NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN Versus PUNJAB LABOUR COURT N0.7, GUJRANWALA
Phullah Masih respondent No.3 (hereinafter referred to as the respondent) was employed as a Godown Keeper in Sitrah Branch of the National Bank of Pakistan. On 31‑1‑1977, he scribed an application for issuance of a blank cheque on behalf of one Muhammad Arif account‑holder. Subsequently, the Manager of the Bank forged the signatures of the account‑holder and dishonestly withdrew an amount of Rs.18,600. The Manager, an Assistant employed in the Branch as also the respondent were charge‑sheeted for dishonestly and fraudulently withdrawing a sum of Rs.18,600 from the account of Muhammad Arif through forged cheque. A domestic enquiry thus followed. As a result of enquiry it was concluded that Inayatulleh, the then Manager and Muhammad Ishaque, Assistant were guilty of misconduct, but it was held that no misconduct was proved against the respondent. The case was referred to the Head Office at Karachi. The competent authority ordered the dismissal of the Manager and awarded punishment for removal from service to the Assistant. It was also directed that services of the respondent be also terminated on payment of one month's wages in lieu of notice.
2. The respondent challenged his termination by way of grievance petition under section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance) before the learned Labour Court, Gujranwala. After hearing the parties, the learned Labour Court allowed the grievance petition of the respondent and ordered his reinstatement with back benefits. It was found that although the respondent was found to be innocent but nevertheless, his services were terminated and that such termination amounted to punishment.
An appeal taken by the petitioner before the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal failed and was dismissed in limine.
Thereafter, the order passed by the learned Labour Court on 17‑3‑1983, re‑instating the respondent into service with back benefits was assailed through the present constitutional petition. It was inter alia contended that the terms and conditions of service including the disciplinary action of employees of banks and other financial institutions were governed by the Wage Commission Award. Such an award could be enforced through the National Industrial Relations Commission. The Labour Court lacked jurisdiction in the matter and, therefore, the impugned judgment was coram non judice. It had also been averred that provisions of Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, were not applicable in case of banks employees. Therefore, a dismissed or terminated employee like the respondent had no locus standi to file an application under section 25‑A of the Ordinance, as he was not covered by the definition of workman as contained in section 2(xxviii) of the Ordinance.
3. It is noteworthy that many other employees of the Nationalized Banks whose services were terminated obtained reliefs from different Labour Courts against the orders of their termination from service. Such orders passed by Labour Courts were assailed through constitutional petitions before the High Court, mainly on the ground that the terms and conditions of service of such employees being governed by the Award of the Wage Commission, Labour Courts lacked jurisdiction in the matter. These writ petitions including the under consideration one, were dealt with by a learned Division Bench of this Court. The learned Division Bench by judgment recorded in Writ Petition No.719 of 1982, allowed such writ petitions. It found that the Award of the Wage Commission was an Award of the National Industrial Relations Commission and could only be enforced by the National Industrial Relations Commission; further that the said Award was not an Award within the meaning of section 25‑A and section 2(11) of the Ordinance and, therefore, the Labour Courts had no jurisdiction to entertain the grievance petitions of the employees of Banks and financial institutions.
The workers including the respondent filed appeals before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The said august Court accepted the appeals and found that the view taken in the High Court was not sustainable, inasmuch as under section 25‑A of the Ordinance a right guaranteed by 'any award' could be enforced, although the award given by the Wage Commission was not included in the definition of the word 'Award' as given in section 2(li) of the Ordinance but in section 25‑A(1) the term 'award' is preceded by the word "any" and the word 'any' adds amplitude to the content of the word to which it is pre‑fixed. It was found that the term 'award' could not justifiably be construed as referring to only those which have been specified in the definition given in section 2(ii). The learned Supreme Court, however, left other issues undecided and after setting aside the judgments and orders recorded by the High Court remanded the appeals to this Court for consideration of other issues.
4. In the present case it has been contended on behalf of the petitioner‑bank that the contention of the bank is that the respondent being a dismissed employee was not covered by the definition of workman as occurring in section 2(xxviii) of the Ordinance and as the Provisions of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, were not applicable in the present case, therefore, the respondent had no locus standi to file an application under section 25‑A of the Ordinance.
Section 25‑A(1) speaks of a worker who can bring his grievance in respect of any right guaranteed or secured to him by or under any law or any award or settlement for the time being in force for its redress. The expression 'worker' and 'workman' has been defined in clause (xxviii) of section 2. Primarily this definition deals with the worker actually in service but at the same time it provides that in relation to an industrial dispute a person who has been dismissed, discharged, retrenched, laid off or otherwise removed from employment in connection with or as a consequence of that dispute or whose dismissal, discharge, retrenchment, lay‑off or removal has led to that dispute shall be included in the definition of worker. The term 'industrial dispute' has been defined in clause (xiii) of section 2 of the Ordinance. As per this definition any dispute or difference between the employer and the workman concerning the employment or non‑employment or the terms of employment or the conditions of work of any person not in respect of the enforcement of any right guaranteed A or secured to him by or under any law other than this Ordinance, or any award or settlement for the time being in force, amounts to industrial dispute. It has specifically been provided in subsection (4) of section 25‑A of the Ordinance, that when individual grievance is sought to be redressed by a workman directly or shop Steward or the Collective Bargaining Agent through grievance petition under section 25‑A, the same shall be decided by the Labour Court as ii such matter were an industrial dispute. The combined effect of the aforementioned provisions of the Ordinance would be that a dismissed or terminated workman has a locus standi to seek redress of his grievance under section 25‑A of the Ordinance. As a matter of fact, the Supreme Court of Pakistan has already expressed this view while deciding the aforementioned appeals of the workers. The Supreme Court's decision has since been reported in January 1988 in the PLD. The citation is Iftikhar Ahmad and others v. President National Bank of Pakistan and others (P L D 1988 S C 53). Reference in this be half may be invited to para. 16 of the Supreme Court's judgment, which may be reproduced as under:‑
"16. For the reasons stated above, we are unable to agree with the view taken by the High Courts of Sind and the Punjab that the petitions filed by the appellants before the Labour Courts under section 25‑A(4) of the Ordinance were not competent solely for the reason that their terms and conditions of service were regulated by the award of the Wage Commission. As the right to approach to the Labour Court was available to them under the Ordinance, itself, it is unnecessary to examine the further question whether they could also invoke the jurisdiction of the said Courts under Standing Order 12(3) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employees (Standing Orders)."
5. Reliance on behalf of the petitioner has been placed on Muhammad Ali etc. v. Sind Labour Court No.l Karachi etc. (1984 P L C 1645). The principle enunciated in this judgment is distinguishable as in that case, the locus standi of a dismissed worker for purpose of section 7(1)(d) of the Ordinance was considered. The principle thus enunciated has no relevancy so far as the question of locus standi of a dismissed worker to seek redress of his grievance under section 25‑A of the Ordinance, is concerned. Two other judgments viz. Superintending Engineering (H.Q.) Irrigation, Labour Zone and another v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal and another (1987 PLC 80) and Messrs National Bank of Pakistan v. Mst. Perveen Akhtar (P L D 1985 Kar. 60) have also been cited on behalf of the petitioner bank. The former judgment reported as 1987 P L C 180, no more holds the field as it has since been set aside by the Supreme Court of Pakistan, through its judgment reported as P L D 1988 SC 53. The other judgment of the Sind High Court does not relate to the issue involved in the present case that if a dismissed worker has locus standi to file grievance petition under section 25‑A of the Ordinance. No other point has been urged on behalf of the petitioner.
6. For the foregoing conclusions it is held that the grievance petition culminating into the impugned judgment by the Labour Court was validly filed before a Court of competent jurisdiction and thus the impugned judgment cannot be held to have been passed by a Court having no jurisdiction or as being otherwise illegal and without lawful authority. In this view of the matter, the writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
S. Q. /N‑107/L ‑‑‑‑‑ Petition dismissed.