned counsel for the respondent. He has, however, argued that since the order dated 20‑8‑1977 is signed by the Chief Engineer, it cannot be said that it was passed by the Member (Power). In the body of the said order it is clearly written that the Member (Power) had decided to treat the period of suspension as leave due. The Chief Engineer, signed the letter only by way of conveying the said order to the appellant. According to columns 2 and 4 of Notification No. S/SO(R)‑6(61)R&R‑1418‑528 dated 10‑1‑1975, only the Chief Engineer Administration or the Chief Engineer concerned was competent to pass the order. Since the suspension order can be passed by the Chief Engineer, only he could re‑instate the appellant and decide whether he was entitled to the wages for the suspension period or not. Likewise, only he could decide whether the appellant was entitled to the annual increments which he earned during the period of suspension. Even otherwise the order treating the period of suspension as leave due and not allowing the annual increments to the appellant are not warranted by law. It has been argued that since the acquittal was not honourable, the authority concerned was competent to disallow wages and increments for the period of suspension. No rule contained in the Efficiency and Discipline Rules of WAPDA has been shown wherein it may have been provided that where a person has been suspended on account of involvement in a criminal case, the period of suspension can be treated as leave due and that he is not entitled to increments. Rather there is no provision that if one is involved in a criminal case, he can at all be brought under suspension. Rule 5 deals with the procedure of inquiry and one of the provisions is that for the purposes of inquiry a person under inquiry may be suspended. Therefore, rule 5 is not attracted. Since the appellant was acquitted and there is no rule that unless the acquittal is honourable, he is not entitled to wages for the period of suspension, the appellant was wrongly disallowed the same. The same may be said with regard to the annual increments for the suspension period. Needless to say that a suspended person remains in service and, therefore, annual increments cannot be disallowed to him. Of course, if he is convicted annual increments may not be allowed to him as a .punishment. In the same manner by way of awarding the punishment, the wages for the period of suspension may be withheld. Admittedly, no charge sheet was given and no inquiry was held, nor any order was recorded by the competent authority finding that although the appellant had been acquitted from the criminal Court, yet the charges levelled against him had been established departmentally.

3. A photo copy of the Government Servants Dismissal, Removal and Suspension Rules has been produced and it has been argued that since the appellant is Government Servant on deputation with WAPDA, the rules apply to him. But even these rules do not help the respondent. Rules 7.2 and 7.3 deal with cases where departmentally one has been promoted. So they are not germane to the case. Rule 7.5 is relevant which says that adjustment of pay and allowances should be made according to the circumstances of the case. It further provides that full amount may be given only in the event of the Government servant being acquitted of the blame. This is noteworthy that it is not said therein that acquittal should be honourable.

4. As a result, the, appeal is accepted and setting aside the impugned decision of the learned lower Court, it is directed that the appellant be paid unpaid wages for the period of suspension and he B also be allowed annual increments which he earned during the period of suspension.

A.E./257/Lb. P

Appeal accepted.