HAMIDA MAHBOOB Versus FAUJI FOUNDATION MEDICAL CENTRE, RAWALPINDI

The petitioner was employed as a married nursing sister by the Fauji Foundation on 6-4-1968. By an order dated 25-I1-1970, her services were terminated with effect from 26-11-1970. She filed a civil suit on 14-12-1970 for declaration to challenge the termination of her services. The suit was resisted by the Fauji Foundation. On the pleadings of the parties the trial Court framed the following issues

(1) Is the order of defendant dated 25-1170, illegal, ultra vices, arbitrary, mala fide and ineffective ?

(2) Is this suit not maintainable ?

The learned trial Judge decided both the issues in favour of the Fauji Foundation and dismissed the suit. The petitioner went in appeal before the Additional District Judge but without any success. She has now come in revision to this Court.

2. Before I take up the main contention of the petitioner in this civil revision I may take notice of an application made by her for permission to adduce additional evidence in this case. The additional evidence is in the form of some publicity material issued by the Fauji Foundation in respect of its activities. According to her these documents show that the Fauji Foundation. is a government-run organisation. I do not think that these documents would even if admitted into evidence: further her case in any way. It was not disputed on her behalf that the Fauji Foundation was a charitable trust within the meaning of the Charitable Endowments Act, 1890: Quite obviously it had an existence independent of and different from that of the Federal Government. The mere assertion that part of the funds of the Foundation had been provided by the Government would not make it a department of the Government.

3. The Courts below have held that the relationship between the petitioner and the Fauji Foundation was governed by the general law of master and servant and that even if her removal from service was not in accordance with the service rules framed by the Fauji Foundation for its employees a suit for declaration would not lie and the only remedy available to her was to institute a suit for damages for wrongful dismissal. The learned counsel has challenged the correctness of this view by referring to a decision of the Supreme Court reported as Salaliuddird v. Frontier Sugar Mills and Distillery Ltd. (PLD1975SC244). This authority has no relevance to the facts before me, for, all that was held by the Supreme Court was that a writ of quo warranto would lie in respect of a public office and that the expression `public office' was wide enough to include the office of a director of a public limited company. It cannot be said by and, stretch of imagination that the office which the petitioner was holding in the Fauji Foundation was of public nature or that the public had some vital interest in it. It could, therefore, hardly be termed as a public office. On the other hand in the case of R. T. H. Janjua v. National Shipping Corporation (PLD1974SC146) the Supreme Court took the view that the only remedy available to a person who had been removed from an office which was not a public one was to file a suit for damages for wrongful removal or dismissal. I do not see how the petitioner can get out of this rule. The Courts below were, therefore, justified in dismissing her suit on the ground of competency.

4. For the reasons stated above I find no merit in this civil revision which is hereby dismissed. Since the Fauji Foundation has not been represented before me today there shall be no order as to costs.

S. G. D. ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Revision dismissed.