S. RIAZ HUSSAIN Versus PAKISTAN STEEL, KARACHI

DECISION

The circumstances giving rise to this appeal, strictly stated, are as under:‑

2. The appellant‑was appointed as a General Operator by the respondent mill on 31‑3‑1981 and on 27‑7‑1989 he was promoted and given PG‑VI scale with effect from the date of joining the service. In spite of this order he was, however, not paid the difference of the pay. He was again promoted on 2‑8‑1989 and was given PG‑VII scale w.e.f. 3‑5‑1986 and was again denied the difference of the pay. To cap it all, on 6‑6‑1990 he received a letter reverting him from PG‑VI to PG‑V.

3. The appellant had sent a grievance notice on 25‑7‑1990 and received the reply by letter dated 10‑8‑1990. It is alleged that the appellant had sent another notice, dated 21‑8‑1990 which remained unreplied. The petition was filed on 14‑10‑1990.

4. The petition came to be resisted inter alia on the ground that it was time‑barred and that the Managing Director had been misled by the misconceived representation of the petitioner.

5. The Labour Court found that the reversion of the petitioner could not be sustained as he was not granted the right of hearing, but dismissed the petition as it was barred by time.

5-A. On the showing of the appellant the grievance notice was sent on 25‑7‑1990 and the reply had been received on 10‑8‑1990. Under the proviso to section 25‑A(4) the petition before the Labour Court had to be filed within a period of two months from the date of the communication of the employer's reply. The period expired on 10‑10‑1990 and there is demonstrably a delay of four days in the filing of the petition.

6. Mr. Khalil‑ur‑Rehman Khan, learned counsel for the appellant maintained that the period of limitation had to be computed from the despatch of the second grievance notice. Apart from the question whether it was at all received by the respondents, it is an axiomatic principle of law that time begins running from the service of the first grievance notice and cannot be extended merely by serving a second grievance notice. Since a citation has been made I might as well refer to it‑‑being Sher Rehman v. Malik Textile Industries 1983 PLC 701. Mr. Khalil‑ur‑Rehman has referred to a judgment of the Appellate Bench of the Shariat Court viz. Maqbool Ahmed v. Hakumat‑e‑Pakistan reported in 1991 SCMR page 2063. It has hardly any bearing on the dispute before me.

7. The reversion of the appellant without affording him any opportunity of hearing is simply indefensible. Nor could the order of the Managing Director be ignored from consideration, simply on the, allegation that he had been misled in making the order. But nothing can be done about it, in view of the fact the appeal is liable to be dismissed on the ground of limitation.

8. I will uphold the impugned order and dismiss the appeal.

H.B.T./2079/Lb. S ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????? Appeal dismissed.