ILIADIS IOAMMIS Versus M. QUEEN VASSILIKI-II
1. This judgment will govern the disposal of Admiralty Suit 395 of 1985 and 555 to 562 of 1985. The plaintiffs who are the owner ship M.V. Queen Vassiliki II, have brought these actions in rem against the vessel and owners of the ship for recovery of their unpaid was The suits are not defended and proceedings are ex parte. The plains filed their respective affidavits in ex parte proof showing the we due in Greek currency as well as their equivalent in Pak. rupees the period for which these wages are claimed. The plaintiffs besides filing their affidavit of ex parte proof also examined the Master of Ship as a witness in the cases who has supported the plaintiffs has further stated that the amount shown in their respective affidavits in ex parte proof correctly represent the amount due to them as 'wages He stated that the plaintiffs under the agreement existing between ship‑owner and Union of Seamen are entitled to wages upto the date actual payment, besides expenses for repatriation including repatriation tickets in respect of those plaintiffs who are foreign nationals learned counsel for the plaintiffs on the basis of above evidence contended that the plaintiffs are entitled to decrees in the above suits for we until actual payment is made to them. To support his above contended the learned counsel relied on the case of Vogiatzin and others Owners of Steamship Fairport (1966) 2 All E.R. 1026. The above‑c case is, however, in my opinion no authority for the proposition the plaintiffs are entitled to fraim wages upto the date they are actually paid off their dues. The question which fell for determination bet the Court in the above‑cited case was whether in an action in rem seamen's wages, judgment could be given for wages accruing after date of writ. Cairns J, who decided the above case after reviewing case‑law on the subject held as follows at page 1035 of the report:‑
2. "The rule that claims in an action can be made only in rest of causes of action that have accrued at the commencement the action is, I think, a rule of practice rather than a rule law. It is subject to exceptions. Mesne profits and interest two that occur to me. In none of the Admiralty cases to which have referred is it suggested that this rule is a ground disallowing a claim for wages and, indeed, it seems to me 1 the reasoning in The Carolina anal in The James W. Elwell inconsistent with it. The strongest reason for considering 1 the rule is not applicable in connection with seamen's action: rem against a ship is that it is well‑established that claims viaticum can be made covering expenses incurred after the c of the writ. The Raffaelluccia, and The Bridge water are two authorities to this effect, and Hewson, J's judgment in very case included the expenses of the plaintiff's repatriation which obviously had net been incurred at the date of the writ.
3. I see no reason why a different rule should apply in relation the wages. I, therefore, allow the appeal."
4. It only follows from the above‑quoted passage that in an action in rem for recovery of seamen's wages the Court has the power grant a decree for the wages which may accrue after the date commencement of proceedings. It, however, does not lay down that upto what date such wages could be claimed by a seaman. The statement of law with regard to the point of time when the right of seamen to claim his wages terminates is to be found in Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Edition) Vol. 35 under the heading "Shipping and Navigation" at page 168 paragraph 260 sub‑heading Wages which reads as follows:‑‑
5. "260. When the right to wages ends.‑‑ The right to wages no longer depends upon the earning of freight (b); but in all cases of wreck (c), or loss (d) of the ship, proof that a seaman has not exerted himself to the utmost to save the ship, cargo, and stores bars his claim to wages. Where the seaman's service terminates before the date contemplated in the agreement by reason of the wreck or 'loss of the ship or of his being left on shore at any place abroad under a certificate of unfitness or inability to proceed on the voyage, he is entitled to wages upto then but for no longer."
6. The above statement of law makes it clear that the right of a seaman to claim his wages in a case where his services are terminated before the contemplated date in the agreement of employment on account A of wreck or loss of ship or on account of seaman being left on shore at any place abroad under a certificate of unfitness, inability to proceed on the voyage extends only upto the date of termination and no longer. In the present case it is an admitted position that the Vessel M.V. Vassibki II was arrested by the Court in its Admiralty jurisdiction in Suit No. 390 of 1985 instituted by the Master of the Ship. The arrest was made on 10‑6‑1985 but before it could be made absolute, the suit was compromised and the owners agreed to pay the wages to Master of the Ship. As a result of compromise in Suit No. 390 of 1985 the ship was released from arrest. It appears that the owners did not pay the amount of compromised decree in Suit No. 390 of 1985 with the result the ship was again attached by this Court for realisation of the decretal amount. The ship was ultimately sold by public auction on 1‑9‑1985 and the purchaser was put in possession of the ship on 23‑9‑1985 by this Court after removing the plaintiffs who were until then on board the ship. In my view, therefore, the delivery of the possession of ship to the auction‑purchaser by this Court on 23‑9‑1985 after removing the plaintiffs from possession of the ship was akin to the circumstances of terminating the services of seaman by reason of his being left on shore at any place abroad under a certificate of inability to proceed on the voyage. This being so, the plaintiffs could claim wages only upto B 23‑9‑1985 when they were removed from the board of the ship and its possession was made over to the auction‑purchaser by the Court. According to the ex parte proof filed in the above cases the following amounts are shown due and payable to each one of the plaintiff both in terms of Greek currency as well as its equivalent in terms of Pak. currency upto 23‑9‑1985:‑‑
7. Suit Name of the Amount due to plaintiff
8. No. plaintiff on 23rd September, 1985.
9. ‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑
10. Greek currency Pak. currency
11. ‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑
12. Rs.
13. 395/85 Iliadis Ioammis DRCS 2674558 3,26,189.09
14. 555 / 85 Riaz Ahmad 263046 32 , 081.09
15. 556/85 Gursoy Mustafa 569501 69,456.34
16. 557/85 Amiri Aburi 354999 43,295.68
17. 558/85 Ikibudak Sedat 611950 74,633.42
18. 559/85 Chafiramdane 824229 1,00,522.96
19. 560/85 Marco Antonio Julian 541155 65,999.26
20. Ramos
21. 561/85 Kouvaris Marinos 1919342 2,34,082.95
22. 562/85 Muhammad Saleem 312112 38,065.18
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23. The above statement of account filed by the plaintiffs in the suit has been fully corroborated by the statement of the Master of the Ship and the documents filed in support of the claim and I see no reason to disbelieve the same. I, therefore, decree the suit of the plaintiffs as shown in the above statement in terms of Pak. rupees. The plaintiffs will also be entitled to the proportionate costs of the suit only to the extent of the amount of court‑fees paid by them. Out of the above decretal amounts a sum of Rs.10,000 will be deducted c from each one of the plaintiffs which was paid to them under the orders of the Court during pendency of these suits. I may mention here that the learned counsel for the plaintiffs also claimed repatriation charges including repatriation tickets for seven plaintiffs (plaintiffs in Suit No. 395 and 556 to 561/85) on the ground that they are foreign nationals and have to be repatriated to their respective countries. The contention of the learned counsel is not without force and these plaintiffs appear to be entitled to these charges. However, in these suits these charges could not be decreed as no such claim is made. I decreed all the above suits by short judgement, dated 16‑10‑1985 and these are the detailed reasons for the judgment.
24. A. A. Suits decreed.