ALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN LTD. Versus THE PUNJAB LABOUR APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, LAHORE
This judgment shall also dispose of connected Writ Petition Nos. 5347, 5348 and 5349 of 1984, as common questions of law and fact are involved in all these four constitutional petitions.
2. Muhammad Anwar Butt respondent No. 3 in the present writ petition, Muhammad Ashraf respondent No. 3 in Writ Petition No. 5347 of 1984, Tahir Raza Butt respondent No. 3 in Writ Petition No. 5348 of 1984 and Tariq Javed respondent No. 3 in Writ Petition No. 5349 of 1984 were, respectively employed as Gunman, Assistant Cashier, Clerk (Assistant) and Cashier in the G.T. Road Branch, Gujrat of the Allied Bank of Pakistan Limited in the year 1981. There had been fraud of huge amount in the aforementioned Branch, for which the senior Officers including the Manager and the Zonal Chief were convicted. The aforementioned respondents were, however, charge‑sheeted on 19‑5‑1981 on the charge of misconduct. They denied the charge, but the Inquiry Officer found them guilty vide report Annexure `C'. He reported that these officials had failed to perform their duties inasmuch as they did not inform the higher officers that the Manager and other officers were mishandling the affairs of the Branch and while allowing them to do so, they (the respondents) disregarded the instructions contained in circular Letter No. P/INST/80/90, dated 7‑9‑1980. On the basis of the report of the Inquiry Officer, second show‑cause notice was served on the respondents and eventually they were dismissed from service on 24‑11‑1981.
3. The respondents tiled grievance .petitions before the learned Labour Court No. 7, Gujranwala, which were, of course, resisted by the petitioner‑bank. The learned Labour Court after hearing the parties and after recording their evidence ordered the reinstatement of the respondents with back benefits on 10?-3‑1984.
4. The petitioner‑bank preferred appeals before the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal but the same were dismissed on 25‑6‑1984, by the learned Tribunal. Thereafter, the petitioner‑bank filed the present constitutional petitions assailing the orders, dated 10‑3‑1984 and 25‑6‑1984, passed respectively by the Labour Court and the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal.
5. It was inter alia pleaded in the under consideration writ petitions that the terms and conditions of service of the workmen employed in banks were governed by the award of the Wage Commission which could only be enforced before the National Industrial Relations Commission and no right accruing to a workman under the award could be enforced through an application under section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance) before a Labour Court. The objection regarding lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Labour Court and the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal found favour with a learned Division Bench of this Court, which allowed the writ petitions on 10‑4‑1985 alongwith many other writ petitions filed by Nationalized Banks against the reinstated employees. The detailed order was recorded in Writ Petition No. 719 of 1982.
6. The respondents went in appeals before the august Supreme Court of Pakistan. Similarly other employees of the Banks also preferred appeals before the said learned Court. The learned Supreme Court disposed of the appeals through judgment recorded in the case of Iftikhar Ahmad and others v. The President, National Bank of Pakistan and others, which has been reported as P L D 1988 S C 53. Through this judgment, the learned Supreme Court has come to the conclusion that the view taken in the High Court that the Labour Courts had no jurisdiction to entertain the petitions of the employees of the Banks was not sustainable. The appeals have thus been accepted and the judgments passed by the High Court have been set aside. The cases, however, have been remanded to this Court for disposal of other issues involved in the writ petitions.
7. The other issues which are involved in the under consideration cases are:‑‑
(a) ??????? that after dismissal from service, the respondents were no more covered by the definition of term `workman' as contained in the Ordinance and, therefore, had no locus standi to take their grievances arising out of their dismissal before the Labour Court; and
(b) ??????? that the learned Labour Court and the learned Appellate Tribunal assumed the role of appellate authority over the result of domestic enquiry and substituted the findings of the Inquiry Officer by their own which was not legally permissible.
8. It has been frankly conceded by Malik Muhammad Afka1, representing the petitioner‑bank that there is no substance in the aforementioned two objections raised on behalf of the bank. According to him it has already been held by the Supreme Court of Pakistan that the right to approach the Labour Court under section 25‑A(4) of the Ordinance was available to the employee concerned who were dismissed workmen of the banks. Needless to add that a dismissed ? or terminated workman can competently take his grievance arising out A of his termination/dismissal to the Labour Court and such grievance by virtue o the provisions of subsection (4) of section 25‑A of the Ordinance is to be deemed as an industrial dispute.
9. Regarding the second objection reference can be invited to the case of Crescent Jute Products Ltd. Jaranwala v. Muhammad Yaqub etc. P L D 1978 S C 207, wherein it has been held that Labour Court can go behind a dismissal order and see for itself whether on facts and in circumstances of case, dismissal order was or was not justified both on merits as well as law. The learned Labour Court as also the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal have recorded specific findings to the effect that the charges levelled against the respondents were not established at all and there was nothing on the record to suggest that they have in any manner collaborated with other staff in the misappropriation of money. Interference by this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction with a finding of fact recorded by tribunals of competent jurisdiction is not permissible.
10. In the light of the foregoing conclusion, there is no merit in the present writ petitions which are, therefore, dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
S.Q./A‑344/L ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Petitions dismissed.