MANZOOR HUSSAIN Versus THE STATE
This matter concerns a post-arrest bail application filed by the petitioner, who was charged under sections 302, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for the murder of Ghulam Nabi. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, who allegedly inflicted 'Danda' blows on the deceased after he had already fallen from a fatal brick injury caused by a co-accused, was entitled to bail given the existence of conflicting versions of the incident and a police investigation suggesting a sudden fight rather than premeditated murder. The court held that the petitioner was not entitled to bail, reasoning that he had actively participated in the assault on the deceased. The court affirmed that the petitioner was prima facie vicariously liable for the murder alongside the principal accused. Furthermore, the court established the principle that questions regarding premeditation, sudden provocation, and aggression are matters to be determined at trial based on evidence, and police opinions or investigative reports cannot be treated as conclusive at the bail stage, particularly when eye-witness accounts under section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 support the prosecution's case.
- Does the existence of two conflicting versions of an occurrence automatically entitle an accused to bail on the ground of further enquiry?
- Can police investigation reports be treated as conclusive evidence at the stage of deciding a bail application?
- Is an accused who inflicts non-fatal injuries on a deceased person vicariously liable for murder if the fatal injury was caused by a co-accused?
- Are questions of premeditation and sudden provocation appropriate for determination at the bail stage?
- Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 148, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 149, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 337-A(i), Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 337-A(ii), Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 34, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 316, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 161, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898
ORDER
A case under section 302/148/149, P.P.C., is registered against the petitioner and four others on the ground that they committed the murder of Ghulam Nabi in an occurrence which took place on 7‑11‑1998 at about 5‑00 p.m., whereas the F.I.R., was lodged on the next following day i.e., 8‑11‑1998 at 6‑40 p.m. by one Muhammad Arshad in which it was alleged that the deceased along with another over the stray of cattle heads in the fields belonging to aforesaid Arshad had a dispute with him. The aforesaid Ghulam Nabi alongwith another gave blows to the complainant side for which initially a case was registered under section 337‑A(i)/337‑A(ii)/34, P.P.C. However, the deceased also received injuries during the occurrence for which a counter‑version was registered on the statement of Shehbaz Ali i.e., son of the deceased in which it was alleged that Arshad complainant had actually hit the deceased with a brick and that the same had proved fatal, whereas, the petitioner had caused injuries to him with 'Danda' alongwith his co‑accused namely Yaseen and Noor Ahmad after he had fallen on the ground on receiving brick injury. The attack was allegedly opened at the Lalkara of another co‑accused namely Manzoor Hussain son of Sardar to whom the petitioner was allegedly related.
2. The bail was prayed on the ground that there was delay of two days in the counter‑version; that the fatal injury was attributed to Arshad who was the complainant in this case, therefore, the petitioner was not liable for the murder nor shared vicarious liability in killing the deceased; that although the first Investigating Officer had held that the version of the petitioner's side was false but later on, the D.S.P. conducted the investigation and came to the conclusion that it was not a pre‑meditated murder, as the fight had taken place between the parties suddenly due to the stray of cattle in Arshad's field. Lastly, it was contended that at the most the offence under section 316, P.P.C., was made out from the facts of the case which does not amount to Qatl‑i‑Amd but would fall within the definition of Qatl. Shibh‑i‑Amd punishable with Diyat and imprisonment for a term extending to 14 years as Tazir. It Was, therefore, finally contended that there being two versions about the same occurrence, it had become a case of further enquiry and the petitioner was entitled to bail. Reliance was placed on 1997 PCr.U 762 (Karachi), Ibrahim and another v. The State, 1997 PCr.U 767 (Karachi), Ali Hasan v. The State and PLD 1985 Sh.C. (AJ&K) 10, Soofi Baqa Muhammad and another v. The State to support the above propositions.
3. Learned counsel for the State assisted by learned counsel for the complainant has opposed the bail application on the ground that each criminal case has to be decided on its own merits and no universal principle can be laid down for the decision of criminal matters alike. In the instant case, the petitioner had given 'Danda' blows to the deceased alongwith his co‑accused Yaseen and Noor Ahmad at the Lalkara of Manzoor Hussain son of Sardar after the deceased had fallen on the ground on receiving brick blow, therefore, the petitioner was vicariously liable with the principal accused who had given fatal blow to the deceased. Lastly, it is contended that the questions such as pre‑meditation, sudden affair and aggression can only be successfully taken into consideration at the time of trial and the police opinion at this stage would be only an ipse dixit.
4. I have considered the foregoing points and agree with the learned counsel for the State that each criminal matter has to be decided on its own peculiar circumstances and no general rule or principle can be evolved to decide one case on the analogy of the other. In the instant case as it would be clear from the above facts that the petitioner had actively participated in the murder of the deceased as he had given 'Danda' blows to the latter after he had fallen down on the ground on receiving the fatal injury from the co‑accused Muhammad Arshad. As such, prima facie the petitioner is vicariously liable with the / principal accused namely Muhammad Arshad for causing the murder of the deceased. Likewise, the questions regarding the pre meditation, sudden flare and aggression can be successfully gone into at the time of trial and the opinion of the police cannot be pressed into action at this stage, particularly when the eye‑witnesses have given clear version about the occurrence in their statements recorded under section 161, Cr.P.C. The petitioner has no case for bail at this stage. The petition is accordingly dismissed.
N.H.Q./M‑1124/L
Bail refused.