NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN Versus PUNJAB LABOUR COURT
Muhammad Rafiq Wattoo respondent No.2 (hereinafter referred to as the respondent) was employed as a Senior Head Cashier (Officer Grade III) in Muzaffargarh Branch of the National Bank of Pakistan. On 11‑10‑1979, he was charge‑sheeted (Annex. J), for misconduct. On 16th October, 1980, however, it was held by the competent authority (Annex. K) that he be let off in the case. Subsequently on 24‑1‑1981, the respondent was informed that his services have been terminated with immediate effect under rule 15(1) of the Staff Service Rules, 1980 (Annex. B). The respondent filed an appeal (Annex. D) addressed to the President National Bank of Pakistan Head Office Karachi. Vide letter (Annex. F) dated 27‑4‑1981, the respondent was informed that his services having been terminated under rule 15(1) of the National Bank of Pakistan Staff Service Rules, 1980, against which no appeal was competent and, therefore, the appeal filed by him could not be considered. On 9‑5‑1981, the respondent sent grievance notice (Annex. G) to the employer. Thereafter he filed grievance petition (Annex H) before the Punjab Labour Court No.9, Multan on 22‑6‑1981. Subsequently he filed an application seeking condonation of delay. The grievance petition as also the application for condonation of delay were resisted by the petitioner‑bank. The learned Labour Court after recording the parties' evidence and after hearing them, allowed the application for condonation of delay and also ordered the reinstatement of the respondent with back benefits on 19‑2‑1984 (Annex. '0').
2. The bank filed an appeal before the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal and also filed the present writ petition, inter alia, on the ground that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction in the matter.
A Division Bench of this Court which dealt with similar writ petitions filed by the different nationalised banks challenging the jurisdiction of the Labour Courts to hear grievance petitions of banks employees on the ground that terms and conditions of service of banks employees were governed by the award of the Wage Commissioner, which could only be enforced by the National Industrial Relations Commission and the Labour Courts lacked jurisdiction in the mater, accepted this plea and allowed all such petitions including the under consideration one vide order dated 10‑4‑1985, passed in Writ Petition No.719 of 1982.
The respondent as also the other affected employees filed appeals before the august Supreme Court of Pakistan. Their appeals have been accepted by the learned Supreme Court. It has been held the Supreme Court that even a right arising out of award of the by Wage commission could be enforced under section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance) and, therefore, the view taken by the High Court that the Labour Court lacked jurisdiction in the matter was not sustainable. The present writ petition, as also the connected ones stand remanded to this Court for deciding the other issues involved in the case.
3. So far as the present case is concerned, the other issues which have been raised on behalf of the petitioner are:‑
(a) that the services of the respondent were terminated under rule 15(1) of the National Bank of Pakistan Staff Service Rules, 1980. This is, therefore, a case of termination simpliciter and not a punishment warranting interference by the Labour Court under section 25‑A of the Ordinance;
(b) that the grievance notice as also the grievance petition filed by the respondent were clearly time-barred and delay has been wrongfully condoned by the Labour Court; and
(c) that the respondent was serving in the establishment of the petitioner as Senior Head Cashier (Officer Grade III), performing supervisory duties and drawing pay more than Rs.800 p.m. He cannot, therefore, be considered as a workman by any stretch of imagination for the purpose of Section 25‑A of the Ordinance.
4.As already stated, the respondent was originally served with a charge‑sheet for misconduct based on many irregularities on his part as detailed in the charge‑sheet. Subsequently, however, he was let off so fax as the charge‑sheet is concerned, but sometime later the order regarding his termination under rule 15(1) of the Staff Service Rules was made. Under rule 37 of the Staff Service Rules, termination is one of the penalties. It has been alleged on behalf of the respondent that, as a matter of fact, his services were terminated as a punishment pursuant to the charge‑sheet served on him. Although the allegations levelled against him could not be proved and he was ex facie let off but on account of mala fides his services were ultimately terminated and the order of termination purported to be one under rule 15(1) of the Staff Service Rules 1980. Admittedly, the respondent preferred an appeal against his termination which was rejected on 27‑4‑1981. Within a period of one month of the rejection of the appeal, the respondent served grievance notice. Thereafter he filed the grievance petition culminating into the impugned order of his re‑instatement. In the circumstances of this case, I am satisfied that the services of the respondent have been terminated by reason of the alleged misconduct on his part for which he was charge‑sheeted. This in reality is not a case of termination of services simpliciter. Such termination is equivalent to dismissal, for which grievance can be sought to be redressed under section 25‑A of the Ordinance. In Osman Ghani v. Federal Service Tribunal and another (1986 S C M R 1875), Water and Power Development Authority started disciplinary action against the appellant under Wapda Employees (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1975, but during the pendency of the proceedings removed him from service under section 17(1‑A) of Act XXXI of 1958. It was held that while passing order of removal, the authority was found to have exercised its power not bona fide but for some extraneous consideration and that such an order would stand vitiated. Similar view has been expressed by this Court in Manzoor‑ul‑Hassan v. The National Bank of Pakistan and another (1986 P L C (CS) 838)
5. In the light of the foregoing conclusion it cannot be said than the grievance notice or for that matter the grievance petition filed by the respondent were time-barred. Keeping in view the date of rejection of the appeal, the grievance notice as also the grievance petition are well within time. Moreover, the respondent also filed an application for condonation of delay as a measure of abundant caution and his application seeking condonation of delay has been allowed by the learned Labour Court. Under section 65‑B of the Ordinance, the, provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 have been applied to the proceedings under the Ordinance in computing the period within which an application is to be made or any other thing is to be done. In National Bank of Pakistan and another v. Muhammad Asif Ahmed and two others (P L D 1985 Quetta 100) , it was held that the authority having jurisdiction to entertain a matter has also jurisdiction to decide question of limitation rightly or wrongly. In Messrs Lyallpur Sahiwal Bus Service (Regd.) Lahore v. Appellate Authority and two others (P L D 1970 Lahore 775), it was held that when Member Board of Revenue entertained time-barred appeal against order of Regional Transport Authority and proceeded to dispose of appeal after over‑ruling objection on the score of limitation, his order passed in this behalf cannot be said to be without lawful authority so as to attract the writ jurisdiction of the High Court.
6. Regarding the plea that the respondent in his capacity as Senior Head Cashier (Officer Grade III) cannot be regarded as a workman having locus standi to move an application under section 25‑A of the Ordinance, it may be observed that admittedly the respondent had no power to allow leave to any subordinate employee or to make any appointment under him. He worked under the supervision of the Manager incharage of the Branch. It has been held by the learned Labour Court that he was responsible for maintaining as many as 11 registers personally while he also used to make entries in about 11 other registers which were maintained by his other colleagues. Nature of his duties was clerical. He cannot, therefore, be said to be an employer and not a workman. Finding of fact recorded by the learned Labour Court in this behalf cannot be interfered with by the High Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction.
17 In the light of the above discussion, it is concluded that there is no substance in the under consideration writ petition which, therefore, fails and is dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
S. Q. /N‑109/L Petition dismissed.