HYSONS SUGAR MILLS LTD. Versus MARKET COMMITTEE, KHANPUR
The revisional jurisdiction of this Court has been invoked to set aside the order dated 16‑6‑1985 pronounced by the learned Civil Judge 1st Class; Rahimyar Khan, and that of the learned District Judge, Rahimyar Khan, dated 8‑9‑1985 who had denied the petitioner the grant of a temporary injunction as prayed for.
2. The brief facts of this case are that the Market Committee, Khanpur was to recover Rs.2,60,000 from the petitioner Mills on account of Market Committee fee. This amount can be recovered as arrears of land revenue and the Tehsildar (Recovery) issued a notice to ‑the petitioner Mills for the payment of the said amount. The petitioner sought the assistance of the learned trial Court for a declaration to the effect that the market fee sought to be recovered on the purchase of sugarcane and the notice issued for its recovery was illegal, void and ineffective on its rights. A separate application was moved for the grant of a prohibitory order. restraining the respondents from recovering the sum in dispute. The learned trial Court dismissed the application of the petitioner for the grant of restraint order on 16‑6‑1985 and also rejected the plaint under Order 7, Rule 11 of the C.P.C.
3. The petitioner lodged an appeal and the learned District Judge quashed the order of the learned trial Court regarding the rejection of the plaint under Order 7, ' Rule 11, C.P.C. and directed the learned trial Court to act in accordance with law. He, however, dismissed the appeal of the petitioner and refused to grant a temporary injunction.
4. It has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that there should have been a difference of thirty days in the issuance of notifications under Sections 3 and 4 of the Punjab Agricultural Produce Ordinance and since it was not done, the Market Committee was non‑existent. Section 3 of the said Ordinance deals with a notification of intention of exercising control over purchase and sale of agricultural produce in a specified area. The proviso to this section envisages that such .period shall not be less than thirty days from the date of issue of the notification. In this case, notification under section 3 of the said Ordinance is dated 7‑9‑1980 and was published in the official Gazette on 1‑10‑1980. Notification under Section 4 pertains to the declaration of the notified area which was issued on 1‑10‑1980 and was published in the Punjab Gazette on 28‑1‑1981. The learned counsel for the petitioner has cited P L D 1978 SC (AJ&K) 37 and Mir Dost Muhammad v. Government of Baluchistan and 3 others (P L D 1980 Quetta 1) and has contended that when a statute provides a procedure for doing of a thing in a particular manner, it should be done in the prescribed manner or not done at all. The learned counsel for the petitioner means to say that there should have been an interval of thirty days between the issuance of both the notifications and when it is not done then both the notifications are void.
5. Notification has been defined in Section 2 Para 41 of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act, 1956. According to the said section, "notification" shall mean a notification published under proper authority in the Official Gazette. There is a difference of more than thirty days in the publication of both the notifications and in this manner, prima facie, the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner does not appear to be sound.
6. It has been represented by the petitioner that the disputed amount is not a sum due and in this manner it could not be recovered as arrears of land revenue and the petitioner was not in a position to approach the Civil Court under section 91 of the Land Revenue Act. Under Section 32 of the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets Ordinance 1978, all sums due from a Market Committee to the Govern ment may be recovered in the same manner as arrears of land revenue. It may also be noted that under Rule 38 of the Agricultural Produce Markets (General) Rules, 1979, every licensed dealer was required to submit a return in Form 'H . A .' showing his purchase in respect of each commission agent and sales in respect of each dealer. According to para 4 of this Rule when a dealer fails to submit a return as prescribed under sub‑rule (1), the Market Committee may, after issuing of notice to him, assess the amount of his business during the period in question on' the basis of such information as may be available and levy the fee accordingly. In the instant case Form 'H‑A' was not submitted by the petitioner and the Market Committee assessed the amount on the basis of the information available for levying the market fee. The learned counsel for the respondents has explained that the petitioner Mills used to send a daily return to the Assistant Commissioner, Khanpur regarding the arrival of sugarcane and its weightage, etc. and they assessed the market fee on the said information supplied by the petitioner to the Assistant Commissioner.
7. About the balance of convenience, it may be pointed out that the petitioner Mills have not paid any market fee to the respondents since the year 1968. The market fee constitutes the major portion of its funds. Under section 156 of the Punjab Local Government Act, 1975, a Municipal Committee or Halqa Council with the sanction of the Government, is to establish within its limits, Farm Market for purchase and sale etc. of the Farm produce. The Market Committee is to pursue various projects for the promotion of which the funds must be available In this manner, the balance of convenience which tilts in favour of the respondents is the balance of inconvenience to the Market Committee which has not been paid the market fee since very long time.
8. Both the learned lower Courts have exercised their discretion against the petitioner Mills. In P L D 1968 Lah. 876, the principles governing reasonableness of temporary injunction have been enumerated which are as follows:‑
(1) Prima facie case,
(2) Balance of convenience,
(3) Irreparable loss,
(4) Conduct of the parties,
(5) Nature of the suit,
(6) The time likely to be absorbed in it, '
(7) The stakes of the parties involved and workability and reasonableness of the orders proposed to be passed.
In Malik Noor Muhammad v. WAPDA PLD 1981 Lah. 340 it was held that when the discretion exercised by the subordinate Courts while disposing of. application for temporary injunction is neither arbitrary nor perverse then the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the impugned orders. The same principle has been enunciated in the Sheikhupura Central Cooperative Bank Ltd., Sheikhupura v, Province of Punjab through Collector, District Sheikhupura 1980 S C M R 699 and Qasim, etc. v. Punjab Province, etc. N L R 1985 Uc. 396.
9. The petitioner has not been able to make out a case for temporary injunction. Revision petition is dismissed.
M.Y.H./H‑73/L Petition dismissed.