SHAHBAZ Versus MUHAMMAD SHAMEER
ORDER
Petitioner Shahbaz filed a pre‑emption suit on 20‑8‑1986 for possession of 100 Kanals of land situated in village Chaukan, Tehsil Jhang which had been sold by Gehena son of Lai in favour of the respondent Muhammad Shameer for an ostensible price of Rs.50,000 by means of Mutation No. 377 sanctioned on 24‑8‑1985, claiming a preferential right on the ground of his being an owner of the estate where the suit land is situated. By the order, dated 15‑12‑1986, learned trial Judge rejected the plaint of his suit under Order VII, Rule 11 of the C.P.C. as not disclosing any cause of action inasmuch as by virtue of the law declared by their Lordships of the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court in Government of N.‑W.F.P. through Secretary, Law Department v. Malik Said Kamal Shah P L D 1986 SC 360, after 31‑7‑1986 the plaintiff could not be said to be possessed of the right to sue for preemption on such a ground and, hence, he could not be a person holding the necessary qualification at all the three crucial stages of the litigation.
2. An appeal there against filed by the plaintiff was heard by the learned District Judge, Jhang and dismissed on 2‑3‑1987 by affirmig the view of the trial Court by upholding its order on the authority of the law laid down in Khan Muhammad and 3 others v. Ghulam Rasool and 5 others P L D 1987 Lah. 71 after a thorough examination of the different aspects of the controversy.
3. The plaintiff has now come up to this Court on revision and learned counsel has attempted to urge on the authority of a Full Pench Judges of this Court reported as Abdul Ghaffar Khan and others v. Saghir Ahmad Aslam and others P L D 1987 Lah. 358 that since the right to acquire in exercise of the right of pre‑emption comes into existence from the very moment of its sale, the cases originating under the law as it existed the declaration made by their Lordship of the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court to be decided in accordance with the then existing law. This, I may venture to state, is not the proposition laid down by the Full Bench in the mentioned cases and the correctness of the views expressed therein is also stated to be under consideration with their Lordships of the Supreme Court, but speaking for myself, with all the respect that I may be capable of showing, I am in complete agreement with the conclusions reached by my learned brother Muhammad Munir Khan, J on the basis of formidable reasons contained in the above‑cited case of Khan Muhammad and in my humble view, it is not possible to countenance the proposition sought to be advanced by the learned counsel because the suit in hand was instituted on 20‑8‑1986 while the right urged therein by the plaintiff‑petitioner had ceased to exist on and from 1‑8‑1986 so that no other Court in the country could have the power to hold otherwise, either on that day or afterwards.
4. Result of the foregoing is that the suit of the petitioner has been rightly held by the two Courts below to be incapable of being proceeded with. There does not exist any case for exercise of revisional jurisdiction. Hence, dismissed in limine.
A . A . /S‑153/L Revision dismissed.