GENERAL SECRETARY, SUI NORTHERN PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS ASSOCIATION Versus SUI NORTHERN GAS PIPELINES LIMITED
ORDER
This petition under section 22A(8)(g) read with section 15, clauses (b), (c) and (e) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 has been filed by Sui Northern Professional Engineers Association, which was registered as an Industry wise Trade Union by the Registrar of Industrying Trade Unions on 4‑3‑1991 and an intimation of this fact was sent to the petitioner on 5‑3‑1991 vide Annexure A/1. The case of the petitioners is that they are being discriminated against in respect of their employment, conditions of work, and there have been attempts to induce them, to leave the Trade Union. It appears from contents of the petition and the documents attached therewith that after the registration of the union certain Matters were taken up by the present petitioner with the higher echelons of the Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited and a letter was addressed to the Managing Director on 24‑3‑1991 concerning the alleged proposal to relax rules in fav4.our of non‑qualified persons, grant of move‑over to non‑deserving persons and; the violation of Pakistan Engineering Council Act, 1976 by way of amendment of rules. One of the grievances ventilated by the petitioners was that fresh graduates in Engineering were being inducted in Grade‑II instead of Grade‑III. No reply to the letter dated 24‑3‑1991 was sent by the Managing Director. The petitioners then addressed a letter on 18‑5‑1991 (Annexure `G') to the Pakistan Engineering Council it regard to their grievances against the hierarchy of the Administration. Another letter dated 28‑5‑1991 (Annex. J) was addressed to the Pakistan Engineering Council in regard to the apprehended violation of the Pakistan Engineering Council Act, 1976 by the Management by way of amendment of service rules whereby move‑over was sought to be granted to unqualified Engineers.
2. ? It is alleged in para. 17 of the petition that during the meeting on 1‑8‑1991 with some officers named therein the petitioner's office‑bearers namely; Qamar Aziz President, Arif Hameed, Vice President and Musaddaq Zulqarnain, General Secretary were told to withdraw the complaint which they had addressed to the Pakistan Engineering Council and to dissolve the Association and in the alternative were threatened with disciplinary action. It is further stated ‑that as an act of victimization, notices were issued to the President and General Secretary of the Petitioners' Association (Annexure `S' and `T') also why action should not be taken against them for writing letters dated 18‑5‑1991 and 28‑5‑1991 to the Pakistan Engineering Council containing baseless and frivolous information with a view to tarnish the image of the company. Both the officers gave their explanations but it appears that their explanations were found unsatisfactory and charge‑sheets under Rules 13 and 14 of the Executive Staff Service Rules for committing misconduct were served on them on 21‑10‑1991 alleging that' the abovementioned President and General Secretary had issued unauthorised communication containing wrong information. (Copy of charge‑sheet addressed to Qamar Aziz is Annex. Y). It is alleged by the petitioner Association that this manoeuvre under the facade of disciplinary action is actually calculated to punish the office‑bearers of the petitioner's Association for their Trade Union activities. It is further submitted that the President of the Association was 'refused privilege leave on frivolous grounds in order to punish him for his Trade Union activities. It has been urged that respondents had violated provisions of clauses (c) and (e) of section 15 of the IRO, 1969 and further intended to violate clause (b) of subsection (1) of section 15 of the IRO. 1969.
3. Written statement was filed on 11‑1‑1992. The facts alleged in the petition were controverted, and allegations of inducement, pressure and general harassment were squarely denied but the basic question raised was in regard to the competence of this petition. It was stated that the petitioners were a Body of Employers and could not invoke the provisions of section 15 of the IRO, 1969. It was pointed out that none of the officers mentioned in para. 17 of the petition who are said to have put pressure on the petitioners' office‑bearers to dissolve themselves have been impleaded as a party and it was explained that the charge‑sheets were issued to the persons concerned on account of justifiable disciplinary basis. It was further stated in para. 8 that regulation of terms of employment and conditions of service of employees in different executive cadres is not covered by the provisions of the IRO. In para. 9 it was stated that the demands raised by the petitioners were in the nature of the demands usually raised by CBAs but there was no procedure under the IRO for resolution of differences between different categories of Executive Officers.
4. The arguments in this case were addressed only in regard to the competence of the petition. The learned counsel for the petitioners referred to clause (xxvi) of section 2 of the I.R.O., 1969 and submitted that a Trade Union could be a combination of employers for regulating the relations between employers and employers as well. It has not been asserted before me that the petitioners are workmen. Reference was also made to section 14 of the IRO, 1969 which says that every Trade Union shall be a body corporate by the name in which it is registered and shall have perpetual succession and common seal, It was asserted that under clause (xiii) of section 2 of the IRO any dispute between the employer and employer falls within the definition of industrial dispute, learned counsel also pointed out that instead of the word "workman" the "person" is used in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of section 15 of the IRO, 1969 and the phraseology employed in the section would thus cover a trade union of employers as in. this case. On this premises it was urged that the petitioners were justified in invoking application of clauses (a), (b) and (c) of section 15 to the respondents. On the other hand Mr. Khalid Mahmood Pasha, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that this petition is not maintainable and the IRO does not contemplate that a body outside the pale of workmen can raise an industrial dispute with their higher officers. He referred to the preamble of the Ordinance which gives its object as regulation of relations between employers and workmen and the avoidance and settlement of any differences or disputes arising between them or matters connected therewith and ancillary thereto. The petitioners are an association of Engineers and admittedly belong to a different and higher strata of employers than the workmen The IRO does not provide any machinery for resolution of disputes between different Executive cadres. True that the registration of Trade Union of employers is permissible under section 22 of the IRO, 1969 but the Statute is addressed to the resolution of differences between the employers and workers and does not provide any machinery for settling the differences between employers and different executive cadres, whose terms and conditions are governed by the law of contract as held by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Pakistan Tobacco Company Ltd. v. Pakistan Tobacco Company Employees Union, Dacca and 2 others PLD 1961 SC 40. The facts in that case were different from, the present case but the basic question before their Lordships was whether the CBA could raise an Industrial Dispute in regard to the terms and conditions of salesman who was not a workman. In the cited case their Lordships were interpreting the definition of Industrial Dispute as given in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which is not different from the one as given in clause (xiii) of section 2 of the IRO, 1969 and observed that the Act must be so operated as to avoid a rift within the body of the employers themselves. The Court also observed that persons employed in the superstructure are not permitted by the Act to raise their own disputes with the Company directly and the machinery of the Act cannot be applied for a purpose for which it i expressly not available. The settlement of the service conditions of employer; who are not workmen is to be effected freely within the scope of the law o contract and is not susceptible of control through the instrumentality of the Industrial Disputes Act. With regard to the interpretation of the words `and person' occurring in the definition of industrial dispute in the Act, 1947, it was observed at page 412 that the expression had to be interpreted in the context it which it occurs and in the light of the scheme and general provisions of the Act. It was again observed at page 413, para. 3 that under the Act, out of the employees, only workmen can be party to a dispute and other employees cannot raise an Industrial Dispute in respect of their conditions of service directly and that a non‑workman employee or an ex‑employee of that category would appear to be excluded from the definition.
5. These observations are a complete answer to the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner that Industrial Dispute can be raised by employees other than workmen or category of supervisors or executive staff who are not covered by the definition of workmen. These observations also serve an answer to the arguments of the learned counsel that the use of word `person' in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of section 15 of the IRO, 1969 was introduced to cover employees who are non‑workmen. I may also refer to the heading of section 15 which reads as under:‑
"15. UNFAIR LABOUR PRACTICE ON THE PART OF EMPLOYERS."
6. So according to the heading the unfair labour practice has to be on the part of the employer and the use of word `person' has naturally to be interpreted within the scheme of the Statute to mean to refer to the workman only. The set up and context of the IRO, 1969 clearly indicates that the word `person' used in these clauses cannot be extended to bring within its ambit any person employed in a category other than as a workman. The word person used in section 15 may well cover the case of workers whom the management might seek to employ on conditions restricting or controlling their choice of a trade union. It may also refer to outsiders who may be members of a union under clause (d) of subsection (1) of section 7 of the IRO, 1969. Sections 15 and 16 of the IRO, 1969 contemplate only two categories of persons who can be punished for unfair labour practice and they are workmen and employers. These provisions cannot be invoked by or against any other category. I may also refer to section 43 of the IRO, 1969. which reads as under:‑
"
43. Raising of Industrial Disputes ‑‑ No Industrial Dispute shall be deemed to exit unless it has been raised in the prescribed manner by a collective bargaining agent or an employer."
7. This clearly places a complete embargo against any category of employees of the company except the workmen and an industrial dispute has to be raised only by the CBA and the CBA under clause (v) of section 2 of the Ordinance has to be a trade union of workmen which under section 22 is an agent of the workmen in the establishment. No other employees arc permitted under the law to raise an industrial dispute or to seek the protection of section 15 of the IRO, 1969.
8. Since the Statute does not provide any machinery for the resolution of the differences between the different executive categories and is only addressed to the removal of differences between the workmen and the employers, I find that this petition is incompetent and the same is hereby dismissed as) such.
A.A./186/NIRC ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Application dismissed.