MATRI PUBLICATIONS LTD., HURRIYET, PUBLISHERS OF DAILY "HURRIYET KARACHI Versus IMPLEMENTATION TRIBUNAL, ISLAMABAD
1. MAMOON KAZI, J.‑‑‑ M/s. Matri Publications Limited, Karachi have filed these three petitions challenging the common judgment of the learned Implementation Tribunal for Newspapers Employees, dated 4‑2‑1988. The three respondents, namely, Zahid Hussain, Haider Imam and Shamsul Huda Ansari instituted proceedings before the learned Tribunal contending that on 14‑4‑1985, they were drawing basic pay of Rs.1,250 in Grade‑III together with Dearness Allowance of Rs.100 per month under the Third Wage Board Award. The management, i.e. the petitioner, while purporting to implement the directions contained in para. 46(i) of the fitment formula of the Fourth Wage Board Award had merged the existing pay and Dearness Allowance admissible under the Third Wage Board Award into one sum called the aggregate which worked out to Rs.1,350. According to the said respondents, it was imperative for the management (the petitioner) after having worked out the aggregate, to fix the employees' pay at such stage of the new consolidated pay scale as was next higher to the said sum so reckoned. According to the said respondents, the next higher pay being Rs.1,350 per month was to constitute the basic pay of the respondents in the new pay scale. The respondents' claim was that one increment was to be given in addition to the said amount for every five years of completed service in their grade up to the maximum of two increments. The plea raised by the respondents was accepted by the learned Tribunal and it was further ordered that the respondents would also be entitled to the arrears of the shortfall in their wages with effect from 15‑4‑1985. The petitioner is, therefore, aggrieved by the above decision.
2. We have had the advantage of hearing only Mr. Muhammad Humayun, learned counsel for the petitioner in the three petitions as none has appeared on behalf of the respondents in these petitions.
3. The main ground urged before us by Mr. Muhammad Humayun is that section 13 of Newspapers Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act') under which the learned Tribunal has purported to exercise power in the present case, such powers cannot be exercised by the Tribunal. Reference to the Ordinance in section 13, according to section 2(f) of the Act, means reference to the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969.
4. It may be pointed out that under section 9 of the aforesaid Act, the Federal Government is empowered by notification in the official Gazette to constitute a Wage Board for fixing rates of wages in respect of newspapers employees in accordance with the previsions of the Act. Section 11 of the Act provides that the decision of the Board be published within a period of one month from the date of its receipt by the Federal Government in such manner as may be prescribed. According to section 12 of the Act, such decision is to be deemed as an Award of the Full Bench of the Industrial Relations Commission, constituted under section 22‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance (hereinafter referred to as `the I.R.O.'). The Implementation Tribunal (respondent No. 1 in these petitions) was constituted by the Federal Government under section 12‑A of the Act for implementation of the decision of the Board published under section 11 of the Act. Section 13 of the Act in respect of which the entire controversy in these petitions revolves, provides as follows:‑‑
5. "13. Power of the Tribunal: ‑‑(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 64 of the Ordinance, the Tribunal shall have power‑‑‑
(a) to try an offence punishable under section 55 of the Ordinance, if the offence relates to failure to implement any decision of the Board;
(b) of its own motion, or on the application of a party, to withdraw from any Court (except the Supreme Court or a High Court) any application, proceeding or appeal relating to such an offence and dispose of it; and
(c) refer any such application, proceeding or appeal to any such competent Court for disposal.
(2) Any Court to which any application, proceeding or appeal is referred under clause (c) of subsection (1) shall enquire into it and dispose of the case as if the application or appeal had originally been made to it or, as the case may be, the proceeding had originally commenced before it.
(3) For the trial of an offence referred to in subsection (1), the Tribunal shall follow the same procedure and exercise the same powers as the Commission follows and exercises for the trial of an offence under the Ordinance, and the provisions of the Ordinance, other than the provisions of subsection (9) of section 22‑A thereof, shall so far as may be and with the necessary modifications, apply to such trial.
(4) The Tribunal shall have the power to issue a direction which a Labour Court has under subsection (1) of section 51 of the Ordinance."
6. (The rest of the section has no relevance to the questions in issue.)
7. It is, therefore, clear from the provisions of the Act reproduced above that the Implementation Tribunal has been empowered either to try an offence punishable under section 55 of the I.R.O. if the offence relates to failure of implementation of any decision of the Board or of its own motion or on the application of the party to withdraw from any Court (except Supreme Court or High Court) any application, proceeding or appeal relating to such an offence and dispose of the same. The Tribunal can refer any such application, proceeding or appeal to any competent Court for disposal. Subsection (4) of section 13 further indicates that the Tribunal has been further empowered to issue a direction which a Labour Court is empowered to issue under subsection (1) of section 61 of the I.R.O. It would thus appear that the Tribunal can either try an offence as pointed out above or it can issue directions under subsection (1) of section 51 of the I.R.O., as just pointed out in this judgment. Obviously the Tribunal was not trying any offence in the present case. The other provision, under which the Tribunal appears to have purportedly acted, is subsection (4) of section 13 of the Act, under which, as we have just pointed out, the Tribunal can exercise similar powers as have been conferred by section 51(1) of the I.R.O. Section 51(1) of the I.R.O. provides as follows:‑
8. "51. Recovery of money due from an employer under a settlement or award.‑‑‑(1) Any money due from an employer under a settlement, or under an award or decision of the Arbitrator, Labour Court or Tribunal may be recovered as arrears of land revenue or as a public demand if, upon the application of the person entitled to the money, the Labour Court, so directs."
9. A plain reading of section 51 would indicate that when any money due from an employer under a settlement or under an award or a decision of the arbitrator, Labour Court or a Tribunal is to be recovered, the same on the application of the person entitled to such recovery may be recovered as arrears of land revenue or as a public demand. Consequently, before any Court or Tribunal acts under section 51 of the I.R.O., it is imperative that there should be no dispute as to the entitlement of the applicant to the recovery of money but the amount in respect of which proceedings can be initiated under section 51 must be a predetermined amount. If there is a dispute in respect of the entitlement of such amount or the amount is not predetermined then it cannot be recovered under section 51 of the I.R.O. As is clearly evident from the impugned order, there was a dispute between the respondents and the petitioner in regard to the entitlement of the respondents to the amount claimed by the said respondents. Since the Implementation Tribunal has not been vested with any powers of adjudication in regard to individual disputes, in our opinion, the learned Tribunal was not empowered to pass the impugned order in the present case. The Tribunal being constituted under the Act could exercise only such powers which have been conferred upon the Tribunal under the said Act. The Tribunal, therefore, could not assume powers which have not been conferred upon it by the Act. We, therefore, find ourselves in complete agreement with Mr. Muhammad Humayun, learned counsel for the petitioner, that the impugned order has been passed by the Tribunal without lawful authority.
10. In the result, we allow these petitions and quash the impugned order. The parties are left to bear their own costs.
11. H.B.T./M‑1797/K Petitions allowed.