ANWAR AHMAD Versus GHULAM QADIR

ORDER

1. I have heard First Rent Appeal No. 301 of 1988 and First Rent Appeal No. 302 of 1988 together as they arise from one impugned order. The respondents in both the appeals are the landlords of the disputed premises which consists of seven tenements with different tenants against whom one joint application for ejectment was filed before the Controller on the ground of reconstruction and bona fide personal requirement. The learned Controller has granted ejectment on both the grounds.

2. Mr. Khalilur Rehman and Mr. Nooruddin Ramzan, Advocates for the appellants have contended that the ejectment application should have been filed separately against each tenant and as this procedure was not adopted the application ,was not maintainable. No doubt a joint application may have created some difficulties in proceeding with the case particularly to the learned Controller but as it related tol the same premises in which there are seven tenements and the ground for ejectment was common in my view on this contention the ejectment, application could not have been rejected.

3. The learned counsel then contended that the Controller has framed only one issue regarding personal requirement and reconstruction and as two separate issues have not been framed the entire proceeding is vitiated. In my view the contention is misconceived, as the Controller is not bound under law to frame issues as required by C.P.C. but only points of determination are to be framed by the Controller which he has done and nothing has been shown that because of this alleged irregularity and injustice has been done to any party.

4. The learned counsel for the appellant further contended that there are other co‑owners of the premises who have not been joined as parties to the ejectment application. It is not necessary that all the co‑owners may be joined as applicants. Any co‑owner is entitled to file ejectment application.

5. The learned counsel contended that the personal bona fide requirement of the respondents has not been established from the evidence on record. From the evidence it is established the family members of respondent No.1 consist of one wife, three sons, and two daughters. Two sons and two daughters are married. Two sons have purchased one house in which the respondent No.1 is residing. Therefore even if two sons and two daughters are excluded for the purpose of the present case there remains the respondent No.1 her husband, and one son for whom premises is required.

6. The respondent No.2 is a sister of respondent No.1 who is a co‑owner. She has five sons and five daughters. Two sons and four daughters have already been married and she is residing in a house of Moosa Line Layari. If four daughters are excluded as they would be living with their husbands there remain five sons, three of whom are married and also the respondent No.1 and her husband. After ascertaining the number of family members now the question arises whether they are residing in rented houses. The respondent No.1 is residing in a house which has been purchased by his two sons. According to Mr. Khalilur Rehman the house was purchased by the respondent No.1 in the name of his two sons but there is no evidence to support this contention. The respondent No.1 with his family is residing in the house purchased by his two sons. According to the! appellant it is a very spacious house having ten rooms but if the! respondent No.1 wants to reconstruct his own house to live with his third son, wife and daughter then merely because his other sons are owning spacious house does not disentitle him from seeking ejectment on ground of bona fide personal requirement.

7. So far respondent No.2 is concerned Mr. Nooruddin Ramzan the learned counsel has contended that no rent receipt has been produced to show that she is residing in a rented house. But n g evidence has been produced on record to show that the house in which she is residing is owned by her. Therefore, the bona fide requirement of the respondent has been established.

8. The main ground of attack by both the learned counsel is that the right of the tenants i.e. appellants has not been protected by the impugned order. The learned counsel contended that as premises is required for reconstruction it was incumbent upon the respondent to reconstruct the building keeping in view the needs of the appellants and the learned Controller should have preserved the right of the tenants in newly‑constructed building. It may be pointed out that the disputed building consists of godown and residential. tenants but the respondents plan for reconstruction is for residential house. The learned counsel has referred to a case of P L D 1973 Pesh. 186 where it was held that the grounds of personal requirement ‑ and reconstruction are destructive of each other. The learned counsel has fairly referred to Dawood v. Muhammad Yasin P L D 1982 SC 227 where this judgment has been overruled. The landlord is entitled toy ask for ejectment on both the grounds namely personal bona fide requirement and reconstruction of the building and these grounds do not militate against each other. An exhaustive and instructive discussion on this aspect of the case is found in the Judgment of Dawood v. Mohammad Yasin. This view has further been followed and confirmed by the Supreme Court in Mohammad Rafiq v. Mohammad Ismail P L D 1988 SC 91. As the respondents have established personal bona fide requirement, it follows that the disputed premises on reconstruction shall be used occupied by them to the exclusion of other tenants. If the ejectment would have been on the ground of reconstruction alone, the appellants would have been justified to ask for the preservation of their right as provided under law. The respondents have also sought ejectment on the ground of personal requirement therefore the question of preservation of right of the appellant in the newly‑constructed building does not arise. However, if after the reconstruction the respondents do not occupy the premises the appellants will be entitled to claim the rights which are available to them in law. Both the appeals are dismissed in limine. At the request of the learned counsel the appellants are allowed six months' time to hand over vacant possession of the disputed premises to the respondents.

9. H.B.T./A‑392/K Appeals dismissed.