GULZAR AHMAD Versus SARDAR ALAM

ORDER

The petitioner purchased the suit‑land vide a Mutation No.1031 attested on 11‑6‑1998. The sale price recorded is Rs.'2,25,000. On 1‑9‑1998 the respondents filed a suit for possession of the suit‑land by pre‑emption. In the plaint it was alleged that the land had in fact been sold for Rs.1,50,000 which is also the market value of the same. The suit came up before the learned Civil Judge on the same date when it was registered, summons were issued to the petitioners for 22‑9‑1998, who were also directed to maintain status quo. Following order was passed for the deposit of 1/3rd:‑‑

The respondents proceeded to deposit Rs.50,000 and presented the receipt on 22‑9‑1998. The case was adjourned. The petitioner put in appearance. Filed written statement. Issues were framed on 17‑4‑1999. The case was being adjourned for recording of evidence, when on 29‑4‑2000 an application was filed for dismissal of the suit on the ground that instead of Rs.75,000 which is 1/3rd of the price recorded in the mutation, a sum of Rs.50,000 has been deposited. In their reply the respondents stated that an order specifying the amount to be deposited was not passed; that the counsel directed them to deposit Rs.50,000 and they did so. It was also stated that learned trial Court may correct the order and that the respondents shall comply with the same. The learned trial Court dismiss the suit vide order, dated 11‑9‑2000. A first appeal filed by the respondents was heard by the learned Additional District Judge, Okara, who allowed the same on 19‑1‑2001 remanded back the suit for its decision.

2. Learned counsel contends that since the price was mentioned ins the mutation, there was no question of any misinterpretation of the order passed by the learned trial Court regarding the deposit of 1/3rd, as the learned trial Court has no discretion whatever in a case where price is mentioned in the mutation but to order deposit of 1/3rd of the said price. Relies on the case of Awal Noor v. District Judge, Karak 1992 SCMR 746.

3. I have gone through the copies of the several documents appended with this civil revision including the judgment of the learned Courts below. Before I proceed further I may state here that the judgment of apex Court being relied upon by the learned counsel was given m a case involving interpretation of section 24 of the N.‑W.F.P. Pre‑emption Act, 1987. There is, however, marked differences between the provisions of said section 24 and section 24 of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act, 1991. This difference is visible in the provision of subsection (1) to section 24 of N.‑W.F.P. Act, 1987 .and the second proviso to subsection (1) of section 24 of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act, 1991, 1 reproduce the two for comparison inter se:‑‑

N.‑W.F.P. Pre‑emption Act, 1987 Punjab Pre‑emption Act, 1991

Provided that if no sale price is Provided further that if no mentioned in the sale‑deed or in sale price is mentioned in the the mutation, the Court shall sale‑deed or in the mutation, or require the deposit of one‑third of the price so mentioned appears to the probable value of the property. be inflated, the Court shall require deposit of one‑third of the probable value of the property. (Emphasis provided).

When two provisions are seen in juxtaposition to each other it becomes I apparent that under the Punjab Pre‑emption Act, 1991 Court is mandated to require deposit of one‑third of probable value of the property where the price mentioned in the mutation or the sale‑deed appears to be inflated:

3. To my mind in every case where there is an allegation that the price mentioned in the mutation or the sale‑deed is inflated the Court is under obligation to examine the plaint arid whatever documents are accompanying and after said examination upon being satisfied that the price does appear to be inflated it is bound by law to determine by approximation the probable value and then to direct the plaintiff to deposit one‑third thereof. In the present case, however, a bare look on order, dated 1‑9‑1998 would reveal that the learned trial Court had not even cared to examine the plaint while passing order of deposit of one‑third. Not only this when on 22‑9‑1998 the respondents presented the receipt before the learned Judge, it is but apparent he did not bother to go through the same. It is thus, the case failure to act properly as cautioned by the Supreme Court in the case of Sherin and others v. Fazal Muhammad and others 1995 SCMR 584 and well‑settled principle that an act of Court is to cause no wrong to a party becomes squarely applicable. The learned Courts entertaining the suits under the Punjab Pre -emption Act, 1991, ought to examine the plaint and any material accompanying it while passing orders for deposit of one‑third and should work out the amount payable and direct the parties to deposit the said amount in order to avoid any complication later on. This is of great importance as consequences provided for non‑compliance of order of deposit are the dismissal of the suit. The order for deposit should accordingly be passed keeping in view the said consequences and plaintiff should not be left guessing as to what he is required to do. With these observations this civil revision is dismissed in limine.

H.B.T./G‑68/L Revision dismissed.