MUHAMMADBUXBALOUCHV. MARKET COMMITTEE, KARACHI Versus MARKET COMMITTEE KARACHI

AJMAL MIAN, CJ.‑‑The above petition is directed against the order dated 18‑6‑1988, passed by respondent No 2, stating therein that the petitioner was wrongly promoted by the Market Committee from NPS Grade‑10 to NPS Grade 15 and that he had been reverted . to its original grade. It was further ordered that the question of claiming refund of the excess amount from the petitioner would be settled later on.

2. The brief facts leading to the filing of the above petition are that petitioner was appointed by respondent No.l as a clerk in 1970. His services were regularised in 1971. He was promoted as Sub‑Inspector in NPS Grade 15 in the year 1982. The impugned order was passed on 14‑5‑1983. The petitioner, being aggrieved by the above order, has filed the present petition.

3. In support of the above petition, Mr. Rizwan Ahmad Siddiqui, learned counsel for the petitioner, has contended that in 1982, when the petitioner was promoted to NPS Grade 15, the power to appoint and to promote was vested in respondent No.l under Section 16 of the Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and not in respondent No.2, as the notification dated 14‑5‑1983, containing the rules, cannot be made applicable to the petitioner retrospectively. 1n support of his above submission, he has referred to the case of Muhammad Akbar v. The State reported in PLD 1958 (W.P.) Lah. 118, in which a learned Single Judge of the erstwhile High Court of West Pakistan held that an employee of a Market Committee could be dismissed by the committee only and not by the Deputy Commissioner.

It seems that under Section 16 of the Act, it has been provided that subject to such rules as may be made by the Government in this behalf, a Market Committee may employ such persons as may be necessary for the management of the Market and may pay such persons such salaries as it may think fit: It also, empowers the Market Committee to control and punish such employees. The notification dated 14‑5‑1983 has been issued by respondent No.3 in exercise of the power contained in section 27 read with section 16 of the Act, providing the rules including as to the authority competent to appoint. Under clause (b) of Rule 2, the "appointing authority" has been defined as means in relation to a post below Grade‑17, the Director‑General, and in relation to a post in Grade‑17, the Chief Secretary. After the enforcement of the above rules, the position is that the "appointing authority" upto grade below 17 is the respondent No.2 and from Grade‑17, the Chief Secretary. However, the above rules cannot be made applicable retrospectively. Admittedly the petitioner was promoted by respondent No.l in 1982, when under Section 16 of the Act, the power was vested in the A above respondent No.l and not in respondent No.2. In this view of the matter, the impugned order cannot be sustained.

4. The petition is, therefore, allowed and the impugned order is declared as being without lawful authority and of no legal effect. However, there will be no order as to costs.

H.B.T./M‑952/K Petition allowed.