MUHAMMAD KHAN AND OTHERS vs MUZAFFAR
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a regular second appeal in a pre-emption suit. The core legal question is whether a tenant who purchases land loses their status as a tenant and consequently their preferential right to defend a pre-emption suit under paragraph 25 of the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner pre-emptors must possess a superior right of pre-emption at the time of the sale, suit, and decree. Since the defendant was a tenant at the crucial time of the sale, the plaintiffs had no preferential claim, and the merger of tenancy into ownership upon purchase does not afford the plaintiffs a superior right. The Court laid down the principle that a tenant-vendee does not lose their preferential status as a tenant under the Land Reforms Regulation simply because the sale has concluded, avoiding the anomaly of a tenant succeeding as a plaintiff in a pre-emption action but failing as a defendant vendee.
- Does a tenant lose their preferential right of pre-emption under paragraph 25 of the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972, once they purchase the land?
- Must a pre-emptor establish a superior right of pre-emption at the time of sale, at the time of the suit, and at the time of the decree?
- Can a defendant vendee who was a tenant prior to the sale defend a pre-emption suit on the basis of their prior tenancy status?
- Paragraph 25, Land Reforms Regulation 1972
ORDER
' MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.-Leave to appeal has been sought from judgment dated 16-9-1981 of the Lahore High Court, whereby a regular second appeal arising out of a pre-emption suit was dismissed. The petitioners are the plaintiffs/pre-emptors while the defendant is a vendee, who defended the suit on the basis that be being a tenant had a preferential right as against the plaintiffs. Reliance was placed in this behalf on para. 25 of the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972. The petitioners' plea that after the respondent purchased the land he lost the status of a tenant and became an owner ; therefore, he also lost the right of pre-emption and thus could not defend the suit on the basis of said provision of law did not succeed and accordingly the High Court dismissed their appeal.
2. Same argument has been reiterated before us. Learned counsel has admitted the obvious condition for the petitioners to succeed as pre-emptors that they should have superior right of pre-emption at the time of sale, at the time of suit, and at the time of decree. It is not denied that Before the sale the defendant was a 'tenant' and qua him the plaintiffs had no preferential claim.
This situation continued up to the time when the sale was to take place ; because at the time of and during, the sale the defendant remained a tenant. Even if for the sake of argument it is assumed that after the completion of sale in every respect, the tenancy right merged into ownership rights, that would in no way clothe the plaintiffs with superior right, The possibility of contemporaneous acquisition of superior right during the process of sale is too philosophical to be given any importance for the purpose of interpreting para. 25 (3)(d). It was never so intended by the law maker. Thus the plaintiffs could not claim superiority, merely because after the sale the defendant became an owner. They failed to show superiority at the first crucial stage of sale.
3. The reasoning in the impugned judgment which is based on the objection of the said provision is also unexceptionable. There is no reason to differ with the learned Judge that first right of pre- emption having been conferred on the tenant under para. 25, if a vendor acting on the dictates of general law of pre-emption accepts the offer of a would-be pre-emptor (here the tenant) and sells the land to him, it could not be the intention of the law to deprive the vendee of the right simply because he himself had become the purchaser. In that eventuality anomalous situation would developed ; namely that, although a tenant when he brings the suit under para. 25, would succeed but would lose if he is defendant vendee in so far as the defense of equal/superior right of pre-emption, is concerned. Thus there being no force in this petition, the same is dismissed.