EMPLOYEES' OLD-AGE BENEFITS INSTITUTION, KARACHI Versus MUHAMMAD ANWAR JAVAID
This is an appeal from an order passed by the Punjab Labour Court No. 3, Lahore at Ferozewala on 2‑6‑1992, whereby the grievance petition filed by the respondent under section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 was accepted and he was reinstated in service with back benefits.
2. Appellant No. 1 is the Employees' Old‑Age Benefits Institution and appellants Nos. 2 and 3 are its Officers. On 5‑5‑1990 the respondent was offered the post of stenotypist vide letter Exh. P‑1. Some of the terms of the appointment were that it would be effective from the date the respondent joined, subject to his passing the medical test, that the services of the respondent would be governed by the Employees' Old‑Age Benefits Institution (Employees Service) Regulations, 1980 as amended from time to time and that the respondent would be on probation for a period of six months in the first instance, extendable at the discretion of the competent authority and his confirmation would be subject to satisfactory performance and conduct. The respondent joined on 28‑5‑1990. By Office Order No. 56/91, dated 6‑2‑1991 (Exh. P‑3) the services of the respondent alongwith 16 other employees were terminated with immediate effect purportedly in pursuance of the decision taken by the Federal Government. They were allowed seven days' pay in lieu of notice, except three persons (not including the respondent) who were allowed one month's pay in lieu of notice. Admittedly no order was passed either extending the period of probation of the respondent or confirming him in service.
3. After service of a grievance notice the respondent filed a grievance petition to assail the validity of his termination order dated 6‑2‑1991. He pleaded that the termination order not only contravened the provisions of Regulation 22(1)(a) of the Employees' Old‑Age Benefits Institution (Employees Service) Regulations, 1980 and Standing Orders 12(3), 14 and 15(4) of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 but also offended against the principles of natural justice as he was condemned unheard.
4. The appellants opposed the grievance petition primarily on two grounds; firstly, that in view of the proviso to section 1(4) of the Industrial Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 the provisions of the Standing Orders were not applicable to the Employees' Old‑Age Benefits Institution as it was being carried on under the authority of the Federal Government and had its own regulations governing the service of its employees and secondly, that the services of the respondent were terminated during his probation in accordance with the terms of his appointment.
5. The respondent examined only himself in support of his grievance petition. In rebuttal Syed Dilawar Shah, Assistant Director (General) entered the witness‑box as RW‑1. The learned Labour Court after appraising the evidence produced by the parties upheld the grievance of the respondent and accepted his petition, reinstating him in service with back benefits. Feeling aggrieved, the appellants have come up in appeal.
6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. As regards the objection of the appellants that the provisions of the Standing Orders are not applicable to the Employees' Old‑Age Benefits Institution in view of the proviso to section 1(4) of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon an unreported judgment of the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench in Writ Petition No. 1235 of 1989. (Employees' Old‑Age Benefits Institution v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal etc.) in which this objection was dealt with and repelled. It was held that neither the Institution was being carried on by or under the authority of the Federal Government nor the Regulations framed by its Board of Trustees carried the statutory force. No precedent to the contrary has been cited by learned counsel for the appellants. Therefore, the objection does not sustain. In Employees' Old‑Age Benefits Institution v. NIRC etc. (1988 SCMR 765) it was held that the functions of the Employees' Old‑Age Benefits Institution constituted "industry" within the meaning of section 2(xiv) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 and since its employees were not rendering service in the administration of the State, they were not excluded from the ambit of the Ordinance in terms of its section 1(3)(b). '
7. So far as the second objection is concerned, the respondent joined service on 28‑5‑1990 and his services were terminated on 6‑2‑1991. One of the terms and conditions of service of the respondent as given in his letter of appointment was as follows:‑
"5. That you will be on probation for a period of six months in the first instance, extendable at the discretion of the competent authority. Your confirmation will be subject to satisfactory performance and conduct."
The initial period of probation for six months expired on 27‑11‑1990. It is conceded that no order was ever passed by the competent Authority extending the initial period of probation. Therefore, it would be deemed that on completion of the initial period of probation for six months the respondent had acquired the status of a permanent workman, especially in view of his satisfactory performance during the period of probation as is evident from the letter Ex.P‑7 submitted by the Assistant Director (General) to the P.S. to Minister for Labour, Manpower and Overseas Pakistanis, Islamabad on 24‑2‑1991. According to Standing Order 1(b) of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, a "permanent workman" is a workman who has been engaged on work of permanent nature likely to last more than nine months and has satisfactorily completed a probationary period of three months. In view of this provision of law also, the respondent after satisfactorily completing the probationary period of three months had become a permanent workman. It may be pointed out that there is no provision in the Standing Orders Ordinance for extension of. the probationary period. Therefore, the services of the respondent could not be terminated at seven days' notice on the basis of the terms and conditions as contained in his letter of appointment (Ex.P.‑1) or Regulation 22(3) of the Employees' Old‑Age Benefits Institution (Employees Service) Regulations, 1980.
8. Moreover, no reasons was disclosed in the order dated 6‑2‑1991 Exh. (P.3) for terminating the services of the respondent. The termination, therefore, is also violative of Standing Order 12(3) of the Standing Orders Ordinance which provides that the services of a workman shall not be terminated except by an order in writing which shall explicitly state the reason for the action taken.
9. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned order passed by the learned Labour Court does not suffer from any illegality and is, therefore, upheld. Consequently, this appeal is dismissed.
H.B.T./746/Lb.P Appeal dismissed.