NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN Versus SINDH LABOUR APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, KARACHI

1. MUKHTAR AHMED JUNEJO, J.-- -Petitioner National Bank of Pakistan has invoked Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court against an order dated 19-8-1987 passed by Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal (hereafter to be mentioned as the Tribunal) in Appeals Nos. Suk-182/85 and Suk-198/85 which were preferred against an order dated 29-5-1985 passed by the Sindh Labour Appellate Court, Sukkur. Respondent No.2 Remesh Lai was an employee of the petitioner Bank till 28-11-1983 when his dismissal was ordered after holding of a domestic inquiry. Respondent No.2 invoked jurisdiction of the Labour Court under section 25-A of the I.R.O. Learned Labour Court under an order dated 29-5-1985 ordered reinstatement of the respondent. Said order was challenged in the Tribunal by the petitioner in Appeal No.Suk-182/85. Under the impugned decision learned Tribunal dismissed the appeal and maintained the order of the Labour Court. Hence this Constitutional petition.

2. The only ground on the basis of which learned Tribunal dismissed the said appeal was that the same was not legally maintainable as the memo. of appeal had been signed by the advocate of the bank and not by the employer and that this was departure from the settled principle of law that the aggrieved person should sign himself the memo. of appeal.

3. In this respect Mr. Partab Rai, learned counsel for the petitioner Bank argued that once an appeal is admitted for hearing, it cannot be thrown away on a technical ground and that the appeal signed by the advocate wa,, maintainable in view of the provisions contained by section 37(3) of I.R.O.

4. Mr. Bashir Ahmad Awan, learned counsel for respondent No.2, canvassed the contrary view and argued that an appeal not signed by the aggrieved party, is not maintainable in law. In support learned counsel cited a judgment of this Court delivered in President, M.C.B. Ltd. v. Muhammad Yaqoob and others (C.P.No.D-.'-30 of 1990) by a D.B. to which one of us (h1ukhtar Ahmed Junejo, J.) was party.

5. In the cited case the view taken was that right of appeal under section 37(3) of the I.R.O. has been given in a very restrictive form and that an appeal under the said provision can be preferred only by the 'aggrieved party.

6. In this view of the matter with which we cannot disagree, no case is made out for interference with the impugned decision given by the Tribunal. Consequently the present constitution petition stands dismissed.

7. H.B.T./N-384/K Petition dismissed.