ZUBAIDA ISMAIL Versus ZOHRA SULTANA

This appeal under section 21 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, is directed against the order dated 25‑4‑1988, passed by 1st Senior Civil Judge and Rent Controller (East), Karachi, whereby the application for ejectment filed by the respondent against the appellant under section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, was allowed and the appellant was directed to vacate the disputed premises within a period of 30 days.

2. The respondent is the landlady of the premises bearing No.74‑P, Block II, P.E.C.H. Society, Karachi. The appellant is in occupation of the first floor of this premises at a monthly rent of Rs.900 exclusive of electricity, gas and water charges. The respondent, who is a widow and has attained the age of sixty years, required the said premises for her own occupation. She, therefore, served the appellant with the requisite notice, but with no result. On 30‑5‑1984, the respondent filed an application for ejectment against the appellant under section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979.

3. The appellant has resisted the application of ejectment by stating that the same was not maintainable. According to the appellant, the respondent owns other properties and the present attempt to seek her ejectment was made with a view to get the rent enhanced.

4. The parties went t trial on the following issues:‑

(i) Whether the application is maintainable?

(ii) Whether the applicant requires the case premises for her personal bona fide use and that of her son?

(iii) What should the order be?

5. The respondent has examined her son and attorney Akbar Raza Bakhtiari (P.W.1). The side of the appellant was closed under the orders of Rent Controller on 4‑2‑1988.

6. On the assessment of evidence available on record, the learned Rent Controller decided all the issues against the appellant and consequently directed her ejectment.

7. I have heard Mr. Muhammad Zahid Khan, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. S. Naqi Mirza, learned counsel for the respondent.

8. Section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, where under the application for ejectment was filed lays down:‑

"14. Delivery of vacant possession .

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Ordinance or any other law for the time being in force, the landlord of a building who is a widow, or a minor whose both parents are dead or a salaried employee due to retire within the next six months or has retired or a person who is due to attain the age of sixty years within the next six months, or has attained the age of sixty years, may, by notice in writing, inform the tenant that he or she needs the building for personal use and require him to deliver vacant possession of the building within such time as may be specified in the notice, not being earlier than two months from the receipt thereof:

Provided that nothing in this subsection shall apply where the landlord has rented out the building after he has retired or attained the age of sixty years, or, as the case may be, has become widow or orphan.

(2) The landlord shall not be entitled to avail the benefit of subsection (1) if he is in occupation of a building owned by him in any locality.

(3) Where the tenant has failed to deliver the possession of the building under subsection (1), the Controller shall, on application by the landlord in this behalf, order eviction of the tenant from the building in a summary manner, by using such force as may be necessary."

9. For the purpose of this section a widow or a landlady, who has attained the age of sixty years, may seek expeditious remedy, and in case she fulfils the conditions as laid down in subsections (1) and (2), the Rent Controller will have no option, but to order the eviction of her tenant. The respondent has examined her son and attorney Akbar Raza Bakhtiari, (P.W.1), who has testified that his mother, namely, Mst. Zohra Sultana Bakhtiari is a widow and she had crossed the age of sixty years when the application for ejectment was filed. The copy of reply to notice sent by Mr. Mohammad Zahid Khan, Advocate on behalf of appellant dated 7‑1‑1984 is on record, in which such admission was made in the following words:‑

"Your client cannot avail benefit of being widow as envisaged in the law as she is in occupation of other buildings."

10. The respondent has also filed photo‑copies of her identity card and passport showing her date of birth as 23‑7‑1914, in her counter‑affidavit dated 14‑12‑1987. The copy of notice sent to the appellant under section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, dated 17‑12‑1983, is also on record, which is not disputed by the appellant. The appellant has questioned the bona fide requirement of the respondent on the ground that she wanted an increase of rent. The plea of want of bona fides is, however, irrelevant in proceedings under subsection (1) of section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. In the case reported as M.S. Baroba v. Manzoor Ahmad PLD 15,86 Kar. 407; a Division Bench of this Court observed as follows:‑

"Accordingly, we hold that in a case under section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, the question of 'good faith' or bona fide is not to be looked into, but the Controller has to see that the' landlord fulfils the conditions mentioned in section 14 which we have enumerated hereinbefore."

11. The weighty observations of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in case of Bakhsh Elahi v. Qazi Wasif Ali reported in 1985 SCMR 291, may be usefully borrowed here:‑

"The object of section 14, therefore, seems to be to relieve this class of landlords from the rigours of an elaborate inquiry as to the good faith of their plea for requirement of the premises for personal use and to put them in possession thereof in the shortest possible time. "

12. It is also alleged by the appellant that the respondent owns so many other properties in Karachi, and, therefore, she was not entitled to avail the benefit of subsection (1) of section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. There is, however, nothing on record to prove that the respondent is in occupation of a building owned by her. The appellant has led no evidence in rebuttal and, therefore, the version of the respondent to this effect has gone) unchallenged .

13. The appellant has also questioned the personal requirement of the respondent on the ground that she had filed application for ejectment after about 10 years of attaining the age of 60 years, and consequently she was not entitled to claim benefits under subsection (1) of section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, Reliance is placed upon the case of Hafiz Abdul Malik v. Mohammad Ilyas reported in 1987 CLC 419. With profound respect to my learned brother, I am unable to share the view taken by him. The delay in making application under section 14, by itself would not defeat the application of eviction, if the landlady fulfils all the requisite conditions, as the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, does not prescribe the period within which such application is to be filed.

14. An exception has also been taken to the power of attorney (Exh.A/1) executed by the respondent in favour of her son Akbar Raza Bakhtiari. It is a general power of attorney pertaining to the property in dispute, whereby the said Akbar Raza Bakhtiari has been authorised to do all acts on behalf of respondent, excepting the powers to sell the property in dispute. In a proceedings before the Rent Controller one should not expect rigid observance of rules of, procedure. The perusal of (Exh.A/1) makes it clear that the respondent had authorised her son Akbar Raza Bakhtiari to do all acts pertaining to the property in dispute, which includes appearance in Court on her behalf.

15. It is also contended on behalf of appellant that section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, provides a special privilege to specified persons for their personal benefits and consequently the same cannot be invoked by the respondent for the need of her son. In the instant case the personal need of the landlady is there in addition to the need of her son. Again the expression "personal use" should be given a fair and liberal construction and it must be interpreted to include the use of family, dependents and such persons, who may be essential for the purpose of such occupation. In determining the meaning of the language employed in any particular passage, it is obvious that the intention which appears to be most in accord with convenience, reason, justice and legal principles, should in all cases of doubtful significance be presumed to be true one.

16. Lastly it was half‑heartedly suggested that the appellant was condemned unheard and her side was closed by the Rent Controller without any just cause. Reliance is placed upon the cases reported as Latif‑ur‑Rehman Khan v. Anwar Ali and 2 others 1985 MLD 1144, Committee of Administration v . Commissioner of Faisalabad Division and others 1986 CLC 834; Imamdin v. Abdul Majid Khan 1983 CLC 2432; Azad‑Bin‑Haider v. Adam Khan PLD 1981 Kar. 225; Abdul Rasheed v. Government of Punjab 1985 CLC 199; Fazal Ahmad v. Additional District Judge and others 1985 CLC 1915 and Ibrahim Ismail v. Brig. (Retd.) S.H.A. Gardezi PLD 1981 Kar. 662. The record as it stands shows that the appellant dragged the proceedings which are summary, in nature for one reason or the other. Her side was closed on 4‑2‑1988. She came to know about this order on 8‑2‑1988 and her Advocate learnt about the next date, viz, 28‑2‑1988, but nobody appeared before the Rent Controller on this date also. The application for G reopening the side was again made on 29‑2‑1988. It was, therefore, not a case of denial of hearing, but an abuse of process of law by the appellant. The application for ejectment was filed on 30‑5‑1984 and it was dragged for about four years before the same could be) decided by the Rent Controller.

17. The evidence which is available on record shows:‑

(a) That the respondent is a widow.

(b) That the respondent has crossed the age of 60 years at the time of filing the ejectment application.

(c) That requisite notice under section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, was served upon the appellant.

(d) That the respondent has not rented out the building after she has become widow or attained the age of 60 years.

(e) That the respondent is not in occupation of a residential building owned by her in any locality.

18. In view of the above position, the ejectment of the appellant from the disputed premises was rightly ordered. The appeal has got no merits and is dismissed with no costs. The appellant is, however, allowed two months' time to vacate the demised premises.

H . B . T . / Z‑90/ K Appeal dismissed.