AMIR Versus RAJAB ALI

ORDER

The facts giving rise to this civil revision are that the petitioner, Amir, and respondents Nos. 1 and 2, namely, Rajab Ali and Fazal agreed to refer a matrimonial dispute to arbitration. Respondents Nos. 3 and 4, namely, Hakam Ali and Warayam were appointed as arbitrators. They gave an award. Thereupon, respondent No. 1 made an application, under section 14 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, for making the award as rule of the Court. The application was opposed by the petitioner and respondent No. 2 by filing objections to the award. The plea raised by respondent No. 1 was that the objections were time barred. Thereupon, the following issues were framed by the Civil Judge, Samundri, District Faisalabad, before whom the application was submitted:‑‑

(1) Whether the objections of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 are within time? OPR

(2) If issue No. 1 is proved, whether the Arbitrators misconducted the Arbitration proceedings and as such the award is liable to be set aside? OPR

(3) Relief.

It was held by the learned Civil Judge that the objections were time‑barred. At the same time, it was found by him that the arbitrators had mis-conducted the proceedings. He, therefore, set aside the award and dismissed the application. His order was challenged by respondent No. 1 by taking an appeal before the District Judge, Faisalabad. The view taken by the learned District Judge was that since the objections were time‑barred, the learned Civil Judge should have made the award a rule of, the Court without looking into any other matter. He, therefore, accepted the appeal, set aside the order of the learned Civil Judge and made the award a rule of the Court. Feeling aggrieved by the order of the learned District Judge the petitioner has come up in revision to this Court.

2. It was contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that no notice of filing of the award was given to the petitioner and respondent No. 2, and therefore, there was no limitation for them for presenting objections.

3. In reply, it was urged by learned counsel for respondent No. 1 that the objections of the petitioner and respondent No. 2 were time‑barred because they had knowledge of the award before respondent No. 1 had made application for making the same as rule of the Court but they did not file objections within 30 days of the making of the said application nor within the period initially allowed by the trial Court for the purpose elaborating his argument, it was pointed out, by learned counsel for respondent No. 1 that vide order, dated the 29th May, 1975, passed by the learned trial Court objections were required to be filed by 17th June, 1975. The objections were not submitted on 17th June, 1975 and, therefore, the case was adjourned to 15th July, 1975 for filing of objections. On this date, the petitioner and respondent No. 2 did file their objections. Learned counsel for respondent No. 1 relied on Sh. Mahboob Alam v. Sh. Mumtaz Ahmed P L D 1960 (W.P.) Lah. 601, to support his arguments.

While commenting on the arguments of learned counsel for respondent No. 1 it was urged by learned counsel for the petitioner that the learned trial Court had itself extended time for the filing of the objections and that they were submitted before it within the extended time. It was also maintained by him that even if he had not allowed such extension the objections could not be thrown away on the ground of limitation because the period of limitation was to run from the date of service of notice of filing of the award but no such notice was given to the petitioner and respondent No. 2. It was further submitted by him that the award was filed in Court on 22nd October, 1978, i.e. long after the filing of objections on 15th July, 1975. According to him, the order of the learned Civil Judge requiring them to file the objections was premature and was, therefore, of no legal effect. In this connection, he invited my attention to Chhotelal v. Jamnadas A 1 R 1963 Medhya Pradesh 20.

5. The provisions relating to limitation for making application for setting aside an award are contained in Article 158 of the Second Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908. According to those provisions, the period of limitation is 30 days and it is to run from the date of service of notice of filing of the award. This A aspect of the matter was, however, not attended to by the two Courts below by determining the date of the filing of the award or the date of service of notice of filing of the award. What was observed by the learned Civil Judge was that the objections were to be filled within 30 days from 29th May, 1975 when he had directed the petitioner and respondent No. 2 to put in their objections.

6. As for the case of Sh. Mahboob Alam, cited by learned counsel for respondent No. 1, it has not been laid down therein that even if the awards not filed before the Court and the notice of its filing has not been given, the period of limitation would run from the date of the knowledge of the award or from the date on which objections are invited by the Court. On the other hand, it was clearly ruled in the said case that the person on whom notice of filing of the award has not been served, can make grievance of it and can rely on it. The case of Sh. Mahboob Alam is, therefore, of little help to learned counsel for respondent No. 1.

7. In view of the above discussions, I hold that the appeal was not properly decided by the learned District Judge. It will therefore have to be sent back to the, learned appellate Court for fresh decision.

8. Accordingly, I accept this civil revision, set aside the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge and remand the appeal to him with the B direction that he shall re‑decide the question of limitation in the light of above observations and according to law. The learned District Judge shall also decide issue No. 2 on which the finding has been recorded by the learned trial Court but was not adjudicated upon by him. Having done this, the appeal shall be decided afresh. There shall be no order as to costs. The parties are directed to appear before the learned District Judge on 17th April, 1982.

MA.K./3198/L

Case remanded.