MUHAMMAD ABBAS Versus KHALIDA KHATOON

ORDER

On an application made by the respondent, Mst. Khalida Khatoon that she needed the house in dispute for personal use, a Rent Controller ordered the ejectment of the appellant, Sh. Muhammad Abbas from there. The appellant assailed the aforesaid order before an Additional District Judge best without success. He has, therefore, come up in second appeal to this Court.

2. The respondent requires the house in question for using it as her residence. Learned counsel for the appellant. contended that the appellant' got this house on lease for the purpose of keeping his cattle there and, therefore, the respondent could not get it for residential purpose. He, however, conceded that it was a residential building within the meaning of clause (g) of section 2 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959. This being the legal position, the mere fact that the respondent used `t it as a cattle shed does not disentitle the respondent from getting it back for the purpose of being used as a residence. Needless to say that in out country, more often than not, residential apartments are used as cattle-shads and vice versa. The respondent cannot, therefore, be non-suited on the short ground that she bad let out the premises in dispute to the appellant for the purpose of keeping his cattle there.

3. It was next contended by the learned counsel that in the application for ejectment it was stated by the respondent that she needed the house in dispute for the purpose of being used as her residence but when she entered the witness box she deposed that the house was needed for her children also. The argument proceeds that in view of this drift in the position of the respondent, her requirement could not be treated as bona fide. Learned counsel fur the appellant, however, conceded that when it was stated by the respondent in her application that she wanted the house for her own use she did not mean to convey that she would live in the house all by herself and leave her children elsewhere. Obviously, when a landlord requires any premises for his own occupation he intends to use them for his entire family including himself. Thus, while explaining that his requirement is genuine, if a landlord discloses the number of the members of his family or spells out their individual requirements he does not substitute his own need by that of his children. A careful look . at the provision of subsection (3) of section 13 of the said Ordinance would reveal that by the word "own occupation" used in subsection (3) the framers of the law meant the occupation of the entire family of the landlord and not of the landlord alone, B and by "occupation of any of his children" they had in mind the occupation of grown up and married children of the landlord who planned to live independently and separately. It is not in the deposition of the landlady in the present case that her children were of the aforesaid category and wanted to reside in the house in dispute without associating her with their living. I am, therefore, unable to agree with the learned counsel for the appellant that there was shifting of ground on the part of the respondent which did not reflect well on her band. fides.

4. The last contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant was that the house in dispute had only one room which was not enough for the requirements of the respondent. He has admitted that no question was put to the respondent when she was in the witness-box, as to how she C will be able to do with that much accommodation. Instances are not lacking in which, in our country, families consisting of the spouses and children live in houses having accommodation as aforesaid. Even if the accommodation presently available to the respondent in the house in dispute proves to be inadequate. there will be no bar to he: adding more rooms to those already existing on he spot. I am, therefore; not impressed by the arguments of the learned counsel that the house in dispute is not sufficient to cope with the requirements of the .respondent.

5. No other plea was raised by the learned counsel.

6. In my view, the order under appeal does not call for any interference. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed in limine.

7. The appellant is, however, allowed two months' time to vacate the house in dispute.

. Appeal dismissed.