AKHLAQ AHMAD Versus KISHWAR SULTANA
This writ petition is directed against the judgment of Judge, Family Court, dated 15‑7‑1986 whereby while answering other issues on merits against the wife except of cruelty and Khula', he granted. a decree for dissolution of marriage.
2. The learned counsel's first contention before this Court is that the judgment is based on insufficient evidence. On this point I must observe that there is difference between insufficiency of evidence and total want of evidence. The judgment without evidence is void or voidable as the case may be. Insufficiency of evidence is a relative term. There were two witnesses examined in support of version of the defendant wife and she herself also appeared to support her case. That evidence has been perused and it cannot on factual plane be said that it was insufficient for the decision of the issues against the petitioner. This ground, therefore, fails.
3. The second objection raised by the learned counsel is that the terms of Khula' have not been examined or laid down. This objection B is answered by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Akhlaq Ahmad v. Mst. Kishwar Sultan and others P L D 1983 S C 252, wherein the following proposition has been laid down:‑‑
"As regards the third submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that dissolution of marriage by Khula' cannot stand whilst an inquiry on facts with regard to the terms on which it is to be granted is yet to take place, it appears plausible but is not quite sound. It was held in the case of Moonshee Buzat‑ul‑Raheem v . Luteefutoon Nisa 3 Moore's Ind. App. 1379 that non‑payment of stipulated consideration for Khula' does not invalidate the dissolution of marriage by Khula'. Once the Family Court came to the conclusion that the parties cannot remain within the limits of God and the dissolution of marriage by Khula' must take place, the inquiry into the terms on which such dissolution shall take place does not affect the conclusion but only creates civil liabilities with regard to the benefits to be returned by the wife to the husband and does not affect the dissolution itself."
4. In view of what has been stated above, I do not think there is any scope for this Court to interfere in its Constitutional jurisdiction with the impugned order which does not suffer from a vitiative factual c or legal infirmity. This petition, therefore, fails and is hereby dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
H.B.T./A‑294/L Petition dismissed.