KALB-I-ABBAS Versus CHAIRMAN, UNION COMMITTEE

ORDER

This writ petition arises out of a matrimonial matter. The petitioner husband claimed that he married the respondent‑lady on 17‑10‑1982 without knowing that she had been divorced by her previous husband only a week ago i.e. on 9‑10‑1982. He thought that his marriage with her having taken place during her Iddat period was void and apprehending action on account of adultery, he further clamed to have pronounced divorce upon her on 10‑12‑1982. However, on his own showing he did not inform the Chairman of the Union Committee, respondent No. 1, of the said divorce till 7‑3‑1983 and in the meantime brought a suit against her for jactitation that their marriage being in the first instance void and in the alternative on account of his having pronounced Talaq upon her, he was no more her husband.

2. On the receipt of his notice on 7‑3‑1983, respondent No. 1, the Chairman, gave notice to the respondent‑lady who stated before him on 12‑8‑.1983 that she had become pregnant. The latter's reaction to this disclosure was that the divorce dated 7‑3‑1983 had become conclusive on 4‑8‑1983 when the period of 90 days had elapsed and that disclosure by her as late as 12‑6‑1983 could not stop the divorce from becoming operative. The Chairman, however, did not accept this version and held that the pregnancy seemingly having taken place during the continuance of their marriage the divorce will be deferred till she would deliver the child. This is how the respondent‑Chairman refused to give a certificate which presumably the petitioner was seeking for taking another wife.

3. Aggrieved by those proceedings, the petitioner brought the present writ petition basically for the relief that his divorce had become final on 4‑6‑1983 and that the respondent‑Chairman had no authority to defer its effectiveness till the delivery of the child by the respondent‑lady.

4. It seems that conceptually the petitioner was not prepared to accept the pregnancy of the respondent at all. Counsel for him stressed before me that the respondent was not at all pregnant. To make it sure, he suggested to call in the lady who in fact appeared before me and made a statement on 20‑12‑1983 that she was expecting a baby in the first week of February, 1984. This disillusioned the petitioner and he started taking the second line, namely, that any such pregnancy was of no effect against him especially because of his divorce initially pronounced on 10‑12‑1982 and in the alternative his second divorce dated 7‑3‑1983 having become final for all purposes on 4‑6‑1983.

5. Counsel for the respondent‑lady objected to the maintainability of the very writ petition and the fishy type of relief sought by the petitioner by his non committal attitude towards pregnancy. He urged that his so‑called divorce dated 10‑12‑1982 which he never communicated to the respondent‑Chairman and then his second divorce dated 7‑3‑1983 could be sorted out in his own suit for jactitation which was still pending and that bringing the present writ petition during its pendency was not visualized. According to him, the petitioner was rather making frantic efforts to get rid of his own suit or at least the evidence, particularly of the lady conceiving of him, by all these devious proceedings.

6. There is ample force in the contention that the questions whether the very marriage was void because of the lady's iddat or that the petitioner had effectively divorced her on one date or the other, were ‑such as called for evidence and could be best settled in the suit for jactitation brought by the petitioner. A There was no idea of resorting to the extraordinary measure when the precise relief sought for by him could be obtained from the Family Court. The writ petition is not maintainable and is accordingly dismissed in limine.

M.Y.H./3033/L

Petition dismissed.