SHAH MUHAMMAD Versus MAQSOODA BEGUM
ORDER
Petitioner filed a declaratory suit with regard to 103 Kanals and 7 Marlas of agricultural land situated in village Maraliwala, Tehsil Gujranwala whereabout he claimed himself to be the sole allottee by way of subsistence as a J & K State Refugee since the year 1962‑63 and alleged that the defendants do not have any concern therewith. The suit was contested by Mst. Maqsooda Begum defendant No.l for herself and also as a guardian‑ad‑litem for the other defendants, her minor daughters. It was asserted that the allotment had been made in the name of all of them as the members of one family but the plaintiff has since divorced Mst. Maqsooda Begum and despite an application made by him earlier for partition of the land among the parties and the consequent order passed by the D . S . C . (L) on 5‑8‑1966 which was also upheld on 14‑2‑1967 upon dismissing his revision petition there against, he had filed the present suit only on 16‑5‑1977 which is not only barred by time but even the plaintiff is estopped by his conduct to file the suit. At an earlier stage, on 26‑3‑1978, the trial Court had rejected the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the C.P.C. for the reason of the suit being barred by time and also the omission of the plaintiff to pray for the relief of possession, admitted to be vesting in the defendants. An appeal there against filed by the plaintiff was, however, accepted by an Additional District Judge on 27‑9‑1978 to remand the suit to the trial Court so that the plaintiff is provided an opportunity to amend the plaint to be able to include therein the prayer of possession and the question about the suit being barred by time is also decided after framing an appropriate issue. He directed the parties to put in appearance ire the trial Court on 12‑10‑1978 and in spite of a period of about 6 years elapsing ever since then, the pliantiff did not make any prayer for amendment of the plaint with a view to claiming a decree for possession against the defendants. Issue No.l with regard to the suit being barred by time was duly framed by the trial Court on 12‑9‑1979 alongwith 9 other relevant issues and it was held on the basis of evidence that the suit filed after about 10 years of undeniable knowledge acquired by the plaintiff of the order passed by the D.S.C(L) was barred by limitation. It was also concluded under issues Nos. 2 and 5 that the suit was not competent in the form that it had been maintained and therein the learned trial Judge took specific notice of the plaintiff's indifference towards the concession made available to him in the appellate order which he had not cared to avail himself of. Learned trial Judge presumably had the provisions of Article 14 of the Limitation Act and Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act in his view in recording the above findings to dismiss the plaintiff's: suit by his judgment dated 31‑5‑1984.
2. Plaintiff again challenged the trial Court's decree in an appeal which was heard by a learned Additional District Judge and dismissed on 23‑9‑1984 by upholding the findings of the trial Court and affirming its decree. He has now come up to this Court on revision:
3. Counsel for the petitioner contended that the two Courts below had erroneously disregarded the plaintiff's prayer for addition of relief of delivery of possession of the land held by the defendants. Trial Court's record was sent for to verify his assertion. It has been received. Petitioner's Advocate has not been able to point out any prayer made by the plaintiff at any stage of the litigation and he has not been able to even dislodge the adverse remarks thereabout made by the two Courts below against the petitioner‑plaintiff. Thus, it is obvious that in the presence of unquivocal admission of the plaintiff about the possession of the land vesting in the defendants since the last 7 or 8 years, under the proviso to Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, he cannot be granted the declaration claimed by him and his suit is liable to be dismissed under Section 3 of the Limitation Act for the reason of its being barred under Article 14 thereof which provides a limitation of only one year to challenge the orders passed by Government Officers in their official capacity.
4. The decrees of concurrence passed by the two Courts below about the dismissal of the petitioner's suit are quite justified and clearly unexceptionable.
5. There is no case made out at all for exercise of revisional jurisdiction. Hence, dismissed in limine.
A.A. /S‑152/L Revision dismissed.