MUHAMMAD IQBAL AND 6 OTHERS Versus PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES CORPORATION, KARACHI

DECISION

These are eight appeals filed against the single order passed by tie Labour Court ou the application, made by the appellant under section 25‑A,

1. R. O. There are seven appellants. Originally one appeal was filed by all these seven appellants. Consequently, I directed them to file separate appeals. In compliance with that order separate appeals were filed. All these appeals have been consolidated as common points of law are involved.

2. The appellants were in the service of respondent and they were re moved from service. They served grievance notice and made applications under section 25‑A of I. R. O. to the Junior Labour Court. The applications were resisted.

3. On the assessment of the evidence the Junior Labour Court ordered re‑instatement with full pay for the period during which they remained unemployed. Against this order the respondent filed appeals which were dismissed.

4. In pursuance of the aforesaid decisions the appellants were re‑instated but their salaries for the period of unemployment were not paid to them. Consequently, they again made applications under section 25‑A to the Labour Court for the recovery of the salary for the aforesaid period but they added certain additional demands. The applications were resisted on various grounds. One of the grounds was that the matter having been already decided the present applications were barred by principle of res judicata.

5. The Labour Court agreed with the respondent that the applications were barred by principle of res judicata and, therefore, dismissed them. Aggrieved by this, the present appeals had been filed.

6. I have heard the learded counsel for the appellants and I am of the view that the applications under section 25.A were misconceived as the matter had already been decided under the previous applications and the applicants had been granted the relief with regard to the salary for the period of unemployment. The proper course for the appellants would have been to make applications under section 51, I. R. O. for the enforcement of the relief previously granted.

7. So far the remaining demands are concerned these could not be agitated under section 25‑A as it was admitted by the learned counsel that prior to the termination of service these benefits were not enjoyed by the appellants and were in fact fresh demands. Thus these demands could only be agitated by raising an industrial dispute and not by wall of application under section 25‑A,I. R. O.

8. In the result the appeals are summarily dismissed.