MUHAMMAD SIDDIQ Versus TEXTILE ACCESSORIES MANUFACTURING LTD.

This is an appeal against an award of the learned Presiding Officer of Sired Labour Court:. No. VI, dated February 13, 1973 whereby the learned Labour Court dismissed the application of the appellant, filed under section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, (hereinafter called the Ordinance). The appellant was taken as an apprentice on 10th August 1970 by the Textile Accessories Manufacturing Limited, (hereinafter called the respondent). He was not given any salary, but allowance from the date that he attended. He was found by the respondent to be very irregular in attendance. The respondent terminated his 'raining period from 22nd November. 1970.

2. The learned Labour Court maintained the order of termination of his tenure on two grounds, namely : (1) that the cause of action arose to the appellant on 21-11-1970, and, therefore, he should have followed the procedure prescribed under Starting Order IS of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, (hereinafter called tile Standing Orders Ordinance), which he did not do ; and (2) that as the appellant was negligent in attending his training facility, the same was rightly terminated.

3. Mr. Wasiullah Qureshi, the learned Representative for the appellant, contended that in tie circumstances of the present case, Standing Order 18 of the Standing Orders Ordinance did not apply, as the appellant claimed a right which was guaranteed to him under an agreement entered upon between the appellant and the respondent on 10th August 1970. The said agreement is regarding terms and conditions of training period of the appellant. The short question is that even if there was infringement of the terms of agreement dated 10th August 1970, could the appellant make an application under section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, (hereinafter called the Ordinance). It may be mentioned at this stage that Mr. Wasiullah contended that the provisions of the Standing Orders Ordinance did not apply to the case of the appellant.

4. Section 34 of the Ordinance will apply only if the appellant is able to show that he had a right guaranteed under any law or any award or settlement for the time being in force. On the face of it, the agreement cannot be said to be an award as it is not a determination of any industrial dispute. Similarly, it cannot be said to be a settlement within the meaning of the definition given under the Ordinance. An agreement cannot take the place of settlement. Settlement means "a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceeding, and includes an agreement between an employer and his workmen arrived at otherwise than in the course of any conciliation proceeding, where such agreement is in writing, has been signed by the parties thereto in such manner, as may be prescribed and a copy thereof has been sent to the Provincial Government, the conciliator and such other person as may be prescribed."

5. The agreement between the parties cannot be said to be a settlement within the meaning of the definition given under section 34 of the Ordinance It has not been contended that a copy of this agreement had been sent "to the Provincial Government, the conciliator and such other person as may bel prescribed." I would hold that the appellant has failed to make out a case of any right guaranteed to him under any law or any award or settlement for the time being in force. The appeal, is therefore, dismissed.