ELECTRONIC INDUSTRIES LTD. Versus M. A. FROOQUI

DECISION

This judgment will dispose of Appeal No. KAR‑330 of 1977 as well as Reference No. KAR‑513/771 the former is an Appeal by the appellants Messrs Electronic Industries Ltd., against an order of the IInd Sind Labour Court, Karachi. dated 6‑8‑1917 allowing the respondent No. 1'e application under section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, setting aside the order terminating his services and directing that he be re‑instated forthwith with all' back benefits and continuity in service. The latter is a Reference made to this Tribunal by the Presiding Officer, Sind Labour Court No. II, Karachi, arising out of a complaint under section 25 A(8) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 filed in his Court by the present respondent No. 1.

2. Briefly, the facts giving rise to this matter are that the respondent No. 1 was in the service of the appellants who on 11‑10‑1976, terminated the service with a Notice they served on him on that very day. The nature of this service constitutes the sole point of dispute in this case and forms the principal issue on which this Appeal is to be decided. According to the respondent No. 1. as stated by him in his application under section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, he was a mere Stenographer though in the year 1971, he was asked by the Company to describe himself an "Executive Secretary" in the cases pending against it before the Labour Courts. This statement appearing for the first time in the respondent No. 1's application under section 25‑A. was stoutly denied by the appellant‑Company who maintained that the respondent No. 1 has been working as their Executive Secretary since 1969 and that since then he was associated with the Company in the capacity of an Executive and represented the Company before various Authorities in the said capacity. It was further contended by the appellants in their written statement in the lower Court that in consequence of the executive position hold by the respondent No. 1 in their Company, he cannot be said to be a worker and hence, the provisions of West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 were not applicable to him and consequently the question of adopting the procedure as laid down under Sanding Order 15 did not arise.

3. In support of this Appeal, I have beard Mr. Iqbal Kazi, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant‑Company and the respondent Mr. M. A. Farooqi appearing in person. I have also carefully perused the record of these proceedings as held in the Court below and the long order of the learned Presiding Officer. Sind Labour Court No. II, Karachi, forming the subject‑matter of this Appeal.

4. As mentioned above, the short point for determination in this Appeal is as to whether the respondent No. 1 was a worker in the appellant Company entitling him to the benefits of the Standing Orders Ordinance. It is to be noted that the appellant‑Company in their Notice of 11‑10‑1976, terminating the service of the respondent No. 1 with immediate effect addressed him as "Mr. M. A. Farooqui. Executive Secretary." In this Notice, they charged him with having misappropriated Radio parts amounting to about Re. 50,000 and added that the Management investigating into the shortage In Stores came toot know that it was he (Mr. M. A. Farooqui) who was responsible for these shortages by abusing his position and statutes in tae Company. In his reply to this Notice dated I5‑I0‑1976, the respondent No. 1 does not deny or controvert his being addressed as 'Executive Secretary' and does not state that he is a mere Stenographer. Again, in his Grievance Notice dated 5‑11‑1x476, the respondent No. 1 is silent on this point and i1 is for the Brit time in par&. 3 of his application under section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 that he points out that he was asked by the respondent‑Company to describe himself as 'Executive Secretary' In the cases pending against it before the Labour Courts. This fact was denied by the Company in par&. 3 of their written statement where, as mentioned above, they stated that "the applicant has been working 1)i an Executive Secretary since 1969 and since then, he was associated with the Company in the capacity of an executive and represented the respondent. Company before various Authorities in the said capacity."

5. At the hearing in the Court below, the respondent No. 1 gave evidence on his own behalf but examined no other witness or worker to show that he was serving the Company in the capacity of a worker and not in an executive capacity. He was cross‑examined wherein he has made some startling admission. For example, he has admitted that at the time of the termination of his service, he was drawing a salary of Re. 1,200 p. m, in addition to Re. 25 as Dearness Allowance and Re. 75 as Conveyance Allowance. He has also admitted that there was a Labour Union in this Company and that some settlements were made between this Union and the Management from which he, the respondent No. 1, derived no benefit at all. Nor did he mate any representation for not getting the benefits that were available to the workers by way of these settlements. He produced as Exh. 4, a Memo of Settlement dated 12‑8‑1974 between the Electronic Industries Employees' Union representing workers on the one hand and Messrs Electronic Industries Ltd. representing employers on the other which Settlement he has signed on behalf of the Employers in his official capacity as 'Executive Secretary' The other person to sign this Settlement on behalf of the Employers is the Factory Manager; and 4 workers have signed on behalf of the Labour Union. In his cross‑examination, the respondent No. I has also admitted that there was a dispute between the Union and the Management which reached the lit Sind Labour Court and In which there were conciliation proceedings in which this respondent No. I appeared on behalf of the Management and styled himself as 'Executive Secretary. In my opinion these admissions made by respondent No. 1 in his cross examination go to show that his position in the Company was not that of a worker.

6. The respondent No. 1 in the course of his arguments contended that he was the only Stenographer in the appellant‑Company and war doing all typing work. He has referred to the admission made by Company's General Manager Mr. Hassan Salt In his cross‑examination to the effect that the typing work in the Company used to be done by respondent No. I, but the mere fact that the respondent No. 1 did typing work in the Company" cannot serve to establish him as a worker and to detract from his position as an 'executive'. 1t appears from the record of the Lower Court that the respondent No. I was a trusted employee of the appellant‑Company who valued his services to the point that for 3 consecutive Financial Years ending 30th June 1967, 1968 and 1961), they made him an ex gratia payment of Re. 2,000 per year 'in appreciation of your extraordinary services." This, according to me, is another circumstance that goes to show that the respondent No. 1 was not serving the Company in the capacity of a worker. There a nothing on the record of the lower Court to show that he at any time received a bonus such as is given to workers and when I put this to him, his answer was 'no bonuses were ever given by this Company.

7. In the result, then, I am satisfied that the respondent No. 1 was not a worker in the employment of the appellant‑Company, I am not impressed with his plea urged for the first time in para. 3 of his application under section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 that in the year 1972, he was asked by the Company to describe himself as "Executive Secretary" in the cases pending against it before the Labour Courts. His admissions in his cross‑examination and above all the Settlement Memo Exh 4 in the dispute between the workers and the Management, which he has signed on behalf of the Management clearly indicate that he served A the Company in an executive capacity and not as a worker. This Appeal is, therefore, allowed) the Order of the lower Court is set aside and the Reference is disposed of as infructuous.