MUMTAZ BEGUM Versus IFTIKHAR HUSSAIN RIZVI

ORDER

1. These are proceedings under section 14 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance and the present appeal arises from the dismissal of the landlady's application based on the ground that she had attained the age of 60 years and therefore was entitled to evict the respondent who was a tenant of and occupying a garage which was being used as a shop.

2. It is an admitted position that the appellant is in occupation of the ground‑floor of the same building which floor she is putting to residential use. In consequence she cannot seek eviction under section 14 of another portion of the same building for the same purpose namely, residential.

3. Now there were two main grounds on which the eviction application seems to have been plausibly resisted. The first was that the landlady had let out another two garages to another tenant after she had attained the age of 60 years. In this context reliance was placed on the proviso to subsection (1) of section 14 which runs thus:‑‑

4. "(1) Provided that nothing in this subsection shall apply where the landlord has rented out the building after he has retired or attained the age of sixty years or, as the case may be, has become widow or orphan."

5. In this behalf the landlady seems to have supported her case, asserting that in the first place the letting out in question took place before the insertion of the above‑quoted proviso and in the second on the ground that the words "the building" occurring in the proviso refer to the letting out of the same tenement after the relevant entitlement under section 14 arose. The controversy obviously involved questions of fact and law, which do not seem to have been duly approached by the learned Controller.

6. Another aspect of the case was that in view of subsection (2) of section 14 of the Ordinance the landlady would have been disentitled to claim eviction of another portion of the same building which she was occupying as owner if and only if she was asking for eviction to utilize of the premises for the same purpose for which she was already utilizing the premises in her continuing possession. Thus, to put it more clearly, if the landlady was occupying a portion of the same building for residential purposes she could seek eviction of another portion of the same building provided that she required it for a commercial purpose or vice versa. This seems to be settled law in so far as interpretation of section 14 (2) of the Ordinance is concerned.

7. On this point as well, involving an intermingled factual and legal dispute the finding of the learned Controller is not clear cut and specific.

8. In such circumstances and by consent I admit this appeal to regular hearing and allowing it remand the case back to the learned Controller for decision on the above questions and/or any other relevant question (s) either on the basis of the same record or such additional evidence as the parties may choose to lead before the learned Controller.

9. Appeal disposed of.

10. H.B.T./M‑1957/K Order accordingly.