MUHAMMAD HIMAYOON Versus DIRECTOR OF INDUSTRIES AND MINERAL DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT

ORDER

1. ABDUL QADEER CHAUDHRY, J. ‑‑By letter, dated 24‑8‑1985 the petitioner was appointed for collection of royalty on daily basis on the payment of Rs.20,000 till such time arrangements for collection of royalty of the District Karachi, Thatta and Dadu jointly are finalized and implemented by the Government of Industries and Mineral Development, Karachi. The petitioner was directed to execute necessary agreement within three days and also pay up amount of 15 days in advance and also pay Rs.20,000 per day in the District Council. This licence was granted by the Chairman District Council, respondent No.2.

2. The case of the petitioner is that he deposited rupees two lacs on 25‑8‑1985 in the account of the respondent as advance and started collecting royalty and also used to deposit Rs.20,000 daily in the account of the respondent in Habib Bank Limited Karachi since 1‑9‑1985. The petitioner came to know that the respondent wanted to accommodate their own person, therefore, he filed a civil suit in the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Karachi against the respondents for permanent injunction. On 29‑8‑1985, the respondents produced a letter dated 28‑9‑1985 whereby the appointment of the petitioner as Royalty Contractor was cancelled. The petitioner being aggrieved by the order/letter, dated 28‑9‑1985 has filed the present constitution petition. The petitioner has prayed in the petition that the order, date 28‑9‑1985 passed by the respondent whereby the contract of the petitioner was cancelled be declared as without jurisdiction and of no legal effect. It is contended that the petitioner was appointed as a contractor to collect royalty and without any notice that his contract was cancelled.

3. In the counter‑affidavit filed by the respondent it is stated that the petitioner did not abide by the conditions laid down in the letter, dated 24‑8‑1985. He has failed to deposit advance amount of Rs.3 lacs and the daily amount of Rs.20,000, therefore, his licence was cancelled.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to P L D 1969 SC 223 and P L D 1962 S C 384 in support of his contention that there is violation of principles of natural justice as the contract had been cancelled without any notice to the petitioner.

5. We have gone through the record but we do not find that any principle of natural justice has been violated by the respondents. The petitioner himself violated the terms of the letter. Petitioner's contract was cancelled as he has not deposited the amount in advance which was a condition for granting him the licence to collect royalty of the District of Karachi. The learned counsel has stated that the petitioner has deposited rupees two lacs on 25‑8‑1985 and thereafter started depositing Rs. 20,000 with effect from 1‑9‑1985. The petitioner had to deposit the amount when he started realising the amount but he failed to do so. The petitioner failed to execute the agreement with the respondent No.2 which was one of the conditions. Second violation of the agreement is that he failed to deposit the amount of rupees three lacs within three days from 24‑8‑1985 and thirdly he failed to deposit Rs. 20,000 per day. According to the respondents the petitioner arranged his payment of Rs. 20,000 per day in such a manner that the said advance of Rs. 2 lacs was adjusted and exhausted in the first 8 days from 24‑8‑1985 to 31‑8‑1985, inasmuch as for these 8 days he did not A make any daily payment of Rs. 20,000 per day. He started making payments for the first time with effect from 3‑9‑1985.

6. In view of these clear violations the petitioner is not entitled to any discretionary relief. He has himself violated the terms of the agreement and no vested right of the petitioner has been infringed. The letter, dated 24‑8‑1985 makes it clear that it was granted upto such time the arrangements for collection of royalty are made by the respondents. Thus, there was no final contract between the parties. It was merely a contract for a temporary period.

7. Additionally, the grant of royalty to the petitioner is in the nature of a licence and it can be withdrawn at any time, which is not justice able in the extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court. Learned counsel for the respondents has referred to P L D 1966 Dacca 69 and P L D 1973 Note 40 Lah. Where in a distinction has been made between a licence and a lease. In the present case at the most it was a licence and in view of the conduct of the petitioner himelf he has no right to seek any relief in the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court.

8. The petition is dismissed summarily.

9. H.B.T. Petition dismissed.