RUSTAM ALI Versus HAIDER BAKHSH

This writ petition assails the orders dated the 14th of October, 1987, of the learned Civil Judge, Khanewal, and dated the 20th of October, 1987, of the learned Addl. District Judge, Khanewal, whereby the petitioners were refused to be impleaded as parties in the suit brought by the respondent for pre‑emption of the land in question.

2. Initially the sale had taken place on the 15th of April, 1976, in favour of Khalid Rasheed vendee who, before institution of the suit for its pre‑emption, transferred it to respondents Nos.3 to 9. They were impleaded in the suit but the respondent claimed a better right of pre‑emption even against them. However, out, of them Mohammad Sharif and Mohammad Yusuf sold their respective shares in favour of the present writ petitioners on the 20th of September, 1979 and the 12th of December, 1983, respectively, of course, during the pendency of the suit. These two vendees of the third instance made an application before the trial Court to be impleaded as parties. The Court acting upon the principle laid down in section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act rejected their application and so was the order passed in Revision by the learned Addl. District Judge.

3. The first thing affecting this petition is the rule enunciated in Ghulam Hussain and another v. Malik Shahbaz Khan and another (1985 S.C.M.R. 1925) which bars writ petitions in regard to matters arising out of civil suits. Here, the petitioners availed their remedy of Revision and that should have been the end of the matter. However, reliance was placed upon a leave granting order of the Supreme Court dated the 13th of October, 1987, passed in C.P.S.L.A. No.630 of 1987, which was admitted to consider an order of this Court refusing such a prayer, but in view of the rule enunciated in Mian Ghulam Jilani, Maj‑Gen. (Retd.) v . Federal Government of Pakistan 1975 Lah.65 such an order does not lay down law to be followed. Next, Allah Rakhio v. Khushmir Khan and 4 others (1986 C.L.C.1828) was also relied upon in support of the contention that all parties may be impleaded to a suit in order to adjudicate effectively upon all matters arising between them. No doubt ordinarily all parties legally interested in a lis may be impleaded for effective adjudication, yet it has to be kept in view that acquisition of interest by them is not hit by any provision of law. Section 52, Transfer of Property Act outright prohibits acquisition of interest at the instance of one of the parties to the suit during its pendency and, therefore, if a subsequent vendee like the petitioners chooses to purchase land despite pendency of the suit, he will do it .at his own risk. He cannot be allowed to be brought on the record by traversing what section 52 ibid. lays down. In fact, I may be bound by the Full Bench decision reported in Mt. Sant Kaur v. Teja Singh (AIR (33) 1946 Lah. 142) wherein precisely such a subsequent vendee acquiring land during pendency of a suit was held not to be even a proper party. Joinder may not be allowed merely on the ground of multiplicity of pleadings. At times there may be a well‑considered design to confuse things) and in order to avoid any such contrivance the law would like to nip the evil in the bud. The writ petition is dismissed.

H.B.T./R‑51/L Petition dismissed.