MUHAMMAD ALI BHATTI Versus PUNJAB LABOUR COURT NO. 1, LAHORE

This petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan calls in question the order dated 29‑10‑1975 passed by the Punjab Labour Court 1, whereby he directed the petitioner to call off the illegal lock out in respect of eleven workers referred to in the report of the Assistant Director (Conciliation), Labour, Lahore Region, Lahore. It was also ordered that the aforesaid workers be paid their benefits for the period they have been locked out.

2. Case of the petitioner is that no notice was issued before proceeding under section 46‑A (2) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance (No. XXIII of 1969) (hereinafter called the Ordinance), and no inquiry as contemplated by section 46‑A was carried out. This plea has been specifically denied by respondent No. 2 in his written statement wherein it was inter alia stated, that the notice was duly served upon the petitioner after a date of hearing had been fixed by the Punjab Labour Court No. 1. The inquiries were conducted at the spot by the Assistant Director (Conciliation), Labour Welfare, himself. It is stated that the petitioner was also afforded an opportunity of being heard by the Assistant Director, which was duly availed by him on 22‑10‑1975 when the conciliatory efforts conducted by him also failed in the presence of the Deputy Director (Conciliation). It is specifically pleaded in the written statement that the impugned proceedings were instituted by respondent No. 2 in conformity with the requirements of section 46‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. Thus visualised, a presumption of regularity is attached to the impugned official acts taken by respondent No. 2. Additionally, this disputed question of fact cannot be enquired into in these proceedings. The case of Star Textile Mills v. 'Third Sindh Labour Court, Karachi and others (1973 PLC 376), is distinguishable and not applicable to the facts of the present case. In the precedent case; there were three separate registered Trade Unions in the Star Textile Mills Ltd., Karachi. One of the Unions was the Collective Bargaining Agent. Notice under section 46‑A(2) was issued only to C.B.A. to the exclusion of other Trade Unions. In these circumstances, it was held that non‑issuance of notices to other Trade Unions was not sufficient compliance with the provisions of section 46‑A(2) of the. Ordinance. In the instant case, learned Presiding Officer of Punjab Labour Court No. 1, Lahore, recorded statement of the Assistant Director (Conciliation), Labour Welfare, in the presence of the petitioner and on receipt of the report of the Reporting Officer under section 46‑A of the Ordinance, notice was issued to the management, as well as, to the workers' Union for 22‑10‑1975. The petitioner‑management failed to lead any evidence in rebuttal before the Labour Court and, therefore, it does not lie in their mouth to contend that no enquiry was conducted by the Assistant Director (Conciliation). After careful scrutiny of the material placed before the Punjab Labour Court No. 1, Lahore, and providing an adequate opportunity of hearing to the parties, a finding of fact was recorded, that workers of Bhatti Takki House, Jail Road, Mozang, Lahore, who are represented through their Goneral Secretary Raja Muhammad Bashir, respondent No. 3, herein, formed a Trade Union: The petitioner‑management got annoyed over it. The petitioner failed to pay the actual wages due to the workers and resorted to illegal strike in respect of eleven workers. Viewed from this angle, the impugned order is well‑reasoned and warrants no interference in these proceedings.

3. When faced with this, Mr. Muhammad Asghar, learned counsel for the petitioner pleaded that the entire proceedings before the Assistant Director (Conciliation), Labour Welfare, were coram non judice, in that, section 46‑A of the Ordinance could be invoked by the Assistant Director, Labour Welfare when there was illegal lock‑out in the factory and that the petitioner was not a factory. The term `factory' has not been defined in the Ordinance. The `factory' within the meaning of section 2, clause (j) of the Factories Act, 1934, means: ‑‑ factory means any premises, including the precincts thereof, whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months; and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried op or is ordinarily carried on with or without the aid of power, but does not include a mine, subject to the operation of the Mines Act, 1923 (1V of 1923)."

4. The report received from the Assistant Director, Labour Welfare shows that preparation of Tikkas has been taken to manufacture process and the Tikka House being a factory. The definition of the term "factory" as defined in the Factories Act, has not been expressly applied to the Ordinance for the purpose of section 46‑A of the Ordinance. But the use of expression `Factory' in section 46‑A of the Ordinance is not in its ordinary dictionary meaning but in its popular and conventional meaning. In the context of industrial and labour laws in general and the Factory Act, 1934, the expression `Factory' means any premises precincts thereof where a manufacturing process is being carried on or ordinarily carried on with or without the aid of power. The report of the Assistant Director; Labour Welfare, shows that the preparation of Tikkas has been taken to be a manufacturing process and, therefore, following the popular and conventional meaning of the expression `Factory' the premises of the petitioner were rightly treated as factory for the purposes of section 46‑A of the Ordinance. This view finds support from the dictum of the Supreme Court in the case of A.F. Ferguson & Co. v. The Sindh Labour Court and another (PLD 1985 SC 429), wherein the ratio laid down in the case of K.G. Old, Principal, Christian Technical Training Centre, Gujranwala v. Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court, Northern Zone and 6 others (PLD 1976 Lah: 1097) was approved that the definition of industry as given in section 2(xiv) of the Ordinance and the words, namely, trade, business, manufacturing calling service; employment or occupation are not used in its ordinary dictionary meaning, but in its popular and functional meaning and the same are to be understood or interpreted not in their plain dictionary meaning but in the context of industrial and labour laws. In Collins, M.R. Wilmott v. Paton (1902) 1 K.B. 237), it was held "it is not necessary to the definition of `factory' that there should be machinery therein:

5. The case of Modern Tentage and Textile Industries Ltd. v. Punjab Labour Court No. 1 and others (PLD 1978 Lah. 965), relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner is of no avail. In the precedent case the order of the Labour Court under section 46‑A of the Ordinance was found to be without jurisdiction and without lawful authority on the ground that the factory of the petitioner therein fell outside its territorial limits prescribed by the notification for Punjab Labour Court. No such point is involved in this petition. It was also held in the precedent case that on the basis of material placed before the Court, the management had failed to establish its contention that the premises at 14‑Empress Road were not a factory.

6. Let me now deal with the case of Indus Dyeing & Manufacturing Company Workers' Union, Hyderabad and another v. The Government of the Province of Sindh (1975 PLC 858). In the precedent case, it was held that section 46‑A ibid was enacted to provide a machinery for expeditious and quick interference with strikes and lock‑outs which are illegal. The Labour Court is to pass order within a short period of ten days as contemplated by sub‑clause (3) of section 46‑A of the Ordinance, following the day on which it receives a report and, therefore, in conformity with the object of the section, the legislature instead of burdening the Court with the function of securing the attendance of parties before commencement of the proceedings, has given powers to the officer of the Labour Department as specified in sub‑clauses (9) and (10) ibid to call a party in his office or secure the attendance of the parties in the factory. No such point is involved in the instant case.

7. Mr. Asghar Malik, learned counsel for the petitioner finally contended that if even it is assumed that the Labour Court was justified in declaring the lock‑out as without lawful authority it had no jurisdiction to pass orders for granting benefits to the workers for the period they have been illegally locked out. The contention is devoid of any force. A finding of fact has been recorded by the Labour Court that the lock‑out was illegal. The directions regarding payment of back benefits for the period the factory remained closed were consequential. Even otherwise, the impugned order being just and fair is not liable to be interfered with in the exercise of my discretionary Constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution. .

8. The upshot of the whole discussion is that the premises of the petitioner establishment have been rightly treated as factory within the meaning of the Ordinance. The reasons assigned by the Punjab Labour Court in the impugned order dated 27‑10‑1975 are just and fair. The writ petition, therefore, fails and is hereby dismissed, but there shall be no order as to costs.

A.A./M-1031/L

Petition dismissed.