MOHAR KHAN Versus SULTAN KHAN

ORDER

In a declaratory suit filed by the petitioners on 5‑5‑1986 with regard to the dispute about the inheritance of one Surjan son of Mohar Singh a deceased refugee‑right‑holder, which had been decided by the Collector/ D. R. C. (L) Chunian on 6‑11‑1983 but was remanded by the Additional Commissioner, Lahore in his capacity as Additional Rehabilitation Commissioner (L) for holding of a proper inquiry into the dispute; they did not claim any decree for permanent injunction and yet filed an application under Order XXXIX of the C.P.C. for issuance of a temporary injunction to restrain the holding of inquiry in persuance of the remand order. After considering the matter learned trial Judge came to be of view that since the dispute about the wrong exclusion of certain heirs of the deceased was still pending determination in an earlier suit, therefore, the dispute raised subsequently was dependant for its determination essentially on the facts to be found in the earlier suit and hence the proceedings to be taken in the mutation on the basis of the order of remand were not proper to be stayed. He accordingly rejected the application by his order dated 10‑9‑1986.

2. An appeal there against filed by the petitioners was heard and rejected by a learned Additional District Judge on 5‑9‑1987 with the conclusion that the grant of temporary injunction would tantamount to causing unnecessary interference in the functions of the competent authorities and hence there was neither a prima facie case in favour of the plaintiffs nor did the consideration of balance of convenience lean in their favour.

3. The plaintiffs have now come up to this Court on revision to claim that the temporary injunction was deserved to be issued in their favour. This plea is altogether devoid of substance because in the suit itself the petitioner‑plaintiffs had not prayed for a decree of permanent injunction and it is well‑settled that in such cases plea for issuance of temporary injunction cannot be accepted. Moreover, p section 56 of the Specific Relief Act prohibits the passing of a decree of such a permanent injunction and even a temporary injunction in such terms cannot be issued by a Civil Court whereto the Rehabilitation Authorities are not subordinate and in the above view of the matter there was no occasion for issuing any temporary injunction.

4. In addition to the foregoing, the fact is that the order of temporary injunction sought by the petitioners related to the domain of discretionary jurisdiction and the two courts below have exercised their discretion into refusing their prayer upon a due consideration E of the relevant factors governing the grant or refusal of such orders and they cannot be said to have acted either arbitrarily or fancifully to attract the exercise of revisional jurisdiction as is laid down in Shahzada Muhammad Umar Beg v. Sultan Mahmood Khan and another P L D 1970 SC 139 and re‑affirmed in Kanwal Nain and 3 others v. Fateh Khan and others P L D 1983 SC 53.

5. This proceeding is only frivolous and being completely devoid of substance, the revision petition is dismissed in limine.

A . A . / M‑442 / L. Revision dismissed.