MUHAMMAD NAZIR AHMAD Versus LYALLPUR IMPROVEMENT TRUST, LYALLPUR

The appellant filed an application under section 4 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance for the fixation of fair rent in respect of a piece of land taken on lease by him from the Lyallpur Improvement Trust, respondent, for use as bus-stand. The Rent Controller at Lyallpur accepted the application and reduced the rent from Rs. 1,000 to Rs. 150 p.m. The respondent preferred an appeal against the order of the Rent Controller which was accepted by the Additional District Judge, Lyallpur, on the ground that the property in dispute stood exempted from the operation of the Ordinance. The appellant has come in second appeal to this Court.

2. The application under section 4 of the Ordinance was filed on 12-4-1966. A notification under section 3 of the Ordinance exempting the properties vesting in Improvement Trusts from its operation was issued on 27-10-1967. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the notification in question could not possibly affect proceedings pending at the time of its issuance and as such the learned Additional District Judge erred in dismissing the application for fixation of fair rent on this ground alone. In support of his submission he has relied upon a large number of authorities reported as Muhamntad Amir Khan v. Muhammad Khalil (A I R 1947 Lah. 180), Peoples' Bank v. Wahid Bakhsh (A I R 1943 Lah. 170), Saeed Ahmad v. State (P L D 1964 S C 266), State v. Sharif (P L D 1960 Lah. 236), Fazal-ur-Rahman v. Abdul Rashid (P L D 1967 Lah. 828), Jamil v. Sultan Mahmood Khan (P L D 1966 Pesh. 43), Transocean Asia v." Secretary the Government of Pakistan (P L D 1967 Kar. 445) and Muhammad Amir Khan v. Controller of Estate Duty (P L D 1.962 S C 335). These authorities reiterate the accepted rule that normally a statute is not to be construed retrospectively so as to take away vested rights, or affect proceedings pending at the time of its enactment. However, two of these authorities are worthy of notice. In Peoples, Banks v. Wahid Bakhsh, certain properties were attached during in the course of execution of a decree. Before these properties could be auctioned the Punjab Relief of Indebtedness Act was enacted. Section 35 of the Act exempted certain types of the property from attachment. A question arose if this section had any effect on the attachment already made. It was answered by a Full Bench in the negative and it was held that this section did not have any retrospective operation and- as such could not affect the pending proceedings. In Muhammad Amir Khan v. Muhammad Khalil, a District Magistrate issued a notification under the Defence of India Rules, preventing the ejectment of tenants so long as they paid the rent and were in the opinion of the District Magistrate good tenants. It was held that this notification did not hit the pending suits for ejectment.

3. The principle is quite clear that a statute unless it expressly provided is not to be construed in a manner so as to affect proceedings which were pending at the time of its enactment. This principle is fully applicable to notifications issued under a statutory authority. I am, therefore, in agreement with the learned counsel for the appellant that the notification by which the properties vesting in Improvement Trust were taken out of the purview of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance did not affect the proceedings which had already been instituted and were pending disposal. The learned Additional District Judge, therefore, erred in dismissing the application of the appellant for the fixation of the fair rent on the basis of the said notification.

4. The learned counsel -for the respondent has made an application for leading additional evidence. His case is that the property in dispute belonged to the Provincial Government which had transferred it to the respon dent for the purposes of management alone. There was already a notification in force, issued on 12th March, 1959, which exempted all property vesting in. the Central and Provincial Governments from the operation of the provisions of the Ordinance. There are two serious objections to this application. In the first instance no satisfactory explanation has been given why this plea was not taken up. before the Rent Controller. Second, this notification applies only to the properties which have been leased out by the Central or the Provincial Governments themselves. In support of this view I would invite reference to a case reported as Assistant Registrar Co-operative Societies v. Abdul Jabbar (P L D 1966 Kar. 214) wherein Waheeduddin, J. relying on Abdul Salam v. Waheed-ud-Din (P L D 1963 Lah. 517) observed :-

"It was held by the Full Bench that the scope of the notification under section 3 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction, Ordinance, 1959, must be restricted to such properties vested in the Central or Provincial Government, which were leased out by them to tenants and not to any other property. I am also of the view that it applies only to such buildings."

It is common ground that the land in dispute here was leased out by. respondent, and not by the Provincial Government, to the appellant. Thus, the notification from which the learned counsel for the respondent wishes to draw benefit does not in terms extend to the tenancy case.

5. For the reasons stated above, I accept this appeal and remand the case to the learned Addititional District Judge, Lyallpur, for a fresh decision of the appeal on the merits. The respondent shall bear the costs of this appeal.

K. M. A. Appeal accepted.