SHAHZADA SULTAN HAMAYUN Versus ZAINAB BAI

This appeal under section 21 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, is directed against the order dated 29‑9‑1987, passed by Mrs. Akhtar Choudhry, Ist Senior Civil Judge and Rent Controller (East), Karachi, whereby the application for ejectment filed by the appellant against the respondent in respect of Flat No.l, Hassan Manzil, Soldier Bazar No.2, Karachi, was dismissed.

2. The building known as "Hassan Manzil" is constructed on a plot of 90 sq. yards. It consists of four one‑room flats, two on the ground floor and two on first floor. The appellant had purchased this building in the year 1971, just to accommodate his expanding family. The respondent is in occupation of Flat No‑I. on the ground floor at a rent of Rs.10.60 p.m. The appellant, who is in occupation of the remaining three flats needs the flat in occupation of the respondent for his .P personal use, as the present accommodation is insufficient for his large family.

3. The respondent has contested the plea of personal requirement in the written statement filed on 20‑3‑1986. According to the case pleaded by her, the appellant is in possession of two additional rooms constructed on roof besides three flats which are admittedly in his occupation, and this accommodation was sufficient to meet his requirement as two of his sons were serving out of the country. The respondent has further pleaded that the main object of the appellant to get the flat in her occupation vacated was to dispose of the entire building for a handsome price. The allegation of mala fide was also raised by the respondent.

4. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned Rent Controller formulated the following issues:‑

(1) Whether the applicant has disconnected the water supply to the disputed premises?

(2) Whether the applicant requires the demised premises bona fide in good faith for his occupation as well as for his children?

(3) What should the order be?

5. To prove his case, the appellant has examined himself (P.W.1), Shahzada Ali Gohar (P.W.2), Shahzada Imran Humayun (P.W.3), Syed Muhammad Shafi (P.W.4), Lodhi Abdul Rashid (P.W.5), Malik Ata Mohiduddin (P.W.6), and Shahzada Sultan Faridoon (P.W.7). In rebuttal the respondent has examined her son and attorney Abdul Hamid (D.W.1), Haji Naseeruddin (D.W.2), Khursheed Khan (D.W.3) and Shaikh Ahmad (D.W.4).

6. On the assessment of evidence, both oral as well as documentary, the learned Rent Controller decided all the issues against the appellant, giving rise to this appeal.

7. Admittedly the family of the appellants consists of the following members:‑

(1) Shahzada Sultana Humayun aged about 50 years Applicant.

(2) Mrs. Saeeda Begum aged about 48 years Wife.

(3) Shahzada Sultan Faridoon aged about 30 years Son.

(4) Mrs. Rubina Faridoon aged about 24 years Daughter‑in‑law.

(5) Shehzada Ali Gohar. aged about 27 years Son.

(6) Shehzada Imran Hamayun aged about 22 years Son.

(7) Miss Khalida Sultan, aged 18 years Daughter.

The appellant has proved his genuine need through his own evidence and the evidence of his three sons, namely Shahzada Ali Gohar (P.W.2), Shahzada Imran Humayun (P.W.3) and Shahzada Sultan Faridoon (P.W.7). Their evidence was further corroborated by Syed Muhammad Shafi (P.W.4), Lodhi Abdul Rashid (P.W.5), and Malik Ata Mohiuddin (P.W.6). The evidence which has come on record establishes that the eldest son of appellant, namely, Shahzada Sutan Faridoon, who was married in January, 1986, while employed in Dubai has returned to Pakistan. The evidence adduced by the appellant also proves that the marriages of his two other sons, namely, Shahzada Ali Gohar Humayun and Shahzada Imran Humayun could not be performed for want of accommodation. The need of the appellant to occupy flat No.l, in possession of the respondent is, therefore, genuine. When the family expands, more accommodation is required by it.

8. It is the case of the appellant that he had purchased this building in 1971, just to accommodate his expanding family. Quite admittedly he was occupying only one flat when he purchased this building. He got possession of two other flats from Mst. Fatima and Mst. Hajiani through the process of law. A landlord has got every right to seek additional accommodation, if the existing accommodation is not suitable for his requirements. The only requirement to see ejectment of the tenant on this ground is that the demand of possession must be honestly made.

9. The learned Rent Controller has erred in holding that the accommodation with the appellant was sufficient to accommodate his family even after the marriage of his two sons. The inspection reports which are on record clearly show that there was no construction on the second floor. On the face of these reports, the finding of learned Rent Controller, "that there are two rooms with asbestos sheets on the second floor" is completely against the evidence.

10. The issue of disconnection of water supply, which was casually mentioned by the respondent in the written statement was again given much more importance than it deserved, although there was no connection between the two issues. There is no satisfactory evidence on record to prove it, and even if it is accepted for the sake of arguments the respondent had a legal remedy, which she quite admittedly did not avail.

11. Lastly a feeble attempt was made to make out a case of payment of Pugree. Abdul Hamid (D.W.1), who is attorney of respondent, states that a sum of Rs.9,000 was paid by the respondent when this flat was taken on rnt in the year 1952. Haji Naseeruddin (D.W.2), Khursheed Khan (D.W.3) and Shaikh Ahmad (D.W.4) also speak of prevalent system of Pugree in that area. The case reported as Muhammad Hanif v. Mumtaz Ahmad PLD 1986 Kar. 16, was referred in an attempt to show that the landlord by accepting Pugree relinquishes the right to eject the tenant. Admittedly the appellant had not accepted any Pugree from respondent. Even otherwise this question was examined by Supreme Court in the case of Skaikh Muhammad Yousuf v. District Judge Rawalpindi and two others reported in 1987 SCMR 307, and was resolved in the following words:‑

"According to lease agreement the shop had been let out to the tenant petitioner for a fixed period of ten years with right of re‑entry reserved by the respondent landlord, but it is not mentioned in the lease‑deed that the respondent‑landlord had received Rs.11,000 as Pugree from the petitioner‑tenant, although it is so stated by him in his statement before the Rent Controller page 134 of the (paper book). However, that being mutual arrangement between the parties, would not debar the respondent‑landlord from instituting eviction proceedings on the ground of bona fide personal need. Even if it is accepted that the respondent was inducted as tenant by the previous landlord on payment of Pugree that would not debar the appellant from seeking her ejectment on the ground of a personal requirement.

12. The case of the appellant further gets support from the judgments reported as Zafar‑ul‑Hassan v. Ali Muhammad 1985 CLC 2076 Mirza Azeemuddin v. Syed Fakhr‑e‑Alam 1986 CLC 685, Guriomal v. Holaram 1986 CLC 710, Mst. Shahnaz Khan (Wahid Khatoon) v. Imtiaz Ahmad 1986 CLC 2048, and Syed Zahid Hussain Tirmizi v. Muhammad Anwar 1987 CLC 1402.

13. As observed in Allied Bank of Pakistan v. Abdul Majeed reported in 1985 CLC 1518, the words of landlord normally should be believed and he should not be denied the use of his own property unless there are substantial grounds to show that the plea of personal requirement is not genuine.

14. The Rent Controller should have taken an objective view of the facts conclusively proved and not rebutted from other side. The growing needs of a E landlord are to be kept in view and not the difficulties and hardships of the tenant. There should be no display of emotion or sentiment. A judicial officer has to deal with hard facts. Emotion has no place in judicial decisions.

15. In this view of the matter, the finding of learned Rent Controller cannot be sustained. The impugned order is, therefore, set aside, and the respondent is directed to vacate the demised premises within a period of two months. The appeal is accepted, but the parties are left to bear their own costs.

H.B.T./S‑359/K Appeal accepted.