GOVERNMENT OF SIND Versus MEHO KHAN

ORDER

1. This is an appeal against the judgment of 1st Additional District Judge Dadu dated 8‑3‑1987 whereby he awarded compensation at the rate of Rs.35 per acre to the respondents plus additional amount of 15$ and interest at 6$ and thus enhanced the same as against 10,000 'per acre awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer Collector.

2. The appeal has been presented on 17‑11‑1987. An objection has been raised by the Office that the appeal was time‑barred inasmuch as the judgment was passed on 8‑3‑1987 while application for obtaining its copy was made on 8‑11‑1987 i.e. about 8 months after passing of the Judgment. The costs were deposited on the same day and the copy was delivered on the same day.

3. The counsel for the appellant has contended that a decree was not framed by the learned Additional District Judge and therefore time shall start running only from the date if and when such decree is prepared. He had stated that he had also made such application to the Additional District Judge on 9‑6‑1987 the true copy of which he has produced. The learned Additional District Judge passed an order on that application that this was a matter decided on a reference by the Land Acquisition Officer and, therefore, no decree was to be framed. Mr. Abdul Hameed Khan insists that it was necessary to frame such a decree. He has also referred to 1st Appeal No. 8/88 and submitted that a formal decree was framed by the IInd Additional District Judge Hyderabad in the matter after having passed the judgment.

4. The contention of Mr. A. Hameed Khan is not tenable. Section 26 of Land Acquisition Act was amended in 1921 and subsection (2) was added therein. Subsection (2) of section 26 of Land Acquisition Act provides that every award shall be deemed to be a decree and A the statement of the grounds a Judgment within the meaning of section 2 clause (2) and section 2 clause (9) respectively of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. No doubt the term 'award' is not defined in the Act, but if the sections in which the word 'award' occurs are referred to, it is noticeable that in all cases the word 'award' is used with reference to compensation in same form or other whether it be the amount of compensation or disposal of compensation. The first formal order to which term 'award' is applied in this Act is that of the Collector under section 11, while sections 26 and 27 of the Act provide for the form of award to be made by the Judge. Hence the award passed by the Collector under section 11 of the Act and the judgment passed by the Court on a reference by the Collector under section 18 on that award are both to be termed as award, therefore, are also a decree by virtue of the deeming provisions in subsection (2) of section 26 of the Land Acquisition Act. The reason for the amendments referred to above, was to remove the anomaly created by the decision of the Judicial Committee in 39 I A 197 and to meet the observations made in that case by their Lordships based on Lord Bramwell's dictum in (1877) 3 Q B D I, that an appeal did not exist in the nature of things, a right of appeal from any decision of any tribunal must be given by express enactment, such a right could not be implied. By the Amending Act of 1921 the awards of Courts made in Land Acquisition cases were placed in the same category as decrees, and awards are now, after the passing of the amending Act, decrees and orders of Civil Courts, and the statements of the grounds of such awards are judgment within the meaning of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the following cases it was held that an award by the Collector as well as judgment by the Court on a reference under section 18 was a decree and that it was not necessary to frame a formal decree in such a matter.

(1) Collector of Dacca v. Ghulam Kuddus Chaudhri AIR 1936 Calcutta 688. In this case it was held that the award by the Land Acquisition Judge shall be deemed to be a decree within the meaning of section 2 (2) of the Civil Procedure Code.

(2) A I R 1960 JK 59. In this case it was held that the effect of section 26(2) of Land Acquisition Act in declaring an award to be a decree within the meaning of section 2 (2) of C . P . C . is that execution can be taken out on the basis of award as if it were a Civil Court decree and it is not necessary to sue for a decree on the basis thereof.

(3) I L R (1971) 9 Calcutta 222. In this ruling it, was held that award of compensation by the Court in reference under section 18 is decree and executable. Tribunal or Court hearing the reference should not leave actual drawing up of decree to Land Acquisition Collector.

(4) A I R 1951 Patna 608. In this case it was held that even for the purpose of Limitation Act an award on reference under section 18 was a decree.

5. It is, therefore, quite clear that the appeal is clearly time‑barred and is, therefore, liable to be dismissed. Consequently I dismiss the appeal in limine.

6. A . A . / G‑56/ K Appeal dismissed.