ALI HAIDER Versus MUNAWAR JEHAN

The petitioner has felt aggrieved against the order of VIIth Civil Judge (East) Karachi, dated 10‑11‑1986, whereby he directed to petitioner to pay the decretal amount to the respondent No.l within 10 days of the direction will be sent thereafter to realise the decretal amount as Land Revenue.

2. The facts leading to this petition were that the parties were married to each other in 1979 and prompt dower of Rs.15,000 were settled. Three children were born out of wedlock. The disputes arose between the parties and respondent No. 1 filed Suit No. 593 of 1979 for recovery of prompt dower as well as maintenance. On 19‑4‑1980 an ex parte decree for dower and maintenance was passed against the petitioner. On 20th September, 1980, execution application was filed for attachment and sale of movable and immovable property of the petitioner. However, on 9‑8‑1982, the respondent made an application for transfer of the decree to the City Deputy Collector (East) for its enforcement and recovery of the decretal amount as arrears of Land Revenue. On the same date the application was allowed by the Civil Judge. However, the matter appears to have come before the Family Court Judge again on 4‑8‑1983. How this matter of execution came to be placed before the Family Judge No. XXIX is not known. None of the parties were present before him. He dismissed execution application for non‑prosecution. One does not know whether any notice of hearing of the execution application on 4‑8‑1983 had been issued to Mst. Munawar Jehan, respondent No.l and whether it is served pr not. Even the petitioner himself was not present before Court at that time. The petitioner probably came to know of the said order and he moved an application on 23‑9‑1986 before the Family Court Judge, that since the main execution application has been dismissed, therefore, all the proceedings pending thereunder are frustrated and hence the proceedings sent by the Civil Judge to Deputy Collector (East) for the purpose of adjustment and sale of the petitioner's property in execution of the decree be withdrawn. Notice was ordered to be issued on that application and affidavits and counter‑affidavits were filed. The learned Judge passed the impugned order on 10‑11‑1986 as stated above.

3. Mr. Hebibulleh Samo contended that the learned Judge has 'taken a wrong view of law that he can proceed suo motu under section 13 of the Family Court Act for execution of the decree. Section 13 (3) of the Act allows the Family Court to direct the recovery of decree for payment of money as arrears of Land Revenue. Subsection (4) provides for execution of decree by the Court passing it or by such other Civil Courts as the District Judge may direct. This subsection (4) obviously allows the execution of the decree by the Family Court and there is no condition that an application for execution of the degree must be made before the Family Court to execute the same. It, therefore, appears t8 me that the Court passing the decree, can act suo motu in respect of the execution of the decree passed by it. Section 17 of the said. Act provides specifically that except sections 10 and 11 the provisions of CPC shall not apply to proceedings before any Family Court. It, therefore, appears to me that the Family Court is not bound by the procedure prescribed under Order XXI, C.P.C. for execution of Family Court decree, and, therefore, the Family Court can adopt any reasonable' method for executing the decree passed by it. Of course the principles analogous to C.P.C. may be kept in view by the Family Court while dealing with the said matter. But suo motu execution of Family Court decree would be a very wholesome step in my view.

4. The view, therefore, taken by the Family Court is not incorrect and, therefore, this petition is hardly competent. Even from another point of view the grievance of the petitioner is not justified. The respondent No. l had got the decree transferred to the Deputy Collector on 9‑8‑1982, and, therefore, the matter to execution was not lived before the Civil Judge unless a reference was made to him by the Deputy Collector or any one of the parties made some application but that was not the case and, therefore, the method for dismissal of the execution application on 4‑8‑1983 in the absence of both the parties appears to be having no justification and, therefore, the petitioner cannot base any claim upon the said order dated 4‑8‑1983. The petition is, therefore, found to be not tenable and is hereby dismissed.

H . B . T . /S‑120/ K Petition dismissed.