ALLIED BANK OF PAKISTAN LIMITED Versus MESSRS SAFETY SEALERS (EASTERN) LTD.

1. Petitioner through this Constitutional petition has assailed the orders, dated 9‑12‑1986, 3‑5‑1987 and 4‑2‑1990 passed respectively by the Assistant. Commissioner/Collector, Toba Tek Singh, Commissioner, Faisalabad Division Faisalabad and the Member Board of Revenue declining his claim to the vacancy of Lumbardar fallen vacant because of the demise of his father on 30‑6‑1986.

2. Facts in brief are that Rehmat Ullah Lumbardar the father of the petitioner died on 30‑6‑1986. Consequent upon his death 5 persons including the petitioner applied for the vacant post. Two of the applicants withdrew their candidatures in favour of respondent No.4 Abdul Rehman while the third one showed no interest. The Assistant Commissioner, Toba Tek Singh through his order, dated 9‑12‑1986 after considering the respective merits of the contesting candidates appointed respondent No.4 as a Lumbardar. Aggrieved with this appointment, the petitioner filed an appeal which was dismissed by the Commissioner, Faisalabad Division Faisalabad on 3‑5‑1987. The revision against this order was also dismissed by the learned Member, Board of Revenue through his order, dated 4‑2‑1990. Hence this Constitutional petition.

3. The only point urged by the petitioner is that all the forums in the revenue hierarchy have wrongly applied Rule 17 of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Rules, 1968 and have not correctly applied Rule 19 thereof, On this bass it is argued that the petitioner being the son of the deceased Lambardar was the rightful claimant to the post and respondent No.4 being a stranger p could not have even been considered.

4. I have considered the contentions. In this case Muhammad Akhtar the elder brother of the petitioner who is a fugitive from law being deserter from the Army, did not come forward to contest the claim. The Revenue Authorities in the peculiar facts of this case invited applications and finding the respondent No.4 being highly suitable for the post appointed him against the vacant post. The argument of the learned .counsel that the Revenue Authorities could not have invited the applications and the petitioner should have been appointed straightaway being son of the deceased Lambardar has got no force. Office of Lambardar is essentially an administrative requirement and cannot be considered as hereditary in stricto senso. It does not devolve automatically upon the son of the deceased Lumbardar, particularly in this case when the elder son is fugitive from law. The Revenue Authorities shall have to appoint the person best suited for the job after study of the comparative merits of the candidates. The rules are directory in nature and it is left to the Revenue Authorities to appoint the most suitable person. Petitioner has got no vested right to this post. In 1976 SCMR 75 "Ghulam Hussain v. Ghulam Muhammad and another" while interpreting rule 19(2) of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Rules, 1968 it has been held that "on its proper construction far from conferring any right much less a legal right, the rule at best is directory which provides a guideline for the choice of the successor Lambardar, the whole object being to appoint a person in the opinion of the appointing authority the most fit person from among eligible under Rules. It would be wrong to impart greater efficacy to the above rule. Moreover, fitness cannot be judged by any objective standard: it is primarily a subjective process, in which the opinion of the appointing authority is the crucial factor. Even on general principles, the appointment rests in the discretion of the graded hierarchy of Revenue Officers created by the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, who because of their experience and training are better qualified to make the choice than the Courts of general jurisdiction. In such cases, the matter is not to be approached as if it were a dispute relating to property or franchise." In 1982 SCMR 202 Abdul Ghafoor v. The Member (Revenue) Board of Revenue and another it has been held "that no one has a vested right to be appointed as Lambardar and the relevant authorities select the persons best suited for the purpose with a view to facilitate the performance of administrative functions entrusted to Lambardars". Similarly, in 1982 CLC 357 Masood Ahmad v: Member (Revenue), Board of Revenue and others it has been held "that the matter of appointment of a Lambardar is essentially an administrative measure and there is no vested right in any person to lay claim to that office. On a conjunctive reading of the rules governing the subject of appointment of Lambardar it emerges that these do not confer any legal right on a person but are of directory nature to provide a guideline to the statutory authorities to choose a successor Lambardar. The manifest object underlying these rules is to appoint a person who in the opinion of the Appointing Authority is most suitable from amongst the eligible candidates and the scrutiny of such an appointment is left with the hierarchy under the W.P. Land Revenue Act, 1967. Otherwise also, in. the nature of things, the selection or choosing of a successor Lambardar should be left to the hierarchy of Revenue Officers who on account of their experience, training and knowledge about local affairs are in a better position to make a suitable choice. The subject of appointment of a Lambardar is therefore not such which may appropriately fall for determination in the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court." In the case in hand there appears no comparison of the petitioner with respondent No.4 who excels in every respect. All the three forums below have found him most suitable to deliver the goods. Resultantly, in the exercise of my Constitutional jurisdiction, I am not inclined to interfere in this matter. Reliance is also placed upon Abdul Waheed v. M.B.R. (1979 SCMR 719), Muhammad Shat v. M.B.R. (1972 SCMR 253), Muhammad Warryam v. M.B.R. (1972 SCMR 354), Muhammad Ramzan v. M.B.R. (1989 SCMR 614) and Haji Ahmad Yar v. Allah Ditta etc. (PLD 1989 SC 373). In view of what has been stated above, this writ petition is dismissed with no order as to costs.

5. H.B.T./M‑230/L Petition dismissed.