MUNIR KHAN Versus PRESIDING OFFICER, IVTH SINDH LABOUR COURT, KARACHI

DECISION

The circumstances culminating in the filing of this appeal, in brief, are as follows.

2. The appellant had been though with short breaks, thrice appointed by the respondents for 89 days each. His case, as to be found in the petition before the Labour Court, was that near the end of the last assignment he was asked to resign so that he might be issued a fresh appointment order, and when he refused the doors were finally closed against him. He had sent a grievance notice and since no redress was provided, he was constrained to file the petition before the Labour Court.

3. These allegations were disputed in the Written Reply filed by the respondents. Their contention was that the assignment was only for 89 days and on the expiry of the period the petitioner had left the job, as he had to do under the terms of appointment. The question of any notice under the circumstances did not arise.

4. The petitioner appeared as his own witness and Muhammad Rafiq Mazari appeared on behalf of the respondents.

5. The Labour Court coming to the conclusion that the appointment was for a specified period, the protection under clause 12(3) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 was not available to him. It, therefore, dismissed the petition.

6. Mr. Gohar Iqbal, learned counsel for the petitioner referred to the case of Muhammad Rafiq v. Karam Textile Mills Ltd. 1992 PLC 707 wherein it was held that the services of even a temporary employee could not be terminated without an order in writing, giving the reasons for the termination. He also referred to the cases of Zulfiqar Hyder etc. v. Presiding Officer, Sindh Labour Court and another 1992 PLC page 665, Allah Ditta v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal and M/s. Pak Cement Ltd. v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal 1990 PLC page 233, in which the same view had been taken.

7. There can be no cavil with this proposition of law. All that Mr. Abdus Samad, learned counsel for the respondents, submitted was that just a glimpse of the letter of appointment showed that the appointment was for a period of 89 days only and on the expiry of the specified period, the appointment would automatically come to an end. There was, therefore, hardly any necessity of another letter intimating the appellant that his services stood terminated. He further urged that clause 12(3) of the Standing Orders Ordinance does not envisage giving any separate notice. It could form a part of original order of appointment as in the instant case. The tenor of the appointment order was a clear pointer to the fact that appointment was for a specified period and after the expiry of the said period the services would not be any more required. Reference was made to the case of Sindh Road Transport Corporation v. Altaf Ali 1982 PLC page 503. The same view was taken in M/s. Amin Fabrics v. Labour Court No. VI and another 1979 PLC page 207, wherein it was found that the worker appointed temporarily for a specified period could not claim the status of permanent workman even after three months. The report mentions that there was no violation of any right guaranteed to the worker if his services were terminated under the term of the contract. In the case of Muhammad Yaqoob v. Punjab Labour Court and 5 others 1990 SCMR 1539 where the petitioner had served as a `Mali' in an establishment for 8 years on 'work charged basis' it was held that to get the benefits of the Standing Orders Ordinance a workman had to show that he was permanent, and a permanent workman had been defined by reference to the nature of the work on which he had been engaged or employed. It also appears that the termination in the precedent case was oral and not in writing.

8. ? Under the circumstances no fault can be found with the conclusions reached by the Labour Court. I will. therefore, uphold the impugned order and dismiss the appeal.

A.A./2093/Lb. S ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Appeal dismissed.